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The Marne Miracle 


Illustrating the Principles of War 


By Col. William K. Naylor, G. S. 
United States Army 

Formerly Director of the General Staff School 
and a Director of the Army War College 



Washington: 

United States Infantry Association 

1923 




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Copyright 1923 by 
United States Infantry Association 


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Contents 


Page 

Preface. 5 

Bibliography. 7 

Foreword. 9 

The German Plan .’. 19 

German Order of Battle and Plan of Concentration 29 

The French Plan. 35 

The British Plan. 47 

The Belgian Plan. 51 

The Operations. 53 

Charleroi and Mettet . 73 

Mons. 83 

The Retreat from Mons to the Sambre . 89 

Le Cateau. 97 

St. Quentin-Guise. 101 

Crossing the Marne. 109 

Battle of Nancy . 119 

Battle of the Ourcq and Marne. 127 

The Decisive Day . 153 

The Von Heutsch Incident. 163 

The Retreat . 171 

Conclusions and Final Comments. 175 

Sketches 

General Map 

Sketch No. 1—Initial Concentration. 

Sketch No. 2—Attack on Liege. 

Sketch No. 3—From Mons and Charleroi to St. Quentin 

and Guise. 

Sketch No. 4—Battle of the Ourcq-Marne, and Battle 

of Nancy—September 6, 1914, 6 p. m. 
Sketch No. 5—Position of the Armies on the morning 

of September 9, 1914. 
























This battle is referred to by the French as the 
‘‘Miracle of the Marne/’ by the Germans as the 
“Tragedy of the Marne Basin.” The former appel¬ 
lation is preferred since the Allied victory seems to 
have been gained because of Divine intervention, 
for on the 9th of September there were fully as 
many reasons for the Allies to withdraw as there 
were for the Germans. 

This study does not pretend to be a final analysis 
of the Battle of the Marne, nor of the preliminary 
movements leading up to that battle. From the 
meagre amount of information that is available, the 
author has been able to check the movements to his 
own satisfaction as they were probably made. The 
accompanying sketches also were prepared by the 
author, and bear only the names of places men¬ 
tioned in the text. Any conclusions drawn are based 
upon the best available data. Since the Battle of 
the Marne, a great many German writers have been 
making contributions; and inasmuch as they all 
seem to agree upon the salient points, it seems but 
just to give full credit to their versions. 

There can be no question that a great injustice 
was done Lieutenant Colonel von Hentsch by at¬ 
tempting to make him the scapegoat of the Marne. 


5 


6 


The Marne Miracle 


In judging the actions of von Kluck, one will make 
a grave error in interpreting his orders unless one 
takes into consideration all the orders that were 
issued to him, commencing with the 17th of Au¬ 
gust. It will be noted in reading these orders that 
there is one expression common to all of them that 
is “to afford the necessary flank protection for the 
armies.” That was undoubtedly von Kluck’s mis¬ 
sion, and that is wherein he failed if at all. 


Bibliography 

In preparing this study, extensive quotations have 
been made from the following works: “Die Marne- 
schlacht 1914” and “Deutsche Heerfuhrung im 
Marnefeldzug 1914,” by A. Baumgarten-Crusius; 
“The March on Paris 1914,” by von Kluck; “Mein 
Bericht Zur Marneschlacht,” by General Fieldmar- 
shal von Bulow; “Erinnerungen an der Marnefeld¬ 
zug 1914,” by General and Baron von Hausen; “Der 
deutsche Generalstab im Vorbereitung und Durch- 
fuhrung des Weltkrieges,” by von Kuhl; “Bis zur 
Marne,” by von Tappen; “Marneschlacht und Tan- 
nenberg,” by von Francois; “Maubeuge, Aisne and 
Verdun,” by von Zwell; “von LudendorfFs Own 
Story;” “Out of My Life,” by von Hindenburg; “My 
Memoirs,” by von Tirpitz; and many other German 
writers and participants. Extensive quotations and 
verifications have also been made from the works of 
General Maurice, entitled “Forty Days in 1914;” 
“Germany in Defeat,” by de Souza; “Gallieni parle,” 
by Gallieni; “Military Operations—France and Bel¬ 
gium 1914,” by Edmonds; “1914,” by Viscount 
French; Nelson’s History of the War; “The French 
Plan 17;” “The Briey Investigation;” “The Pomp 
of Power,” Anonymous; “Military History of the 
World War,” by Frothingham; “Belgian Gray 


7 


8 


The Marne Miracle 


Book;” “English Blue Book;” “History of the World 
War,” by Simonds; Repington’s “First World War, 
1914-1918;” “Le Plan de Campaigne de Fran^aise;” 
“Les Archives de la Grande Guerre;” Laurenzac’s 
“Account;” Brossard’s “Le Secret de la Frontiere;” 
“Histoire de la Guerre, 1914-1915,” by Cornet; “Les 
Erreurs de haut Commandment,” by Percin, and 
many others. To all these writers, credit is given, 
and their works are recommended to the reader who 
desires to study this campaign in more detail. 

Note: It must be remembered that many French 
military papers, including plans, etc., were de¬ 
stroyed by the French Government in August, 
1914. 


Foreword 


It is not the purpose of this study to go into a 
discussion of the causes of the World War, nor who 
was responsible for starting it, since were that done 
this book would be prolonged to a tiresome extent, 
and would be off the subject. 

In looking for an alibi for the Germans and trying 
to find a reason for their defeat, one is prone to 
attribute it to the defective plan of von Moltke and 
to think that had the Germans followed out the von 
Schlieffen plan they would have prevailed. 

With reference to the plan of von Moltke, a con¬ 
dition confronts us, for it was actually tried, or at 
least an attempt was made to try it, and it failed. 
The other plan was never tried, so it is still in the 
realm of theory, and admirers of that plan can con¬ 
tent themselves with thinking that had it been tried, 
it would have succeeded. 

It might have succeeded, and again it might have 
failed. Who can tell? It must be admitted, how¬ 
ever, that the von Schlieffen plan looks considerably 
better than the plan of von Moltke, for it was sim¬ 
pler and easier of execution, but the failure of Ger¬ 
many was due in great part to many other causes 
than a defective plan, for a plan alone never wins 
a war. 

Germany’s failure to win in 1914 cannot be 
attributed to the inefficiency of her fighting force, 


9 


10 


The Marne Miracle 


for no troops could have marched and fought better 
than they. Where, then, lay the fault? In detail, 
it will be disclosed by a study of the text with the 
accompanying sketches. 

As a preliminary, reference is made to an extract 
from “Die Marneschlacht 1914,” by Baumgarten- 
Crusius, which indicates wherein the major difficulty 
lay. 

“The causes of the Marne disaster do not lie, 
however, exclusively in a single person, they lie 
in the autocratic imperial power of the 25 years 
preceding the war.” 

The vainglorious megalomaniacal Kaiser, whose 
pride and vanity made him consider himself the All 
Highest and junior partner “mit Gott” and most 
learned in all subjects, would not tolerate those 
minds who at times would not go along peacefully 
with his. “But you must obey orders.” “You are 
too independent by nature,” he said to von Francois. 1 

“Is it any wonder then,” says Baumgarten-Cru- 
sius, “that ‘iron heads/ men who went their own 
way, even contrary to orders and ‘higher and the 
highest wishes’ had become impossible in the Army? 
‘Hindenburg disappeared, Ludendorff had to leave 
the General Staff.’ 2 ‘Why should they be annoyed 

1 "Marneschlact und Tannenberg,” von Francois, p. 177. 

3 Ludendorff when relieved from Operations (same as G-3) 
was assigned to the command of the 39th Fusiliers at Dussel- 
dorff, later he was assigned to command of a brigade at 
Strassburg and at the outbreak of war he was assigned as 
Oberquartiermeister of von Bulow’s II Army. 



Foreword 


11 


with such strong characters ?’ ‘Only no strong utter¬ 
ances, disturbing to the internal peace. This was 
the watchword of the Royal Prussian Cabinet, of 
the General Staff and of the War Ministry,’ etc.” 

From the above quotation, it would seem that 
positive characters were not wanted by the Kaiser 
in the seats of the mighty. Upon the retirement of 
Count von Schlieffen as Chief of the Imperial Gen¬ 
eral Staff (1906), several names were suggested to 
the Kaiser as possible successors and from this 
group he chose von Moltke over the protest of the 
latter. Von Moltke was a man of “noble, aristo¬ 
cratic character, richly developed on the side of the 
heart, of deep, tender, almost weak sensibility, full 
of unselfishness and modesty; he was free from per¬ 
sonal ambition.” He was not in good health and 
his physical condition reacted upon him, causing him 
to brood, to be over-pessimistic and look on the dark 
side of things. He went to Carlsbad twice during 
the exhausting period of tension before the outbreak 
of the war. It is said of von Moltke: “He knew 
how to handle the Kaiser more skillfully and better 
than anyone else, especially in regard to renouncing 
startling personal interference.” 

There is a story to the effect that one of the rea¬ 
sons that the Kaiser selected von Moltke was on ac¬ 
count of his name, thinking that the name von Moltke 
in the minds of other nations might recall Count 
Helmuth von Moltke of 1870 and act as a bogey. 
It must be borne in mind that the Chief of the 


12 


The Marne Miracle 


Imperial General Staff was really the Army Com¬ 
mander; and when we imagine von Moltke in that 
capacity, we see that he did not possess the self- 
confidence, the fiery spirit, the strong nerves, and 
the force of character necessary for command. 

Before proceeding to a discussion of the plans 
and operations of the respective armies, the reader’s 
attention is called to certain accounts of incidents 
in connection with this campaign which are exag¬ 
gerations if not inaccuracies. 

For example: Many writers claim that von 
Leman’s stand at Liege saved France. Just what 
credit should be given the defenders of Liege is 
hard to determine, but clearly they and they alone 
did not save France. The stand made by the Bel¬ 
gians at Liege greatly contributed to the success 
of the British and French by delaying the German 
advance sufficiently long to enable these troops to 
concentrate and deploy for battle in the angle of the 
Sambre and Meuse. 

Many accounts refer to the von Schlieffen plan 
as being the one carried out by the German Army. 
The following are a few illustrations: 

“The plan of campaign which was inaugurated 
in August, 1914, was conceived by General Count 
von Schlieffen. ... It was planned by him, in 
event of France not respecting Belgium’s neutrality, 
or of Belgium joining France. On this assumption, 


Foreword 


13 


the advance of the German main forces through 
Belgium followed as a matter of course.” 3 

Von Tirpitz, in his book, “My Memoirs,” also 
refers to the plan as follows: “The Schlieffen plan 
of attacking through Belgium.” The following 
reference is taken from FrothinghanTs “The Mili¬ 
tary History of the World War:” “The movement 
of these German armies had been turned to follow 
the Schlieffen plan of a wide envelopment sweeping 
through Belgium against the Allied left.” Maurice, 
in his book, “Forty Days in 1914,” in general terms 
refers to the plan as being that of von Schlieffen. 
All these writers have in mind the wide turning 
movement through Belgium which was the distinc¬ 
tive feature of the von Schlieffen plan, in fact the 
main feature. 

In the plan carried out it was only one of several 
features. 

Popular writers endeavor to picture the German 
Army as an overwhelming colossus; an Attiline 
horde; the last word in military efficiency; rushing 
in a resistless torrent over the weaker armies of 
Belgium, Great Britain and France. 

This is absolute buncombe. 

Let us analyze : Bear in mind that continental 
divisions are all about the same strength. In the 
French plan before the war, France figured that the 
Germans would be able to mobilize 25 active corps 


*von Ludendorff’s Own Story, p. 28. 



14 


The Marne Miracle 


and 35 to 40 Reserve and Ersatz (replacement) 
divisions, of which 3 or 4 corps would be sent to the 
Russian front with about double the number of 
Reserve and Ersatz divisions. This would leave 21 
or 22 active corps and in the neighborhood of 28 
Reserve and Ersatz divisions to be used in France. 
As a matter of fact, Germany had 22 corps and 13 
Reserve corps plus 2 Reserve divisions on the West 
Front. To this must be added 10 cavalry divisions, 
6 Ersatz divisions and 27 Landwehr brigades and 
certain heavy artillery and pioneer units. A total 
of 72 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, 6 
Ersatz divisions and 27 Landwehr (second line) 
brigades. 

We are only indirectly concerned with the East 
Front, so no strengths there are stated. 

France estimated that she could have 22 active 
corps, with 15 or 16 reserve divisions, which would 
be increased by the Alpine corps when Italy declared 
her neutrality, and troops from Morocco, Algeria, 
Senegal, and Tunis would also be used on the front 
in France if the African Colonies were quiet. At 
the outset, France actually had 10 cavalry divisions, 
45 active and 21 reserve infantry divisions. Great 
Britain sent at the outset 2 corps of two divisions 
each and a cavalry division. A fifth division joined 
before Le Cateau and a sixth just before the Marne. 
Belgium had 6 infantry and one cavalry divisions. 
The equivalent of 66 French, 6 British and 6 Belgian 
infantry divisions — total 78 infantry divisions. 


Foreword 


15 


France, in addition, had 10 cavalry divisions as 
shown, which with those of Great Britain and Bel¬ 
gium, brought that total up to 12. France also had 
about 6 Territorial divisions available at the outset. 

Marshal Joff re stated that toward the end of 
August, 1914, the Allies had on the Western Front 
83 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions opposed to a 
German force of 85 infantry and 10 cavalry divi¬ 
sions. Reginald Kann, in the Revue de Paris of 
July 15, 1919, counting only active and reserve 
divisions, estimates the strength of the German con¬ 
centration in the west at 70 divisions, and this 
estimate agrees with the number of enemy units 
shown on the French official maps for August and 
September, 1914. It is certain that the Allies were 
at least equal in strength, and it is altogether proba¬ 
ble that the Allied armies had a considerable supe¬ 
riority in numbers over the Germans throughout 
the first Marne campaign. 

Recapitulation 

Infantry Cavalry 
Divisions Divisions 

Germany. 72 10 

Allies. 78 12 

Certain French writers give Foch credit for deal¬ 
ing the left wing of the II and right wing of the III 
German Armies the knockout blow at Fere Cham- 
penoise, that started the retreat to the Aisne. As 
a matter of fact, Foch’s IX Army had been driven 




16 The Marne Miracle 

back all along the line, particularly on the right, 
when the German Army Command No. 3 was 
informed of the withdrawal of the II German 
Army, and was compelled, thereby, to fall back 
itself. When Foch countered with the 42d Division, 
the German retreat was already under way, so all 
the 42d Division did, at the most, was to speed up 
the Germans. Greater credit is due Marshal Foch 
for his indomitable spirit and his unwillingness to 
admit defeat in the face of facts indicating the 
contrary. Marshal Foch’s attitude aptly illustrates 
the aphorism; no one is defeated until he is willing 
to admit it. 

Answering the Joffre-Gallieni dispute as to who 
is entitled to the credit for the Maunoury envelop¬ 
ment, all one can say is that Joffre conceived the 
idea and Gallieni saw the opportunity. 

Finally, as to the von Hentsch incident, facts and 
investigation show that von Hentsch did not exceed 
his authority and order the retreat of von Bulow’s 
II Army—he did not have to do so, since von Bulow 
did it himself and admits it in his own report. 

Before commencing to trace the movements, the 
reader is cautioned to keep in mind that the change 
from the von Schlieffen plan to the von Moltke plan 
was all done prior to D day and H hour, and what¬ 
ever vacillation was shown by the German High 
Command was with reference to carrying out the 
provisions of the von Moltke plan, which contem¬ 
plated protecting everything and was not an attempt 


Foreword 


17 


to change from the von Schlieffen plan to the von 
Moltke plan at the eleventh hour, as so many writers 
would like to have us believe. As a matter of fact, 
von Moltke tried, about the 17th of August, to 
switch back from his plan to the plan of von 
Schlieffen. 

Most all of the commanders, however, were indoc- 
trined with the von Schlieffen idea, which fact 
exerted a sub-conscious influence over them. 

The preceding statement may seem gratuitous, 
but it is given for the reason that many writers give 
the impression that the reason for the German fail¬ 
ure was that they had not the courage to carry out 
the von Schlieffen plan and at the eleventh hour lost 
their nerve and tried to switch to the von Moltke 
plan. As a matter of fact, this change from one 
plan to the other covered a period of eight or nine 
years in its evolution. 

The German failure was not due to the defective 
plan so much as it was due to defective command 
and execution. 

As Napoleon and Foch have said, everything is in 
the execution; so, had the Germans had a von 
Schlieffen in command in 1914, they would have 
won, von Moltke plan or no von Moltke plan. 







The German Plan 

The German plan provided that the bulk of the 
forces namely the I, II, III, IV, and V Armies con¬ 
sisting of 27 corps, seven cavalry divisions, re¬ 
inforced by certain landwehr formations, was to 
advance through Belgium and Luxemburg into 
northern France. This advance was to be a wheel 
pivoting on the Metz-Thionville line. 1 

The V Army, commanded by the German Crown 
Prince, which formed the left flank of these forces, 
was to rest its left on Thionville. 

The task of protecting the left flank of the forces 
making the wheel was assigned to the VI and VII 
Armies, commanded respectively by Prince Rup- 
precht of Bavaria and General von Herringen, 
which were to operate in conjunction with the fort¬ 
resses of Thionville and Metz and the Nied position. 
The latter was a fortified line constructed by labor 
troops along the Nied between Metz and the Saar 
and was to be garrisoned by a considerable number 
of landwehr brigades and by heavy artillery. 

The fortress section Metz-Thionville was to be 
under control of the commander of the V Army 
and the Nied position under that of the Governor 
of Metz. This was a very unfortunate arrange¬ 
ment, as it proved later on, for the Germans. 

The VI Army (five corps, four Ersatz divisions 
and the 3d cavalry corps of three divisions) was 

1 See General Map and Sketch No. 1. 

19 



20. The Marne Miracle 

to concentrate southeast of Metz in the area Cour- 
celles-Saarburg-Sarreguemines; the VII Army 
(three corps, two Ersatz divisions and one reserve 
division) at Strassburg and on the Upper Rhine. 
The VII Army was to be placed under the orders 
of the commander of the VI Army, who was to 
advance with both armies toward the Moselle be¬ 
low Frouard and toward the Meurthe (river), with 
the object of containing the French forces concen¬ 
trating there, so as to prevent their transfer to the 
French left wing. But if the French assumed the 
offensive with superior forces and advanced between 
Metz and the Vosges (Mountains), he was to retire 
and prevent an envelopment of the Nied position 
and the consequent threatening of the left flank of 
the main German forces by the French. 

The VII Army was, in addition, to protect Upper 
Alsace and Baden while the strategic concentration 
was in progress. It was considered probable that 
the French would launch an offensive from Bel¬ 
fort. If this was made with inferior forces, the VII 
Army was to hurl it back “in order that the coun¬ 
try would not be left at the mercy of every hostile 
enterprise.” But if this offensive was made with 
superior forces, the VII Army was to retire on 
Strassburg and to the right bank of the Rhine, and 
the Governor of Strassburg was to hold the line 
Fortress Emperor William II-Breusch position- 
Strassburg. 2 


J Part of the line of defense of Strassburg. 



The German Plan 


21 


The mission assigned to the commander of the 
VII Army in Upper Alsace and southern Baden 
was expressly designated as a transitory one. His 
most important task was to cooperate closely with 
the VI Army in carrying out the mission assigned 
to both armies in common. This cooperation was 
not to be deferred beyond the time when the VII 
Army might perchance be forced to retire on Strass- 
burg and to the right bank of the Rhine. 

These directives were based upon the expecta¬ 
tion that the French might launch a vigorous of¬ 
fensive between Metz and the Vosges, coupled with 
a secondary advance from Belfort into Upper 
Alsace. It was expected that the German forces 
in Alsace-Lorraine would keep considerable French 
forces from joining the French left wing. The re¬ 
tirement of the VI Army in face of a vigorous 
French offensive in Lorraine, was to be in the 
nature of a retrograde movement toward the Saar, 
designed to draw the French on until they could be 
attacked from the north from Metz and the Nied 
position and from the south by the VII Army. 

The transitory mission of the VII Army was by 
no means easy. If the French advanced from Bel¬ 
fort, it was impossible to determine immediately 
whether they did so with a large or small force. An 
advance by the VII Army on Mulhausen might 
prove a thrust in air and interfere with its co¬ 
operating with the VI Army in carrying out the 
principal mission assigned to both in common. 


22 The Marne Miracle 

As soon as the left wing of the German Army 
had succeeded in accomplishing its mission on the 
left flank it was to be transported from that 
vicinity around to reinforce the right wing Armies. 
Rail transportation sufficient for transporting six 
corps was assembled in and about Strassburg for 
the accomplishment of this purpose from the very 
beginning. 

The von Schlieffen and von Moltke Plans 

Compared 

The principal difference between the von Schlief¬ 
fen plan and the von Moltke plan is this: von 
Schlieffen expected with a powerful right wing, ad¬ 
vancing through Belgium, to swing around and 
completely turn the French, his left flank being on 
a restricted defensive and falling back in the event 
of the French making a determined attack between 
Metz and the Vosges. In other words, enticing the 
French on with the left wing in order to make the 
movements of the right wing easier. The von 
Moltke plan contemplated pinning the French right 
to the ground by a strong offensive with the Ger¬ 
man left; that is, “To contain the French by ad¬ 
vancing” or if the French advanced in force into 
Lorraine, for the VI Army, in that vicinity, to fall 
back, drawing the French after it, the latter then 
to be pinched off by an offensive from Metz and 
Alsace. By this activity von Moltke hoped to con- 


The German Plan 


23 


tain superior French Forces in Lorraine, thereby 
weakening the French left. 

To justify von Moltke’s concentration of 23 divi¬ 
sions in Alsace-Lorraine, this condition had to re¬ 
sult. Von Schlieffen, on the other hand, welcomed 
an advance into Lorraine in force, but if it did not 
come, his plan would not be vitally affected. As a 
matter of fact, Joffre turned the tables on von 
Moltke and with inferior numbers contained 
superior German forces in Lorraine. 

It does not appear that the two plans were so 
dissimilar—their difference lay in distribution and 
execution. While von Moltke retained the idea, in 
general, of a great strategic turning 'movement 
through Belgium, he increased the German left 
wing instead of the right. The forces in Alsace- 
Lorraine were doubled, being eight corps, with 
certain war garrisons and landwehr troops. 

“Von Schlieffen gave serious consideration to the 
participation of England in the war and, as far as 
I could learn, it was his wish to meet the English 
danger by occupying all northern France north of 
the Somme, in connection with the attack against 
the Allied Army. Then we would have been mas¬ 
ters of the coastal strongpoint of Dunkirk, Calais, 
and Boulogne, could have carried a submarine war¬ 
fare much more easily and efficiently and would 
have possessed a splendid base line and a good sup¬ 
port for offensive movements in the partly swampy 
lowlands of the Somme. The economic side of the 


24 


The Marne Miracle 


war would also have received considerable support. 
It must be deeply regretted that General von Moltke 
dropped this sound strategically significant idea.” 
(von Francois.) * * 3 

There is considerable discussion among German 
Military writers on the subject of whether or not 
von Moltke actually made his right weaker in his 
plan than von Schlieffen did in his. It was not a 
question of strengths. It was a question of propor¬ 
tions. Von Ludendorff on this subject says: “But 
the proportion was altered to the disadvantage of 
the right wing. That is correct. I expressed my 
concern about this to Moltke on the General Staff 
tour. He considered, however, that he must protect 
Baden, and that the 15th and 14th Corps would 
still reach the right wing in time.” 4 

Von Ludendorff also states: “The substantial ad¬ 
dition to the left wing was doubtless made because 
the Great General Staff had at least some inkling of 
the French plan, and someone in authority wished 
to spare German soil from the horrors of invasion.” 
If von Moltke knew of the French plan there is 
some slight extenuation in his thinking that he 
would find the French masses in Lorraine and that 


9 When the German 4th Reserve Corps passed through 

Amiens on August 31st, 1914, it was but 50 kilometers from 

the coast. 

4 Both plans contemplated shifting the 15th and 14th Corps 
around to the right and railroad trains were massed at 
Strassburg for that purpose. When the shift w'as fianlly 
made, it was too late. 



The German Plan 


25 


he could pin them to the ground by hitting them 
such a hard tactical blow that they would find it 
impossible to withdraw, and thereby the movements 
of the German Right Wing would be facilitated. 

It would seem from a study of the operations 
that what von Moltke intended to do was to strike 
the French in Lorraine a severe blow at the outset; 
nail them to the ground in a major tactical battle, 
and meanwhile, under cover of this, to carry out 
the von Schlieffen turning movement around the 
French left. Von Moltke always retained the idea 
of the turning movement through Belgium but, he 
made its success contingent upon the offensive 
operations by the left. The change in attitude of 
von Moltke on the 18th of August, may be explained 
as follows: 

By the 17th, the French offensive in Lorraine 
had sufficiently developed to show its weakness. 

The reconnaissances toward Verdun about Au¬ 
gust 12th and toward Dinant on August 15th, 
particularly the latter, developed strong French 
detachments. Also, reports arriving at German Gen¬ 
eral Headquarters at Coblentz pointed to large 
French concentrations along and to west of the 
Meuse about Mezieres and Hirson. Von Moltke’s 
“victory castle in Lorraine” collapsed like a deck 
of cards, and he decided, before it was too late, to 
revert to the von Schlieffen turning movement 
through Belgium as a main movement. So the IV 


26 The Marne Miracle 

and V Armies were ordered to resume their former 
role as the left wing of the offensive mass and the 
VI and VII Armies were again given the responsi¬ 
bility of protecting the left flank of the wheel. 

It looked for the moment as if von Moltke had 
definitely abandoned his Lorraine offensive idea, but 
not so. (For confirmation of this, see articles in 
the Army Quarterly, July, 1921, by Captain G. C. 
Wynee, K.O.Y.L.I., page 316.) 

This estimate reconciles the von Moltke concen¬ 
tration to the south with his order of August 17th 
to von Kluck which reads as follows: 

“The main forces of the German Army are to ad¬ 
vance through Belgium and Luxemburg into France. 
Their advance is to be regarded as a wheel pivoting 
on the area Thionville-Metz. Should Belgium offer 
resistance to the advance through its territory, 
Liege is to be taken by the II Army, so as to free 
the main roads which are covered by that fortress. 

“For this purpose the 11th Infantry Brigade of 
the 3d Corps and the 14th Infantry Brigade of the 
4th Corps (I Army) have been placed under the 
orders of the general commanding the 10th Corps. 
As soon as the 9th Corps, temporarily allotted to 
the II Army, has moved forward, the I Army is to 
advance toward Aix-la-Chapelle. 

“When Liege has been taken and as soon as the I 
and II Armies are in position on the roads of ad¬ 
vance level with Liege, the general advance of the 


The German Plan 


27 


main forces will be ordered by the Supreme Com¬ 
mand. n etc. 5 

From a careful study of the General Staff maps, 
on which are indicated the movements of the Ger¬ 
man troops from day to day, one notices two distinct 
concentrations—one to the South toward the Lor¬ 
raine frontier, and the other to the North toward 
Liege. These maps were kept from day to day and 
show all the movements in detail. A glance at the 
map indicating the movements on August 17th 
shows the shifting of the troops toward the North, 
whereas prior to that time the center of gravity was 
toward the South. This incident confirms one in 
the belief that about August 17th von Moltke dis¬ 
covered that the main French forces were not in 
Lorraine and tried to make the wide turning move¬ 
ment through Belgium the main operation. That 
explains the order to the assault wing which uses 
the expression, “the main forces of the German 
Army are to advance through Belgium and Luxem¬ 
burg into France.” 

Summary 

The plan as actually executed was to turn the 
strong French Eastern fortified line by an envelop¬ 
ment through Belgium and Northern France with 
a major tactical battle by the left wing in Lorraine 
to contain the French masses in that vicinity. After 
August 17th, a reversion to the main idea of the 

6 “The March on Paris, 1914, 1 ” von Kluck, pp. 9-10. 



28 The Marne Miracle 

von Schlieffen envelopment pivoting on the Thion- 
ville-Metz line, and later, after the French Lorraine 
offensive had failed, a vigorous offensive by the 
German left against the Gap of Mirecourt to facili¬ 
tate this envelopment by the right. 


German Order of Battle and Plan 
of Concentration 

The German concentration march was completed 
on August 16th. 

I Army 

Composition: The I Army under General von 
Kluck consisted of the 2d, 3d, 4th and 9th active 
Corps; the 3d, 4th, and 9th Reserve Corps; 1 the 2d 
Independent Cavalry Corps consisting 2d, 4th and 
9th Divisions; three Landwehr Brigades; four bat¬ 
talions of Heavy Artillery; one Pioneer Regiment. 

Concentration Area: Space back of Aix la Cha- 
pelle. 

Objective: The section of the Meuse north of 

Liege. 

II Army 

Composition: The II Army under “Generaloberst” 
von Bulow consisted of the Guard, 7th and 10th 
active Corps; the Guard, 7th and 10th Reserve 
Corps; the 1st Independent Cavalry Corps consist¬ 
ing of the Guard and the 5th Cavalry Divisions; 
two Landwehr Brigades; four Howitzer Batteries; 

1 The 9th Reserve Corps did not arrive until after opera¬ 
tions began being held in the north to meet the reported land¬ 
ing of the 80,000 Russians—the 9th active Corps on August 
16th, passed from the II to the I Army. 


29 



30 


The 


Marne Miracle 


one-10 c.m. gun Bn.; two Heavy Coast Artillery 
Mortar Batteries and two Pioneer Regiments. 2 

Concentration Area: On the left of the I Army. 

Objective: Its objective was the Belgium Section 
of the Meuse south of Liege. The preponderance of 
heavy guns was for the purpose of fortress reduc¬ 
tion. It was the main striking force of the assault 
wing. 

Ill Army 

Composition: The III Army under General and 
Baron von Hausen, ex-Minister of War of Saxony 3 
consisted of the 11th, 12th, and 19th active Corps, 
the two latter being Saxon Corps; the 12th Reserve 
Corps (Saxon) ; one Landwehr Brigade; two Howit¬ 
zer Batteries; one Pioneer Regiment. 4 

2 The Guard Reserve Corps was withdrawn for service on 
the East Front after Namur, August 26th. 

3 There is a story published by some to the effect that the 
Saxon Army and Hausen were not in the original contem¬ 
plated line, but were after-thoughts. This is entirely incor¬ 
rect. The story gained credence from the fact that Baron 
von Hausen in his book on this campaign gives a copy of 
the order placing him in command and the late date creates 
the idea that he, Hausen, and his army were not contemplated 
at first. It was the practice in the German Army to reserve 
formal notification to prospective Commanders of Armies un¬ 
til mobilization had been ordered and, while commanders 
might have had a pretty good idea as to their assignments, 
they were not officially certain until they got their letters of 
assignment. As a matter of fact, all Army Commanders 
were similarly notified, but Hausen was the only one who, 
to date, has published his letter of assignment in a book, as 
far as known. 

4 The 11th Active Corps was withdrawn with the Guard 
Reserve Corps for service on the East Front after Namur, 
August 26th. 



German Order of Battle 31 

Concentration Area: Assembled in the space 
about Prum. 

Objective: The Meuse on both sides of Dinant. 

Cavalry Corps 

The two Independent Cavalry Corps, No. 2 on 
the right and No. 1 on the left, under the Cavalry 
Generals von der Marwitz and von Richthofen, 5 
respectively covered the front of Armies I to III. 

IV Army 

Composition: The IV Army under Duke Albrecht 
von Wurttemberg consisted of the 6th, 8th and 18th 
Active Corps; the 8th and 18th Reserve Corps; 
one Landwehr Brigade; two Howitzer Batteries and 
one Pioneer Regiment. 6 

Concentration Area: Joining the III Army on the 
south and to the north of Treves. 

Objective: Northern Luxemburg. 

V Army 

Composition: The V Army under the German 
Crown Prince consisted of the 5th, 18th (Wurttem¬ 
berg) and 16th Active Corps; 5th and 6th Reserve 
Corps; 33d Reserve Division (Metz); 4th Cavalry 
Corps (3d and 6th Divisions) ; five Landwehr Brh 
gades (seven others were in the Nied position) ; 
four Heavy Howitzer Batteries; and two Pioneer 
Regiments. 


6 Father of the Ace. 

6 The 6th Active Corps passed to the V Army, August 28th. 



32 


The Marne Miracle 


Concentration Area: In the space between Treves 
and Thionville. 

Objective: To turn to the left around the pivot 
Thionville with the right wing from Bettenburg to 
Florenville. 

VI Army 

Composition: The VI Army under Crown Prince 
Rupprecht of Bavaria consisted of the three Bavar¬ 
ian Active Corps and the 21st Active Corps; 1st 
Bavarian Reserve Corps; 3d Cavalry Corps consist¬ 
ing of the 7th, 8th, and the Bavarian Cavalry Divi¬ 
sions; 7 Guard, 4th, 7th and 8th Ersatz Divisions 
(eleven Brigades) ; six Landwehr Brigades; four 
Battalions of Heavy Artillery and two Pioneer Regi¬ 
ments. 

Concentration Area: In the space between Metz 
and the Vosges. 

Mission: See VII Army. 

VII Army 

Composition: The VII Army under “General- 
oberst” von Herringen consisted of the 14th and 
15th Active Corps; 14th Reserve Corps; one Reserve 
Division (Strassburg) ; 19th (Saxon) and the Bava¬ 
rian Ersatz Divisions (six Brigades) ; and two 
Landwehr Brigades. 


7 The 8th Cavalry Division, Saxon, was transferred to the 
East Front the latter part of August. 



German Order of Battle 


33 


Concentration Era: In the Strassburg Area and 
south of it. 

Mission: To the VI and VII Armies, with the 
Crown Prince of Bavaria as the Commander-in- 
Chief, was assigned the task of “advancing against 
the Moselle below Frouard and the Meurthe in order 
to detain the French troops assembled there and to 
prevent their transfer to the left wing of the French 
Army. ,, 

Summary 

The Ersatz Divisions assigned the respective 
armies arrived on or after August 18th and 20th. 
It will be noted that none of these Ersatz organiza¬ 
tions were placed in rear of the assault wing. Von 
SchliefTen contemplated having them in rear of right 
wing for replacements, etc. 

The German High Command went to Coblentz on 
August 16th, the day when the railroad transporta¬ 
tion of the Western Army came to an end. The 
rail movements of mobilization and concentration 
of the Armies worked without the slightest friction. 

The Germans contemplated a vigorous offensive, 
in fact the spirit of the offensive was a habit of 
thought with the German Army and that spirit 
permeated it in every department except the High 
Command where it was thought that it existed in 
fact whereas it existed only in fancy. The offensive 
spirit and the desire of von Moltke to be safe every¬ 
where were inconsistent. History shows that com- 


34 


The Marne Miracle 


manders with the true offensive spirit, after esti¬ 
mating the situation to the best of their ability, 
have come to a clear cut decision and then have 
stuck to that decision meanwhile evaluating sub¬ 
sidiary dangers to their own satisfaction and, after 
making what seemed to them to be reasonable ar¬ 
rangements to meet these dangers, have concen¬ 
trated their whole attention on their main activity. 

Napoleon's 1805, 1806 and 1809 campaigns, and 
Lee’s 2d Manassas Campaign are good illustrations. 

Moltke did not have the true offensive spirit. 


i 


The French Plan 1 


The French objective was the Main German 
Army. Joffre stated at the Briey Inquiry, in re¬ 
sponse to the question as to why that valuable region 
had not been seized that “it was impossible” since 
the German Main Army was the objective. 

The French Plan, called Plan 17, contemplated 
the offensive as shown by the following extract 
therefrom: “It is the Commander-in-Chief’s inten¬ 
tion to advance all forces united to the attack of 
the German Armies.” The action of the French 
Armies was to be developed into two main actions 
as follows: 1. On the right, in the country between 
the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle 
below Toul. 2. On the left north of the line Verdun- 
Met z. 

These two operations were to be closely connected 
by forces operating on the Hauts de Meuse and in 
the Woevre. 

Before passing, it is desired to call attention to 
this illustration of the Principle of the Objective— 
the first principle of strategy. The hostile main 
army is the objective. The French, as much as the 
Germans, were also indoctrinated with the prin¬ 
ciple of the offensive. In order to be true to the 
offensive spirit and retain the initiative, the French 
main advance was against and into a geographical 


1 General Map and Sketch No. 1. 


35 



36 


The Marne Miracle 


area. Not on account of any economic value of that 
area but because, by moving in that direction, it 
was estimated they would strike the Main German 
Army. They advanced in the decisive strategical 
direction for had the attacks by the I and II Armies 
been successful the Germans in Belgium and Luxem¬ 
burg would have had to pause until this threat at 
their communications was removed, and might have 
been forced to fall back to assist in meeting it. 

The French Plan contemplated two eventualities: 

1st.—Operations limited to the territories of the 
two belligerents. 

2d.—Operations extending also into the neutral 
territories of Luxemburg and, in particular, Bel¬ 
gium. 

Whether or not the second eventuality should 
become an actuality depended upon the action of 
Germany, for France did not contemplate a viola¬ 
tion of the neutrality of either Belgium or Luxem¬ 
burg. 

Whichever eventuality materialized, the actions of 
the I, II, and III French Armies were to be identical. 

The V Army was to be the maneuver wing, but in 
case of the first eventuality, it was to be prepared 
for a strong offensive against Thionville (Dieden- 
hofen). 

In case of the second eventuality, the V Army was 
to move northward for an advance into Belgium- 
Luxemburg by way of the Neufchateau and Floren- 


The French Plan 


37 


ville District. It will be seen from this that the 
French did not expect much German effort west of 
the Meuse. In either of the two eventualities there 
was to be echelonment in depth to the left rear. 

The 4th Group of the Reserve Divisions (GDR) 
billeted in the Bourgogne-Vervins-Sissone Area on 
the left was to form a part of the Mass Maneuver 
in rear of the left. 

The Sordet Cavalry Corps, consisting of the 1st, 
3d, and 5th Divisions, in the first eventuality was to 
cover the left of the 2d Corps, left corps of the V 
Army advancing from Montmedy. 

In the second eventuality, it was to move into 
Belgium. 

Should the second eventuality materialize, the IV 
Army in reserve was to pass from the second to 
the first line between the V and III Armies prepared 
to advance toward Arlon. 

France figured that at the outset she would have 
to meet Germany single handed. She did not con¬ 
template that Russia could contribute very much 
during the early stages. In this she calculated 
erroneously, for Russia, quite contrary to the 
expectations of all, including the Germans, advanced 
rapidly into East Prussia which caused von Moltke 
to make that unfortunate switch of the Guard 
Reserve Corps, 11th Army Corps and 8th Saxon 
Cavalry Division to the East front thereby relieving 


38 The Marne Miracle 

the pressure to that extent against the Allies on the 
West front. 2 

There was also a rumor that the Russians were to 
land about 80,000 men off the north coast of Ger¬ 
many which resulted in holding the 9th Reserve 
Corps in that locality until the rumor was exploded. 

France had an understanding with Great Britain 
whereby the latter agreed to assist France in the 
event of Germany being the aggressor and vio¬ 
lating Belgium’s neutrality. Just what form this 
assistance would take, and when and where troops 
would land if sent, was not written into the agree¬ 
ment, but it was generally understood that if an 
Expeditionary Force were sent to the Continent it 
would take position on the left of the French being 
concentrated in the area about Cambrai. 

As to Belgium, France had agreed to assist her, 
but no definite plan for cooperation between the 
armies of the two countries had been determined 
upon. 

France was not entirely sure as to the attitude of 
Italy in event of War with Germany and so, as a 
part of her plan, left the Alpine Corps in the Alps 
to await developments. France must have been 
reasonably sure as to the Italian attitude in event 
of war as evidenced by the leaving of but one corps 
to oppose Italy. As soon as Italy declared her 
neutrality these troops were moved north. 

2 Tannenberg was over before the G. R. and 11th Army 
Corps even left Aix-la-Chapelle. 



The French Plan 


39 


The British and Belgian plans will be discussed 
in detail later. 

The French strategic deployment and general dis¬ 
tribution to carry out her plan was as follows: 

I and II Armies, to operate between the Rhine 
and the Moselle below Toul extending west via the 
Marne-Rhine Canal and the line Vaucoulers-Gondre- 
court. 

V Army, with the Cavalry Corps, north of the line 
Verdun-Metz. 

III Army, to link up these operations. 

IV Army, to be provisionally in the second line 
ready to move either to the south or to the north 
of the III Army. An alternative detrainment of 
this army was arranged. 

Reserve Groups (GDR), one in the rear of each 
wing of the general front, were at the disposal of 
the Commander-in-Chief. 

FRENCH ARMY DISTRIBUTION AND 

MISSIONS 

I Army (Dubail) 

Composition: 7th, 8th, 13th, 14th, and 21st Army 
Corps; 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions; five regi¬ 
ments of Heavy Artillery: First reserve group at 
Epinal (58th, 63d, and 66th Divisions) under 
G. H. Q. 

Mission: To attack in the general direction Bac- 
carat-Saarebourg-Sarreguemines. 


40 


The Marne Miracle 


Right of the main body to follow the crest of the 
Vosges. 

Extreme right to advance into the plains of Alsace 
so that the right of the whole front would rest on 
the Rhine. 

To be ready to move out on the 12th day of mobili¬ 
zation (in this case the 13th August). 3 

As a preliminary this army was, as soon as pos¬ 
sible, to be in position to drive the enemy back from 
the eastern slopes of the Vosges north of the 
Schlucht. 4 

A special group of the I Army, consisting of the 
7th Army Corps and the 8th Cavalry Division, was 
to move into Upper Alsace on orders given by the 
Commander-in-Chief any time after the 4th day of 
mobilization for the purpose of driving out any 
enemy who might “attempt to advance on the east¬ 
ern slopes of the Vosges, and to assist the removal 
of that part of the population of Alsace that had 
remained faithful to the cause of France.” 

II Army (De Castelnau) 

Composition: 9th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 20th Army 
Corps; 2d and 10th Cavalry Divisions; one regiment 
and 17 batteries of Heavy Artillery; Second Group 
of Reserve Divisions (59-65-70). 

Mission: To attack in the general direction of 


’The first day of mobilization was August 2d. 

4 A brook running west to east through Colmar. 



The French Plan 


41 


Chateau Salins-Saarebruck. At first to occupy 
covering positions along the front Luneville-Grand 
Couronne de Nancy and from this line to advance 
on the 12th day of mobilization. 

The Group of Reserve Divisions to detrain north 
of Nancy to oppose hostile operations from Metz 
and assure protection of the left flank of the II 
Army. 

Ill Army (De Ruffey) 

Composition: 4th, 5th, 6th Army Corps; 7th Cav¬ 
alry Division; one regiment and ten batteries of 
heavy artillery; 3d Group of Reserve Divisions 
(54-55-56). 

Mission: Connecting link between the two main 
operations. 

To drive back on Metz and Thionville any hostile 
advance coming from that direction and be prepared 
to invest Metz. 

Reserves and Heavy Artillery to protect the Hauts 
de Meuse. 

To be prepared for a general offensive from the 
line Domvere en Haye-Vigneules-Hatton Chatel 
(near Vigneules)-Ornes on the 12th day of mobili¬ 
zation. 

Certain Corps from the III and V Armies (namely 
the 4th and 2d) were charged with holding the 
Hauts de Meuse until completion of the mobilization. 


42 


The Marne Miracle 


IV Army (Langle De Cary) 

Composition: 12th, 17th and the Colonial Army 
Corps; 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions; three heavy 
batteries; 52d and 60th Reserve Divisions. 

Mission: To be provisionally in the second line 
ready to march either to the South or to the North 
of the III Army. In event of the second eventuality, 
to move into the front line between the III and V 
Armies and attack toward Neufchateau. 

V Army (Lanrezac) 

Composition: 1st, 2d, 3d, 10th, 11th Army Corps; 
one cavalry division; 17 heavy batteries; 4th Re¬ 
serve Group (51st, 53d, 69th Divisions) under 
G. H. Q. 

Mission: If operations were limited to the terri¬ 
tories of the two belligerents, the V Army was to 
be the maneuver wing prepared for a strong offen¬ 
sive beyond Thionville. If the operations extended 
into the neutral territories of Luxemburg and 
Belgium, then the V Army was to move northward 
into the angle formed by the Rivers Sambre and 
Meuse prepared for an advance into Belgium-Lux- 
emburg via Neufchatel and the Florenville district. 

In any event, to be deployed in depth and so dis¬ 
posed that it could march either to the east, or to 
the northeast and cross the line of the Meuse when 
ordered. 


The French Plan 


43 


Grand Division of Reserve 

1st Group on the Right. 

1. To deploy facing east in the event of a viola¬ 
tion of Swiss territory or 

2. To move northward as a part of the I Army 
to cover its right and assist in the investment of 
Neuf Brisach and Strassburg. 

4th Group on the Left. 

To be able to deploy facing east or southeast or 
facing northeast so as to support the III, IV, or V 
Armies. 

Cavalry Corps (Sordet) 

Composition: 1st, 3d, and 5th Cavalry Divisions. 

With the 4th GRD, to constitute the bulk of the 
mass maneuver of the left wing. 

Mission: Responsible for the initial covering 
arrangements. Its function in either of the two 
eventualities has already been given. In the second 
eventuality, the 145th and 148th Infantry Regi¬ 
ments were to be under its orders as support and 
were to be used respectively to delay the hostile 
advance through Belgium-Luxemburg and, to occupy 
the Meuse bridges between Namur and the French 
frontier. 

Summary 

The idea gleaned from some writings is that the 
retirement of the French Armies was a part of the 
foregoing preconceived plan. That they, so to 
speak, of their own volition lured the Germans on 


44 The Marne Miracle 

until a propitious time arrived to strike them a blow. 
A careful study of the Plan 17 shows that the 
French entertained no other idea than an offensive 
a l’outrance against the Main German Armies. The 
withdrawal to the south of the Marne was forced 
upon the French after they became convinced that 
their offensive would not succeed. In proof of this, 
one needs but read Joffre’s order of the night of 
August 25th. The following instructions were 
issued to his Army Commanders after it had been 
seen that the contemplated offensive must be aban¬ 
doned : “It being impossible to execute the offensive 
movement which had been perfected, the subsequent 
operations will be carried out in a manner to consti¬ 
tute on our left, by the united strength of the IV 
and V Armies, the British Army and new troops 
gathered in the eastern region, a massed force cap¬ 
able of taking the olfensive, while the other armies 
will for the necessary time hold in check the efforts 
of the enemy.” The point is that Joffre’s original 
idea was an offensive but when it became apparent 
to him that such action was impossible, he quickly 
changed his plans and from then on he clearly 
intended falling back waiting for the propitious 
moment. It is clear that Joffre had not decided upon 
the Marne or any other place for this offensive, he 
was merely awaiting his time and Gallieni, in his 
conversation over the phone, “Coup de telephone/' 
called Joffre’s attention to the fact that von Kluck 
was turning southeast at Meaux and suggested that 


The French Plan 


45 


the time had come. Naturally not having had a 
chance for a counter-attack before reaching the Isle 
of France, JofTre was bound to do it then, for a 
further withdrawal meant the loss of Paris with its 
resulting influences. Notwithstanding articles to 
the contrary, it is believed that the handling of the 
French retirement by Joffre will stand as one of the 
most brilliant illustrations of defensive warfare of 
this kind. 

In the successive withdrawals, the French Army 
lost heavily, but it did not lose its morale, neither 
was it impaired to such an extent that it had lost 
the power to fight back when called upon. Seldom 
has there been a record of forethought on the part 
of a general that was so fully confirmed on the field 
of battle. As a further confirmation of this fact, 
that the withdrawal was involuntary, we have but to 
read the following extract from Viscount French’s 
book “1914,” giving an account of his conversation 
with Joffre at the latter’s headquarters at Vitry le 
Francois on August 16th: “There was a complete 
absence of fuss, and a calm, deliberate confidence 
was manifest everywhere, I had a long conversation 
with the Commander-in-Chief, at which General 
Berthelot was present. He certainly never gave me 
the slightest reason to suppose that any idea of 
'retirement’ was in his mind. He discussed possible 
alternatives of action depending upon the informa¬ 
tion received of the enemy’s plans and dispositions; 
but his main intention was always to attack.” 

Some writers, in proof of their contention that 


46 The Marne Miracle 

France intended to stand on the defensive in event 
of a war with Germany, call attention to the fact 
that the French concentration was well back from 
the frontier. De Souza in his work “Germany in 
Defeat” 1st Phase, states the following: “The Ger¬ 
mans derived some advantages by the orders given 
to the French covering troops to leave a space of 
ten kilometers (six miles) between themselves and 
the frontier. This measure, which was taken by 
the French Government in order to show its pacific 
intention and its strong desire for compromise and 
a peaceful solution, enabled the aggressors to seize 
some important positions along the frontier, etc.” 
We might believe in these altruistic motives attrib¬ 
uted to France were it not for the 1st paragraph 
entitled “General Situation of Plan 17” which reads: 
“From a careful study of information obtained it is 
probable that a great part of the German forces will 
be concentrated on the common frontier.” This 
latter quotation gives the reason for the concentra¬ 
tion back from the frontier—it was a cold blooded 
military proposition. One familiar with the concen¬ 
tration of the French Army in 1870 will recall that 
it was concentrated on the frontier but before the 
concentration was completed, the German armies 
struck the French armies and when they were 
through, the French were bottled up in Metz. 
France did not care to repeat the performance hence 
the concentration to the rear. 

Also the Eastern fortified frontier line was a good 
one behind which and upon which to concentrate. 


The British Plan 

Secret agreements had been entered into between 
France and Great Britain whereby the latter prom¬ 
ised her assistance if the Germans were the aggres¬ 
sors and violated Belgian neutrality. 1 

Just what form this assistance would take was 
not specified. At first it was the protection of the 
French northern coast by the British Navy, but 
later it came in the form of troops in addition. 

Doubtless the two General staffs had worked out 
a plan for the use of a British land force if it should 
come to the Continent. On this subject Repington 
states in volume I, page 14, of his work, “The First 
World War 1914-1918,” the following: “The Anglo- 
French military conversations, officially began in 
January, 1906, continued uninterruptedly till the 
outbreak of war in 1914. They led to close co¬ 
operation of the British and French Staffs, and to 
the gradual working out of all naval, military, and 
railway projects for the delivery of our Expedi¬ 
tionary Force in France. It was first called the 
Striking Force.” 

Sir Edward Grey stated in his August 3d speech 
to the Commons: “I think it is due to the House to 
say that we have made no engagement yet with 
regard to sending an expeditionary armed force 
out of the country.” Apparently this arrangement 


1 Le Plan de Champagne Frangais. 


47 



48 


The Marne Miracle 


was made by Lord Kitchener with the French dele¬ 
gation that came to London about the 5th or 6th 
of August and left on the 10th. 2 

What the French counted on the British doing 
is pretty clearly shown by the extracts from GHQ 
notes. 3 

From these notes it appears that Joffre expected 
that the British would operate with him on the 
left flank of the general line which would have 
culminated in the British, in event of success, swing¬ 
ing around to the north into Belgium and connect¬ 
ing up with the Belgians as a result. 

Under his orders, General French was restricted 
to a qualified defensive attitude and any offensive, 
unless accompanied by superior French forces, re¬ 
quired previous approval by higher British author¬ 
ity. His instructions read: 

“Therefore, while every effort must be made to 

2 The first troops of the expeditionary force left England 
on the 7th and on the 17th report was made public that the 
entire Expeditionary Force was in France. 

* “The British Army is requested to take station by August 
21st to the north of the Sambre, so as to be able to march 
upon Nivelles, that is in the direction intermediate between 
Charleroi and Brussels—either to the left, or in rear and to 
the left of the 5th Army, according to the line of operations 
that shall have been determined for the army.” (Note No. 
1119 from French GHQ, August 16th.) 

“The cavalry corps will take station in the Eghezee-Tirle- 
ment region, by August 17th, in order to establish liaison 
between the Belgian troops at Namur and Louvain, and to 
check, at the same time, the enemy cavalry seeking to push 
forward toward the west.” (Note No. 1119 from French 
G.H.Q., August 16th.) 



The British Plan 


49 


coincide most sympathetically with the plans and 
wishes of our Ally, the gravest consideration will 
devolve upon you as to participation in forward 
movements where large bodies of French troops are 
not engaged and where your force may be unduly 
exposed to attack. Should a contingency of this 
sort be contemplated, I look to you to inform me 
fully and give me time to communicate to you any 
decision to which His Majesty’s Government may 
come in this matter,” Kitchener. 4 

The order of battle of the British Expedition¬ 
ary Force consisted of General Headquarters, a 
cavalry division commanded by Major-General E. 
H. H. Allenby, of five brigades with the necessary 
auxiliary troops. The First Corps, commanded by 
Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, of two divi¬ 
sions of three brigades each and the necessary 
auxiliary troops. The second Corps, commanded by 
Lieutenant-General Sir J. M. Grierson, who died 
on the train between Rouen and Amiens August 17, 
1914, being succeeded by General Sir Horace L. 
Smith-Dorrien, of two divisions of three brigades 
each and the necessary auxiliary troops. The Third 
Corps, formed in France on August 31, 1914, under 
the command of Major-General W. P. Pulteney, of 
two divisions and the necessary auxiliary troops. 

During the fighting on the Mons, the 19th In¬ 
fantry Brigade, Line of Communication Defense 


4 “1914”—Viscount French, page 15. 



50 


The Marne Miracle 


Troops, under Major-General L. G. Drummond, be¬ 
came combat troops. In addition to the above were 
the necessary army troops and lines of communica¬ 
tion units. 

The base was at Boulogne but was shifted during 
the course of the campaign to St. Nazaire with ad¬ 
vance base at Le Mans. The Infantry was debarked 
at Boulogne while the mounted troops moved up the 
Seine and debarked at Rouen. 


The Belgian Plan 

The plan of Belgium depended greatly upon what 
her Allies did to assist her and when they did it. 
The defense of Liege by the Belgians was undoubt¬ 
edly for the purpose of preserving the immunity 
of Belgium soil from invasion and to show Germany 
that she intended to resist from the outset. 1 The 
defense at Liege was also for the purpose of cover¬ 
ing the Belgian concentration on the Geete. It also 
may have had a psychological significance in that 
it showed her prospective Allies that Belgium in¬ 
tended to do her part. 

The Belgian Army was concentrated along the 
Geete, about 30 miles west of Liege and half way 
between that town and Brussels. The 3d Division 
was assigned the task of assisting the defenders of 
Liege while the 4th Division was to perform the 
same function with reference to the defenders of 
Namur. The entire Belgian Army consisted of 6 

1 “It was only on August 4th when its territory was ef¬ 
fectively violated, that Belgium appealed to the armed assist¬ 
ance of the Powers that guaranteed her neutrality—the very 
day before, it had declined the offer made to it by France, 
to support it with 5 army corps.” (English Blue Book, No. 
71.) On this date of August 4th, the Belgian Government 
telegraphed to the Cabinets at London, Paris, and St. Peters¬ 
burg to express its desire for common and concerted action 
towards the “end of resisting the forcible measures employed 
by Germany,” and it added, “That Belgium is pleased to be 
able to declare that it will assume the defense of the fortified 
places.” (Belgian Gray Book, No. 40.) 


51 



52 The Marne Miracle 

Divisions and a small cavalry division numbering 
in all about 93,000 rifles, 6,000 sabres, 324 guns, 
102 machine guns and the necessary auxiliary 
troops. 

A glance at the map will show that this line of 
concentration is in prolongation of the Meuse, with 
its right behind the low, marshy country at the 
headwaters of the Dyle and Geete. An excellent 
position that made it possible for the British Army 
to come in from the west and connect up with the 
V French Army on its right and the Belgians on 
its left, so that the entire Allied line would face 
east. Apparently such a deployment was contem¬ 
plated by the French when the British Army was 
moving up from Boulogne, Havre and Rouen. 

The Belgians at first intended to stand and fight 
on this line, expecting to be assisted by the Allies. 
On the 18th, that aid not having materialized, and 
being pressed by three German corps and three 
cavalry divisions, the Belgian Army fell back on 
Antwerp, its base, assuring the British and French 
at the same time “of the unreserved support of the 
Belgian Army on the left flank of the Allied armies 
with the whole of its troops and all available re¬ 
sources, wherever their line of communications with 
the base at Antwerp, where all their ammunition 
and food supplies are kept, is not in danger of being 
severed by large hostile forces.” 2 How nearly fatal 
was their final withdrawal into Antwerp and at¬ 
tempted stand at the point will be shown later. 


2 “1914”—Viscount French, p. 46. 



The Operations 

War was declared by France on the 3d of August 
and on the 5th, word was received by France of 
the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by the 
Germans, and Belgium appealed for help. 1 

The Belgian mobilization had commenced on the 
2d of August and the concentration along the river 
Geete was practically completed by the 6th of the 
month. The Belgian Army consisted of 6 divi¬ 
sions, with a small cavalry division and certain 
fortress troops. The 3d Division was sent forward 
from Diest to Liege to assist in the defense of that 
point but, after the capture of the city proper, with¬ 
drew to the main field Army. The 4th Division 
assisted in the defense of Namur but did not effect 
its withdrawal therefrom as effectively as did the 
3d Division from Liege. In round numbers, the 
Belgian Army consisted of about 100,000 men, but 
only about 54,000 of these were concentrated on the 
Geete. King Albert’s headquarters in command of 
the Field Armies was at Louvain. On July 31st, 
before the declaration of war, the three German 
corps nearest Liege were moving toward the fron¬ 
tier, namely the 7th (Westphalia) ; 4th (Schleswig- 
Holstein) ; and 10th (Hanover). Early on the 
morning of August 4th, the 2d and 4th Cavalry 
Divisions of von der Marwitz’ 2d Cavalry Corps, 


1 See General Map. 


53 



54 The Marne Miracle 

entered Belgium and attempted to force a crossing 
of the Meuse at Vise, but were stopped by a Belgian 
detachment holding the bridge, and it was not until 
August 7th that they were able to move across to 
cover the attack on Liege. 

To the south, along the valley of the Meuse and in 
the Ardennes, the 9th, 5th and the Guard Cavalry 
Divisions established a screen covering the concen¬ 
tration of the II and III Armies, and this screen 
was, with the assistance of armored cars, infantry 
cyclists and Jagers, effectively established before 
the French cavalry was free to cross the Belgian 
frontier. 2 

In addition to these movements, the French fron¬ 
tier fortress of Longwy was besieged by troops 
from the army of the Crown Prince. Troops of the 
II Army seized the bridge at Huy on August 10th 
and, on this same day, a reconnaissance was made 
by the Crown Prince’s forces toward Verdun. 

There seems to be no question but the Germans 
expected to encounter little or no opposition in seiz¬ 
ing Liege and figured that they would be able to 
get through the narrow pass between Liege on the 
south and the Dutch frontier on the north in a 
minimum of time, so that they could accomplish the 
deployment of the I and II Armies before the gen¬ 
eral advance started. This being the case the bri¬ 
gades that were concentrated in the areas closest 


3 “Forty Days in 1914,” Maurice, p. 42. 



The Operation 


55 


to Liege were sent forward to seize that placed 
The 14th Brigade moved in from the east to the 
north of the River Vesdre; the 11th Brigade to 
the south and on the left of the 14th; and the 27th 
Brigade to the north. On the extreme right was 
the 34th Brigade and on the left the 43d and 38th. 



In moving forward, the 14th Brigade encountered 
considerable opposition, not only from Belgian sol¬ 
diers, but, it is alleged, from citizens. The com¬ 
mander was killed early in the operations and von 


3 See Sketch No. 2. 





56 


The Marne Miracle 


Ludendorff, who happened to be in that vicinity, 
took charge. 4 

Von Emmich, the commander of the 10th Ger¬ 
man Corps, commanded this mixed force, and de¬ 
manded the surrender of the town on August 5th. 
White flags were displayed at the entrance, but 
upon investigation it developed that they were not 
authorized. 

Shortly before the war, von Emmich had been a 
guest of King Albert during which time, in all 
probability, he did not keep his eyes shut. It may 
be that he was selected for this command on account 
of what he had learned on this visit of his to the 
King of the Belgians. 

The city itself was occupied on August 7th, but 
the last fort, (Fort Loncin) did not fall until the 
night of August 15th. Von Leman, the defender 
of Liege, was wounded and captured with the fort. 

Von Ludendorff is supposed to have ridden boldly 
up to the citadel in a motorcar and alone and single- 
handed to have demanded the surrender of the few 
Belgians at that place. 

As already stated, the 3d Belgian Division that 
was holding the field works in the intervals between 
the forts, was withdrawn and sent to join the main 
army in time to prevent its, the 3d Division’s, cap¬ 
ture. 


4 Ludendorff as Oberquartiemeister of von Bulow’s Army 
was present as liaison officer. 



The Operation 


57 


From the first to the last the siege and the opera¬ 
tions around Liege lasted 12 days, during a greater 
part of the time that the mobilization and concen¬ 
tration of the German armies was proceeding. 

If the Germans anticipated the opposition that 
they encountered at Liege, it is hard to understand 
why they did not have their siege howitzers (Aus¬ 
trian Skodas) present with the advanced forces. 
It was necessary to send back for these weapons in 
order to reduce the forts, a thing which greatly 
delayed the final accomplishment of their task. 

On August 13th, von Kluck’s forces moved 
through Aix-la-Chapelle three days late, crossing 
the Meuse by the bridges to the north of Liege. 
The II Army crossed by the bridges to the south. 
It was the intention to “clear . . . the narrow and 
troublesome defile between Liege and the Dutch 
frontier as soon as possible.” 

On August 12th, the German cavalry screen came 
in touch with the Belgians at various places, fight¬ 
ing unsuccessful engagements at Haelen on that 
date and on August 13th at Tirlemont and Eng- 
hezee, near the field of Ramilles. On August 14th, 
a detachment of Jagers attacked Dinant, but fell 
back before stiff opposition. 5 

On the afternoon of August 17th, the two German 
armies (the I and II), received their order from 
the Supreme Command for an advance next morn- 

6 Each German Cavalry Division had from 2 to 5 jager 
battalions mostly on or in motor vehicles. 



58 The Marne Miracle 

ing. Quoting certain extracts from this order will 
bring out vital defects: 

“The I and II Armies and the 2d Cavalry Corps 
(Marwitz) will be under the orders of the 
commander of the II Army during the advance 
north of the Meuse/’ 

“It is most important that the enemy’s forces 
reported to be in position between Diest-Tirle- 
mont-Wavre, should be shouldered away from 
Antwerp.” 6 

Note this fatal defect of organization—placing 
one army under the commander of another and 
creating a new distribution at the eleventh hour. 

What the Germans should have done was create a 
group of armies, as they afterwards did, designating 
an army commander and giving him a group staff. 
In this case, von Bulow’s staff was not only an army 
but a group of armies staff. History teaches us 
that it is bad policy to place the commander of 
one army under an officer who is directly command¬ 
ing another. In this case, von Kluck’s army, by 
this order, really became the right flank guard of 
von Bulow’s army. By this change in command 
during operations, the German Supreme Command 
had violated Abraham Lincoln’s famous aphorism, 
“Never swap horses while crossing a stream.” 

The situation on the German right on August 
18th, from a strategical viewpoint, resembles the 


'“The March on Paris, 1914,” Kluck, p. 21. 



The Operation 


59 


situation at the beginning of the Waterloo campaign. 
The German I and II Armies are Napoleon—the 
Belgian Army is Blucher—Antwerp is Cologne— 
The British Army and V French Army are Welling¬ 
ton and the Dutch-Belgians. Napoleonic strategy 
dictates that in a situation like this, the decisive 
strategical directive is the junction point of two 
allied armies, yet the Germans wanted “to shoulder 
the Belgians away from Antwerp.” Had the Bel¬ 
gians allowed this and retired west, dropping back 
to the line of the Scheldt, on the British left flank, 
doubtless the German envelopment would have been 
stopped on the Sambre and the Germans never 
would have reached the Marne or the coast. The 
Belgians fell back on Antwerp, which was their 
base, and held that place longer than was wise on ac¬ 
count of Winston Churchill’s promise of help, whicji 
did not materialize. Result—The Belgians lost 
Antwerp anyway—one division of their army was 
interned in Holland and the balance driven back 
to the coast in a generally bad condition. 

Falling back on Antwerp had some good points, 
for it diverted two German corps that might have 
been used on the Marne, yet had the Belgians re¬ 
mained in the open, there probably would not have 
been any Marne. 

It was originally intended that von Kluck should 
march through Aix-la-Chapelle on August 10th, 
but the delay at Liege forced a change to August 
13th. “The 13th of August was, therefore, fixed 


60 


The Marne Miracle 


as the date for the march through Aix-la-Chappelle 
instead of the 10th. . . . The uncertain situation 
about Liege prevented the issue of any definite 
orders, besides which the roads, which had been 
torn up and blocked, needed a great deal of repair.” 7 

Had the Germans moved on August 10th and had 
other incidents happened the way they actually did, 
the German army would have arrived on the Sambre 
before either the British or V French Army, catch¬ 
ing the British concentrating just south of Mau- 
beuge and the V French Army part in position, but 
the 18th Corps detraining at Maubeuge and the 
9th Corps farther south en route. (The 9th corps 
was destined for the IV French Army.) 

“Had the German Army been mobilized and de¬ 
ployed three days earlier, a more sweeping and 
decisive result would probably have been gained. 
At the outbreak of war, time is always of the great¬ 
est importance, and in certain situations it is vital.” 8 

Possibly, however, Sordet’s cavalry, on its recon¬ 
naissance towards Liege on the 6th of August, might 
have discovered the Germans, and his report to that 
effect would probably have stimulated the French 
and British to greater activity. 

It goes without saying that the Germans wanted 
the superlative of activity from their maneuver 
wing, which was under von Kluck and von Bulow, 
for their order read: “The II Army will march 

7 “The March on Paris, 1914,” General von Kluck, p. 12. 

8 “The March on Paris, 1914,” General von Kluck, p. 13. 



The Operation 


61 


with its right flank on Wavre, and the I Army will 
receive orders to march on Brussels and to cover the 
right flank of the armies. Its advance, together 
with that of the II Army, will regulate the pace of 
the general wheel.” 9 

Let us now turn our attention to the south and see 
what was transpiring. 

The French concentration was progressing rap¬ 
idly and was virtually completed by August 14th. 
Anticipating a German advance south of the Meuse 
through Belgium and Luxemburg, Sordet’s Cavalry, 
was sent across the Belgian frontier on August 6th, 
the day after Belgium’s request for help, and recon- 
noitered toward Liege on August 8th, and, between 
August 11th and 15th towards Neufchateau and 
north of the Meuse towards Namur and Charleroi. 

“These enterprises brought negative results.” “It 
was not until August 15th that General Joffre 
received definite information that large German 
forces were moving westwards through Liege.” 10 

Joffre had not expected this, however, he at once 
extended his left, and prepared to attack through 
the Ardennes, where he assumed that the Germans 
were weak, that is, if they were advancing on Brus¬ 
sels in strength. The V Army moved across the 
Belgian frontier into the angle formed by the 
Sambre and the Meuse between Charleroi, Namur, 

” “Forty Days in 1914,” Maurice, p. 32. 

M “Forty Days in 1914,” Maurice, p. 30. 



62 


The Marne Miracle 


and Dinant and the IV Army moved into the Front 
Line. 11 * * V 

The First Offensive in Alsace 

On August 7th, the covering troops of the 7th 
Army Corps (General Bonneau) about Belfort, 
moved into Upper Alsace and, taking the Germans 
at Altkirch by surprise, routed them and on August 
8th occupied Mulhausen. On the 10th of August, 
the French were driven out by parts of the German 
14th and 15th Army Corps and escaped from a Ger¬ 
man outflanking movement by a rapid retreat at 
the right moment. On August 11th, the German 
42d Infantry Division and the Bavarian Cavalry 
Division severely defeated an advance brigade of 
the French 15th Army Corps on the open Lorraine 
frontier at Lagarde (on the border east of Nancy). 
One thousand prisoners, a flag and two batteries 
were the spoils of war. 12 

Strategical Effect of the First Operations Into 

Alsace 

This operation into Alsace was contemplated by 
Plan 17 for the purpose of freeing the inhabitants 
of Alsace who had remained loyal to France. It 
was not executed for the purpose of appeasing the 

11 See Sketch No. 3. 

” When Joffre moved the V Army to the north and slipped 
the IV Army into the front line he transferred the 2d and 11th 

corps from the V to the IV Army; the 18th from the II to 
the V Army; and the 9th from the II to the IV Army. The 

V Army was further reinforced by certain Reserve Divisions. 



The Operation 


63 


demand of Paris that something be done and for 
political reasons as one writer states. 

It had quite far-reaching influences, since it drew 
the German 14th and 15th Army Corps in that 
direction. The encounter was very much like Kerns- 
town in the Valley in 1862, which while a tactical 
failure was a strategic success in that it attracted 
forces destined elsewhere to that flank, thereby 
relieving the pressure on other threatened forces. 
Wynee, in the Army Quarterly claims that this 
advance delayed the German contemplated offensive 
towards the Moselle about a week. After August 
7th and 8th, the center of gravity of the German 
troops in the vicinity of Metz began to shift more 
to the south. 

The General French Offensive 13 

On the 14th, the French Army was ready for 
the general offensive into Lorraine. 

General Pau, the one-armed veteran of 1870, 
relieved the incompetent commander of the previous 
expedition into Alsace and was reinforced until he 
had about one-half of the I Army. The balance of 
the I Army under Dubail, its commander, was to 
seize the passes of the Vosges covering the right 
flank of the II Army (De Castelnau), that was to 
strike in on the line connecting Metz and Strass- 
burg in the general direction of Saarburg, his left 
being protected by the III Army of De Ruffey. 


13 See General Map and Sketch No. 3. 



64 


The Marne Miracle 


The movement was hardly under way when word 
came of the German advance to the north of the 
Meuse. The cavalry reconnaissances of Sordet were 
unproductive, but other troops moving to the north 
in the general extension were struck at Dinant on 
August 15th by strong advance forces of Germans 
and the cavalry got in touch with other German 
forces that had moved out from Huy toward Gem- 
bloux on August 16th. Meanwhile, the V French 
Army was extending its left to the Sambre, but now 
Joffre sent the 18th and 9th Corps, a cavalry corps, 
and the Algerian and Morocco divisions to the north. 
These two latter organizations originally were in¬ 
tended for the forces of Pau in Upper Alsace. By 
this detachment, the I and II Armies were reduced 
to about six corps. It was the hope of the French 
command that this offensive into Lorraine would 
puzzle the Germans and cause them to draw troops 
to the south from their northern flank, or delay 
shifting troops in that direction. 

Pau on the right advanced northward from Bel¬ 
fort and struck from the region of Thann, com¬ 
pletely turning the German divisions in the vicinity 
of Mulhausen. 

By August 19th, Pau was in control of Upper 
Alsace, including the approaches to Colmar, Neu 
Brisach and the Rhine bridges. 

After the withdrawal of the French from the first 
offensive into Upper Alsace, the German 14th and 
15th Army Corps were moved north and their places 


The Operation 65 

were taken by landwehr, which probably facilitated 
Pau’s victory. 

By this time, the remainder of the I Army had 
secured the passes of the Vosges. 

Meanwhile, De Castelnau was moving towards his 
objective and, by August 20th, had captured one 
after another the German positions south and south¬ 
east of Metz. 

The Germans now became alarmed by this ad¬ 
vance and determined to smash it in accordance 
with their plan. Their main position was strong 
with interminable lines of trenches covered by barb¬ 
wire entanglements and supported by heavy artil¬ 
lery from Metz. 

On August 20th, at Morhange and Saarburg, the 
French moved forward to attack. Without adequate 
artillery support and becoming mixed up in the 
wire and enveloped by heavy fire, they were driven 
back. Their attack was met by units of the VI 
Army in front while the 14th and 15th Army Corps 
of the VII Army were moved in on the right to 
pinch off the French on their eastern flank, but 
instead of bringing down sufficient force from the 
V Army to envelop the other flank only one-half of 
the Wurttemburg Corps was sent down and it was 
inadequate. Neither were other troops that were 
available used. The result was a barren tactical 
frontal victory from which the French retired upon 
their covering positions at Nancy and Luneville and 


66 


The Marne Miracle 


the German opportunity for a “Cannae” in that 
locality was gone. 

Here was von Moltke’s opportunity to “pinch off” 
the French in Lorraine, one of his two alternative 
reasons for his heavy concentration on his left. It 
looked as if the French were walking in the gigantic 
trap which had been so often tested on the German 
War Game Table. 

Matters did not come to this point. General Head¬ 
quarters feared drives thrown against Diedenhofen 
pivot if the V Army was diverted and wheeled to the 
south to be the northern lever of the pinchers. This 
fear was groundless however, yet only half of a 
Corps was diverted to the south. 

Not even the outlying troops of the Metz fortress 
were brought up. However, in furtherance of his 
idea “to tie up the main forces of the French and to 
thus lighten the task for the right wing of the Army, 
which was wheeling about,” von Moltke ordered the 
picked troops of the VI and VII Armies to attack. 

It is hard to follow the mental processes of the 
German High Command at this time. 

1st. Under the plan, they contemplated an offen¬ 
sive in Lorraine, in violation of the von Schlieffen 
idea, for the purpose of pinning superior hostile 
forces to the ground or to pinch them off. 

2d. About August 17th, fearing the French 
masses were moving to the north, they notify von 
Kluck that the main movement is to be through 
Belgium and Luxemburg into France and turn the 


The Operation 


67 


axis of advance of the 6th, 11th, 18th, and 19th 
Army Corps to the northwest. 

3d. Then when the French appear in force in 
Lorraine, the Germans only bring down one division 
of the V Army to act as one lever of the pinchers. 

4th. They hold out the outlying troops of the Metz 
garrison; and the seven Landwehr Brigades in the 
Nied position are not placed under orders of the 
officers commanding the battle. 

5th. They make no arrangements for unified com¬ 
mand, and the VI and VII Armies, after a barren 
tactical success, are allowed to follow up the French 
later to attack them and thereby making impos¬ 
sible their transfer to the right in time to be of 
any assistance to the assault wing—this notwith¬ 
standing the fact that railroad transportation was 
waiting on the siding about Strassburg for that 
very purpose. From the German view-point, it 
would have been a Godsend if their troops in Lor¬ 
raine had been defeated leaving the French to attack 
their fortified line. There the French would have 
stuck and the VI and VII Armies could either one 
or both have been shifted to the right as contem¬ 
plated for the VII Army. 

General Headquarters purposely refrained from 
directing this battle leaving its conduct to the two 
Army Commanders. “No co-operation was provided 
between the Metz-Diedenhofen fortresses, the Nied 
position and the VI and VII Armies. 

Von Moltke wanted to do two things at the same 


68 The Marne Miracle 

time, namely, win a victory in Lorraine while the 
right wing pushed forward to a decisive assault. 
It was on this idea that he was wrecked.” 14 

The vacillation of the German High Command 
eclipses that of any other High Command in modern 
times unless it was the French High Command in 
1870. 

Having driven back the French Armies between 
Metz and Strassburg, the VI and VII Armies fol¬ 
lowed them up towards Nancy and the Mirecourt 
Gap. 

Operations on the German Right 

The I to V German Armies, the assault wing, 
began the advance on August 18th, according to 
plan. 

On August 15th, when Joffre received definite 
information that large German forces were moving 
westward through Liege, he extended his left by 
sending the V French Army across the Belgian fron¬ 
tier into the angle formed by the Sambre, and the 
Meuse between Charleroi, Namur and Dinant. 

In order to protect French Flanders from raids 
and to cover the deployment of the British Expedi¬ 
tionary Force, General d’Amade was sent to Arras 
to take command of a group of territorial divisions 
consisting of the 84th at Douai, which was sent for¬ 
ward later to Conde—the 82d at Arras, and the 
81st at St. Omer, the 88th at Lille, and two reserve 


14 Baumgarten-Crusius. 



The Operation 


69 


divisons sent from the garrison of Paris. All these 
movements northward were completed by August 
21st and probably before Joffre realized the strength 
of the Germans in Belgium, particularly those west 
of the Meuse. 

Meanwhile, Joffre’s concentration having been 
completed, he started to carry out the offensive in 
Lorraine. The modification of his original offensive 
plan in so far as it pertained to the V Army was for 
that army to attack through the Ardennes. 

Ill and IV French Armies 

In addition to the activity of the French I and II 
Armies before related, on August 21st, the III and 
IV Armies struck respectively the German Crown 
Prince at Virton and the Duke of Wurttemburg 
north of Neufchateau but were driven back. 15 Mean¬ 
while, the Germans, who had occupied Brussels on 
August 19th, turned south and on August 21st and 
22d arrived in front of the V French Army and the 
British along the Sambre. 

From August 21st to the 23d occurred the battles 
of Mons and Charleroi, two days after the III and 
IV French Armies had been forced back on the 
defensive, and on the night of the 25th of August, 
“the most critical day of all” 16 Joffre was forced to 
decide whether he would concentrate and fight in 

” This forcing back of the IV Army left a gap that might 
have been fatal to the French—it will be discussed later. 

M Simonds “History of the World War.” 



70 The Marne Miracle 

northern France or retreat to the south for a final 
stand. 

Neither the British nor the French intended to 
fight on the defensive on the Sambre, that role being 
forced upon them by the Germans. 17 Until the 
affairs on the Sambre, “Joffre was far from re¬ 
nouncing all idea of attack. He had been forced to 
weaken his offensive in the south, but this was to be 
remedied by a blow in the north, and therefore, 
his central reserve, the IV Army, was Brought up 
toward the Ardennes, ready to strike if it were 
found that the enemy were moving in force north 
of the Meuse, while if the Germans were not in 
strength there, the British would come in on the left 
of the V Army and with it envelop the German 
right. The idea still prevailed that the Germans 
could not be strong enough to secure their center 
in the Ardennes against attack and at the same time 
carry out a great attack against the Allied left. 18 

On the afternoon of August 21st, Lanrezac was 
still desirous of an offensive and, as Sir John French 
says in his book “1914,” “was anxious to know if I 
would attack the flank of the German columns which 
were pressing him back from the river.” 

Apparently Lanrezac at this late date did not 
know of the German enveloping movement north of 
the Meuse. 

” “Forty Days in 1914,” Maurice, p. 60. 

” “Forty Days in 1914,” Maurice, p. 34. 



The Operation 


71 


A great deal of discussion has arisen over the 
French plan. Some think that Joffre contemplated 
the step by step defensive from the very outset as 
soon as he discovered that the Germans were in 
force to the north. Others think that he formulated 
this plan after the battle of Le Cateau. 

Unquestionably, Joffre stuck to the idea of the 
offensive until on the night of the 25th, when, after 
all his offensives had failed, Namur and Ayvelles 
(south of Mezieres) had fallen, and the line of the 
Sambre and Northern Meuse had been forced, he 
issued his order for the retreat. 











Charleroi and Mettet 1 


The German advance came on August 18th, and 
the Belgians, not receiving any support or assistance 
from their allies, fell back through Brussels on 
Antwerp. Von Kluck occupied Brussels on August 
19th; meanwhile his troops were swinging around 
towards the south looking for the British Army 
which von Kluck could not make himself believe was 
not landing at Calais or thereabouts. The gradual 
wheel of the German forces through Belgium by 
August 21st brought von Bulow nearer to the Allies 
than was von Kluck, and the II German Army was 
consequently the first to become engaged. We will, 
therefore, follow its movements before dealing with 
von Kluck. 

The pivot of the Allied position was Namur, a 
fortress covering the junction of the Meuse and the 
Sambre and resembling the forts at Liege in design. 
The field force supporting the fortress garrison was 
the 4th Belgian Division. Having learned a lesson 
from their experience at Liege, the Germans did not 
try to carry the forts by assault, but brought up the 
Skoda howitzers that they had used at Liege and 
on August 22d opened on the forts. These howitzers 
were with the troops this time having accompanied 
the infantry of the Guard Reserve Corps. 2 

1 See Sketch No. 3 and the General Map. 

2 The troops attacking Namur were the Guard Reserve 
Corps, left wing of the II Army and the 11th Army Corps, 
right wing of the III Army, the two corps being under Gen¬ 
eral von Gallwitz. 


73 



74 The Marne Miracle 

The garrison of Namur, in addition to the troops 
mentioned, was reinforced by the detachments 
driven in from Huy and three battalions of French 
Infantry. Total strength about 18,000. The forts 
were destroyed in short order by gun fire, the 
Belgian infantry having no chance to reply. The 
German infantry advanced to the attack on August 
23d, as soon as they were satisfied that the forts 
were out of action, and carried the positions, cutting 
off a part of the garrison; the town of Namur was 
occupied on August 24th. 

By order issued on the evening of August 20th, 
German General Headquarters left it to “arrange¬ 
ments between the Higher Commands of the II and 
III Armies to bring the attack of the II Army upon 
the enemy west of Namur into unison with the at¬ 
tack of the III Army upon the Meuse line, Namur- 
Givet.” 3 General Headquarters thus renounced any 
direction of the great attack of the Assault Wing, 
the same as it did in the attack of the VI and VII 
Armies in Lorraine. 

“Generaloberst” von Bulow by order of August 
21st moved the I Army nearer the II Army with the 
justification “that otherwise the I Army would move 
too far away and could not support the II Army at 
the right time.” One sees from this order that von 
Bulow is featuring the II Army at the expense of 

* “Deutsche Heerfuhrung im Marnefeldzug 1914,” Artur 
B a um ga rten-C rusi u s. 



Charleroi and Mettet 75 

the I Army which I Army apparently, in his estima¬ 
tion, is but a flank guard. This brought the I 
Army in a southerly direction when von Kluck 
wished to continue the advance in a southwesterly 
direction so he could envelop the British left and 
force the latter back on the V French Army and 
Maubeuge. 

The II and III German Armies 

The attack of the II Army over the Sambre and 
the III Army over the Meuse in cooperation was 
fixed for the morning of August 23d. The leading 
troops of the II Army pushed back the French 
Cavalry which had been independent until August 
15th when it was assigned to the V Army and 
advanced troops over the Sambre as early as 
August 21st. “Towards midday of August 22d 
Generaloberst von Bulow determined to take ad¬ 
vantage of the favorable opportunity since he had 
in front only three cavalry divisions of the Sordet 
Corps and the weaker infantry/’ 4 and “on August 
22d, before the arrival of the further reinforce¬ 
ments to the enemy, to cross with the left wing this 
extremely difficult section of the Sambre.” 5 On 
the day before the German 10th Corps drove in the 
French troops at Charleroi and by night had a firm 
footing on the south bank of the Sambre. 

The German 10th Reserve Corps got across the 


4 Baumgarten-Crusius. 

* Bulow, p. 22. 



76 The Marne Miracle 

river, but in the neighborhood of Thuin encoun¬ 
tered stiff opposition. This was the French 18th 
Army Corps coming in on the left. 

It is hard to understand why Lanrezac didn't 
dig himself in as did the British farther west, when 
he found he was to fight on the defensive, and then 
make an endeavor to hold the Germans north of 
the river. This he completely failed to do. 

Just for the moment turn to von Hausen's III 
Army; on the evening of August 22d, the advance 
guards of the three corps, namely 12th, 12th Reserve 
and 19th Corps reached the Meuse on either side of 
Dinant. The attack on the town was made early on 
the morning of August 23d and after a sharp 
struggle the Germans entered it and crossed the 
river. Again why was not stronger resistance made 
by Lanrezac and why were not the French “dug in"? 
One explanation for the loss of the river line is the 
following. The 1st French Corps that had been 
holding this line was relieved on the evening of 
August 22d by the 51st Reserve Division. There¬ 
upon the 1st Corps marched off in the direction of 
Mettet to reinforce the troops on the Sambre and the 
51st Reserve Division was too weak a force. 

Along the Sambre, the brunt of the German 
attacks was borne by the 3d and 10th French Corps. 

By the afternoon of August 22d, the Germans had 
three corps on the south bank of the Sambre. The 
situation was not entirely unfavorable to the French. 
The French 18th Corps was coming in on the left 


Charleroi and Mettet 77 

and had held up the German 10th Reserve Corps; 
the French 1st Corps along the Meuse had been 
relieved by the French 51st Reserve Division and 
was coming up on the right so that at this time the 
French along the Sambre were equal to the Germans 
and had the additional advantage of being on the 
defensive and Namur was holding out. Off to the 
west the British Army was coming up and von Kluck 
was still pretty well scattered in depth. 

A joint attack by the I and II German Armies, 
arranged for the morning of August 23d, got under 
way. The Guard Corps on the south side of the 
Sambre had followed up the French and prepared 
to attack them in the Fosse position about 5 miles 
south of the river in the vicinity of Mettet. At the 
same time the 10th German Corps was forcing back 
the 3d French Corps to the vicinity of Walcourt and 
the 10th German Reserve Corps was attacking the 
18th French Corps in the vicinity of Gozee and 
Thuin. 

The Guard Corps, under von Plettenberg, had just 
started its preparation when word came in announc¬ 
ing the advance of fresh French troops from the 
southeast against the left flank of the Guard. This 
was the 1st French Corps coming up from Dinant. 
But just as it was about to deploy for action word 
came to Lanrezac to the effect that the Germans 
(12th Saxon Corps) was across the Meuse in his 
right rear and that the forts of Namur had fallen 
(the city was not occupied until the 24th). 


78 The Marne Miracle 

Instead of directing the 1st Corps to attack at 
once, it was ordered back to the Meuse and to protect 
the communications of the V Army. So the 1st 
Corps was lost as far as having any influence on the 
battle on the Sambre and did not prevent von 
Hausen from establishing himself on the west bank 
of the Meuse. This incident reminds one of the 
performance of d’Erlon’s corps between the fields 
of Ligny and Quatre Bras in the Waterloo Cam¬ 
paign. 

The Guard, the danger to its flank being removed 
by the withdrawal of the 1st French Corps, 
renewed the attack and forced the right of the 
French line back, capturing the Mettet position; 
meanwhile the 10th German Corps was forcing the 
3d French Corps back to the vicinity of Walcourt. 
At the same time the 10th German Reserve Corps 
renewed the attack on the 18th French Corps in the 
vicinity of Gozee and Thuin, and after fierce fight¬ 
ing, drove it back, its retirement being caused to a 
great extent by the uncovering of its right by the 
withdrawal of the 3d French Corps. 

By nightfall on the 23d, the situation looked very 
gloomy for Lanrezac. His front had been driven 
back six or seven miles, his flank was threatened by 
the fall of Namur and the appearance of the III 
German Army at Dinant, and he had received infor¬ 
mation that the British Army had been attacked by 
three German Corps with a fourth working around 
its left flank. Having just been ordered to send 


Charleroi and Mettet 


79 


Sordet’s cavalry to protect the British left from 
being turned, Lanrezac concluded that there was 
nothing to do but order the retreat. Dawn on the 
24th, found the V French Army some hours on its 
way to the rear. 

The British 

Let us now glance at what was transpiring in 
front of the British Army. 

Von Kluck was marching in parallel columns with 
right refused looking for the British who were 
expected from the direction of Lille. The German 
and British Cavalry came in contact to the north 
and northeast of Mons in the vicinity of Casteau 
(north of Mons) on the Soignes road. This was on 
the 22d and on the same date a British plane was 
shot down near Enghein. This seemed to be about 
the only exact information von Kluck had received 
up to date of the whereabouts of the British. Von 
der Marwitz’ cavalry divisions were under the 
orders of the group commander von Bulow and, at 
the time, were away to the west looking for the 
British but not really getting in touch, since they 
allowed themselves to be held up by French terri¬ 
torials between the Lys and Scheldt. Joffre, as 
already related, had stationed territorials in the 
towns to the west to cover the British advance. 

This use by the Germans of the 2d Cavalry Corps 
reminds one of the manner in which cavalry was so 
often used in the American Civil War,—off on an 


80 


The Marne Miracle 


independent mission and not contributing to the 
success of the fighting armies by screening them 
and getting information. 

The German Cavalry Divisions up to the time of 
contact on the Sambre had covered the advance of 
the I and II Armies most effectively, for it will be 
recalled that Sordet returned from his reconnais¬ 
sance towards Liege, Neufchateau and north of the 
Sambre with negative information. Now just as 
contact is established, the German Cavalry is off 
on an independent and unimportant mission. They 
are looking for the British and do not find them. 
The cavalry fight at Casteau was by German tactical 
cavalry. 

Meanwhile the British troops are moving forward 
from their detraining point at Maubeuge and are 
occupying the line of the Conde canal, with the 2d 
Corps holding the line from near Conde around to 
the right rear of Mons, the 1st Corps being eche¬ 
loned to the right rear of the Second. A cavalry 
brigade fills the gap of about five miles existing 
between the right of the British Army and the left 
of the French Corps on the extreme left of Lanre- 
zac’s forces. 

t 

The left flank of the 2d Corps is protected by the 
19th Brigade made up of line of communications 
troops and Allenby’s cavalry division. French terri¬ 
torials hold Valenciennes and two divisions under 
d’Amade are detraining at Lille and moving towards 
Tournai. 


Charleroi and Mettet 81 

We now have a unique situation that so often 
occurs when an envelopment is attempted, that is, 
the so-called holding attack is too vigorous and the 
enemy falls back before the enveloping forces can 
envelop. 

On August 22d, when von Bulow was attacking 
the V French Army in force, von Kluck’s army was 
located about the following distances from the Brit¬ 
ish. From their left to right, 9th Corps, 10 kilo¬ 
meters; 3d Corps, 22 kilometers; 4th Corps, 23 
kilometers; 2d Corps, 45 kilometers; and 4th 
Reserve Corps still farther in the right rear. It 
will be recalled that von Moltke informed von Kluck 
of the landing of the British at Boulogne, conse¬ 
quently von Kluck’s right was refused in anticipa¬ 
tion of an encounter from the direction of Lille 
and von der Marwitz’ cavalry corps was off looking 
for the British from that direction. The next day, 
namely August 23d, on which von Hausen forced 
the Meuse at Dinant and von Bulow was driving 
back the V French Army, we find von Kluck at 
daylight with right rear refused and confronted 
with the impossibility of getting all his troops into 
action that day. In the fighting along the Sambre, 
the I German Army's mission, even though it was 
to afford flank protection, was to envelop the British 
left flank and bring about a “Cannae" in the neigh¬ 
borhood of Maubeuge. Von Bulow’s impetuosity 
prevented the envelopment, for von Kluck could not 
get up in time. 


82 


The Marne Miracle 


The French territorial troops off to the west ful¬ 
filled the requirements of detachments as laid down 
by von der Goltz. By their very presence off on the 
flank they held out superior numbers, namely the 2d 
German Corps, and the Cavalry, and prevented both 
from participating in the decisive action. 


Mons 


Promptly at daylight on August 23d, the German 
divisional cavalry began to try out the British out¬ 
posts. During the course of the morning the artil¬ 
lery of the 9th and 3d German Corps came into 
position and opened fire on the right of the 2d Brit¬ 
ish Corps at Mons and, at about 11 o’clock, the 
German infantry launched a violent attack. The 
Germans at this point attacked in mass, their attack¬ 
ing troops preceded by skirmishers. Their losses 
were terrific due principally to the accuracy of the 
British rifle fire. 

The German attack was made by their 9th and 3d 
Corps and resulted in the capture of the town of 
Mons and the canal held by Hamilton’s 3d British 
Division, the right of Smith-Dorrien’s 2d Corps. 

Towards evening, the advance guards of the 4th 
German Corps were coming into action but were 
held back by Allenby and the 19th Brigade, under 
Drummond, together with 84th French Territorials. 
The 7th German Corps, of von Bulow’s army, during 
this time, was leisurely advancing towards Binche 
in the direction of the corps of Sir Douglas Haig, 
which latter was not seriously engaged on August 
23d. Von Kluck was suffering from the lack of 
information and, thinking that the British troops 
were farther to the west, allowed his 4th and 2d 
Corps to march in a direction southwest until late 

83 


84 


The Marne Miracle 


in the afternoon, when he learned to a greater degree 
of certainty where the British left really was; then 
it was too late in the day to complete the envelop¬ 
ment. 

On the evening of this eventful day, we find the 
2d German Corps marching through Grammont and 
the 4th Reserve Corps near Hal and away from the 
main fight. Had von Kluck been able to press his 
attack on the evening of August 23d, the fate of 
the little British Army w T ould have been sealed; 
its flank would have been turned completely and 
probably the army either routed or captured. 

The absence of von der Marwitz’ cavalry on a 
distant mission; the fact that von Moltke away 
off at Coblentz was not keeping in touch with the 
movements of von Kluck to the extreme west; and 
the further fact that apparently von Bulow was 
paying too much attention to the II Army and not 
to his group of armies, may be taken as the main 
reason for the failure of this day. 

After the successes of August 23d, the I German 
Army determined to force the British back into 
Maubeuge and to cut off their retreat to the south¬ 
west by throwing forward the right w T ing of the 
Army (2d Army Corps and 4th Reserve Corps) in 
connection with Independent Cavalry Corps No. 2 
(Marwitz). Von Kluck had finally succeeded in 
obtaining from General Headquarters the subordi¬ 
nation of this cavalry corps to his orders, but these 


Mons 


85 


troops did not arrive until the evening of the 24th 
and in no condition for operations until rested. 

August 2.!f .—Von Bulow’s Army followed up the 
retreating French and at 4: 00 p. m. called upon 
the Headquarters of the III Army to support their 
attack in the direction of Mettet. At this time the 
direction of the advance of the III German Army 
was southwest, the Cavalry Corps No. 1 was on 
its left flank and the IV German Army was driving 
back the left of the IV French Army. 

“In spite of the victory of the German IV Army 
adjacent to the left, news of which had been re¬ 
ceived meanwhile, and in spite of certain success in 
the pursuit towards the southwest, Army Head¬ 
quarters No. 3 came up in accordance with the wish 
of Army Headquarters No. 2. . . . The II Army 
succeeded by its own strength, in forcing the V 
French Army to retreat. But valuable hours were 
lost for the III Army in order to throw this retreat 
into disorder or to entirely surround the enemy/' 1 
In addition to this, the 1st Cavalry Corps which 
had been covering the fronts of the II and III 
German Armies, on August 20th when it was near 
and to the south of Dinant, was ordered to the 
rear and then to pass to the north of Namur to 
cover the flank and front of the II German Army. 
Thus Independent Cavalry Corps No. 1 was forced 
to make a march around to the rear of the III and 


1 Baumgarten-Crusius. 



86 


The Marne Miracle 


II Armies in order to be used at the place where it 
was wanted. As a result of this forced march, 
the animals were in no condition for effective 
service when they arrived at their destination. Not¬ 
withstanding the fact that this cavalry corps was 
deployed in the wrong place at the outset, it would 
have been better had the Supreme Command 
allowed it to remain where it was, particularly 
when the Supreme Command, even as early as 
August 15th, knew that there was a gap between 
the French IV and V Armies; and when this gap 
was further extended by the turning of the left 
flank of the French IV Army, it seems unquestion¬ 
able that the cavalry should not have been moved. 
But for this move the cavalry would have had a 
clear swing in rear of the V French and the British 
Army and a “Cannae” might have been effected on 
that flank. 2 One can see through all this, the ever 
featuring of the II Army by von Bulow and General 
Headquarters doing nothing to prevent it. 

On this subject Baumgarten-Crusius says: “The 
subordination of the I Army to the command of 
the II Army and the order to the II Army and III 

'The withdrawal of the V Army from the pocket it was 
about to fall into reflects great credit upon Lanrezac. Whether 
it was due to his skillful handling, to lack of skill on the part 
of the Germans, or to fortuitous circumstances, it is impos¬ 
sible to say, but the facts are, the Germans had an oppor¬ 
tunity to bring about a “Cannae” by the left of their north¬ 
ern wing and to completely envelop the V French and the 
British Armies, but were prevented by the timely withdrawal 
of these forces. 



M o n s 


87 


Armies to establish liaison for the first great en¬ 
gagement of the decisive wing proved a mistake. 
'Mutual agreement is only a half measure. It lends 
to friction and failure/ Subordination of one army 
to an adjacent army robs the former army of the 
joy of independent action. 'The Command of the 
II Army, even with the greatest disinterestedness, 
protects the interests of its own army because it 
makes decisions and gives orders from the point 
of view of that army/ The II Army needed only 
to fight on August 23d and 24th in order to detain 
the enemy on the Sambre front, then the I and III 
Armies could have closed in about the British and 
the French north wing at the right time. 

" ‘A strong central direction, however, either by 
the Command of a Group of Armies, as in the latter 
course of the war, or by General Headquarters, 
which however would have had to be nearer for 
this purpose, was the sine-qua-non for this/ ” 

At this time the German liaison system was not 
well developed. The Telephone troops did not have 
enough new instruments; the Radio Service was 
also insufficiently developed. At times it took 14 
hours to get messages through without considera¬ 
tion of the time taken to get the reply back. Gen¬ 
eral Headquarters had only one receiving station at 
its disposal. Army Command No. 1 had two differ¬ 
ent wire systems but only one connecting with GHQ. 
Neither the Chief of the Operations Division GHQ, 
nor the Chief of Staff nor his first assistant were 


88 


The Marne Miracle 


ever with the armies up to the Battle of the Marne. 
In isolated cases officers were sent from GHQ as 
bearers of long recopied directions, which were often 
anticipated by events and also with instructions to 
give orders in the name of the Chief of Staff based 
upon their own personal estimate of the situation. 
Instances of this will be pointed out later. 

It is quite clear from what has just been said, 
wherein the greatest weakness of the German Army 
lay. 

Let me reiterate in regard to the cooperation 
spirit so much emphasized in the German Army: 
‘‘Cooperation cannot replace nor be a substitute for 
Command.” There must always be a head who 
must direct. Subordinate units assist one another 
in so far as possible but not forgetting their main 
mission as laid down by this head. 


The Retreat From Mons and the Sambre 

With the withdrawal of the V French Army, 
there was nothing left for the British Expeditionary 
Force to do but fall back with it. The fortress of 
Maubeuge, about five miles in rear of the 1st British 
Corps, was a very tempting place of refuge for the 
British Army, hardpressed as it was. Fortunately, 
however, Sir John French did not allow this for¬ 
tress to exert its pernicious power of attraction upon 
him, so he fell back on the fortification, not into it. 

By the withdrawal from the line of the Sambre 
and Meuse by the British and French, there can be 
no question that the Germans lost an unusual oppor¬ 
tunity to bring about a “Cannae” by a double envel¬ 
opment. Neither French nor Lanrezac had any idea 
of retreating and Lanrezac ordered a counter-attack 
to the north for August *24th. Judging from the 
subsequent marching powers of the I and III Ger¬ 
man Armies, as shown by their later prodigies, they 
would have been able to carry out the encircling 
movement had they been given half a chance. 

The trouble was von Bulow’s conception of what 
had happened to the French. He reported to the 
General Headquarters that the French retreat was 
a rout. In his report he states “I have ordered, for 
the 25th, a continuation of a pursuit of the beaten 
adversary in a southwest direction.” 1 This estimate 


1 von Bulow’s report. 


89 



90 


The Marne Miracle 


of the situation by von Bulow had a far-reaching in¬ 
fluence. Von Moltke at Coblentz and out of touch 
with all except von Bulow—the wire lines with von 
Bulow were more efficient than those with the I and 
III Armies—assumed that the decisive victory by 
the Assault wing had been won. 

‘‘The exceedingly favorable reports which came 
in to General Headquarters, even on the 25th of 
August, from the right wing of the Army, in con¬ 
nection with the great victory in Lorraine of August 
20-23, led to the belief in General Headquarters that 
the great decisive battle in the West had been 
decided in our favor. Under the impression of this 
decisive victory, the Chief of the General Staff, in 
spite of the considerations opposed to it, decided on 
August 25th to send forces to the East. Two Corps 
were taken immediately from the right wing—the 
Guard Reserve and the 11th Corps. Four others 
were to come later from the center and left wing 
but were not sent.” 2 3 Let us pause for a moment 


2 Baumgarten-Crusius. 

3 It will be recalled that the Guard Reserve and 11th 
Corps, under von Gallwitz, were the attacking troops at 
Namur and with the fall of that place and the converging 
of the II and III Armies, these Corps were pinched out so 
to speak and would have had to be put in the line elsewhere. 
Von Bulow’s optimistic accounts of his victory over the 
French on the Sambre coming in about the time that the 
worst accounts of the Happenings in East Prussia were 
arriving, nothing was more natural than that von Moltke 
should send assistance consisting of the corps no longer in 
the line—in this connection see comment on the failure to 
send the 9th Reserve Corps in place of one of these corps. 
The 9th Reserve Corps had been in Schleswig-Holstein and 
was now joining the main army. 



Retreat from Mons 


91 


and interpolate a story that gives another reason 
why von Moltke decided to send troops to the East 
Front. The expression “The Cossacks won the 
Battle of the Marne” gained wide publicity. The 
Junkers whose stronghold was Konigsberg and 
whose estates lay largely in East Prussia, as did 
some of the estates belonging to the Kaiser, did not 
look upon the overrunning of their property by Cos¬ 
sacks with complacency and indifference and were 
continually bringing pressure to bear upon the 
Kaiser, who passed it on to von Moltke, to send 
troops to relieve the situation at the earliest possible 
moment regardless of the military needs of the 
hour.” 

With the fall of Namur, the retreat of the French 
and British from the Sambre-Meuse line and the 
optimistic reports of von Bulow, and the victories 
reported in Lorraine, von Moltke, thinking every¬ 
thing was virtually finished except the mopping up, 
weakened and sent these corps to assist in the recov¬ 
ery of the property of the Junkers and also the 
Hunting Lodge of the Kaiser. 

Whether or not this is a true story is not known 
but it is a fact that troops were withdrawn from the 
West Front for service on the East Front at this 
time. 

In the Quartermaster Corps training trip of 1905, 
von Schlieffen had six corps and two cavalry divi¬ 
sions for the protection of East and West Prussia 
as a part of his plan; von Moltke had four corps 


92 


The Marne Miracle 


and one cavalry division in his plan. The transfer 
of the Guard Reserve and the 11th Corps after 
Namur, together with the 8th Saxon cavalry divi¬ 
sion, seems to indicate that in regard to the east 
front von Moltke was attempting to return to the 
von Schlieffen estimate of the strength necessary. 

As already related, the III and IV French Armies, 
in furtherance of their plan to attack through the 
Ardennes covering the left flank of the Army in 
Lorraine, had moved forward. Meanwhile the IV 
and V German Armies were moving towards the 
southwest. The collision between these forces oc¬ 
curred on the banks of the rivers Lesse and Semois 
in the Semois Basin. The German IV Army forced 
back the IV French Army to the Meuse on both 
sides of Sedan. The French defeat was due to the 
superiority of troop leading on the part of the Ger¬ 
mans who, turning to account the difficult terrain of 
the Ardennes, were able to secure the maximum 
benefit. Fort Ayvelles, south of Mezieres, fell on 
August 25th thereby widening the breach or gap 
that already existed in the French line. Consider¬ 
able fighting occurred in this vicinity for the fol¬ 
lowing days. According to accounts, the French IV 
Army was preparing for a counter-attack when the 
order from Joffre for the retreat was received. 

To the south of the IV French Army, the III 
French Army moved forward to attack the Germans 
and encountered the Army of the Crown Prince on 
both sides of Longwy. Contact was made on August 


Retreat from Mons 


93 


22d near Virton and the French, after poor tactical 
handling, were forced back into the Chiers Area in 
the vicinity of Longuyon. 

A terrific battle raged in this area on August 
24th. On August 25th, the French 6th (iron) Corps 
under Sarrail struck forth from the direction of 
Verdun via Etain against the flank of the Crown 
Prince’s Army. The attack was so fierce that the 
33d (Aussen Division) from Metz had to be thrown 
into action. 

“German General Headquarters against its better 
judgment, had allowed the V Army to make a pre¬ 
cipitate advance, exactly as it did in the case of the 
VI Army. When the French III Army began its 
advance towards the north on August 21st, the V 
German Army determined upon a frontal attack. 
General Headquarters curbed this army at first, 
but then yielded. The result was exactly as with 
the VI German Army, an ‘ordinary’ victory, no 
‘Cannae.’ ” 4 “Longwy” fell at midday on August 
25th but the III French Army was able to extricate 
itself. 

By August 25th, the entire French front was in 
touch except between the right of the V and left of 
the IV Armies. But Foch’s new IX Army, created 
on August 20th, was moving up into this gap. 

Von Moltke’s plan for a double envelopment and a 
“Cannae” had fallen through again. 


4 Baumgarten-Crusius. 



94 


The Marne Miracle 


From the manner in which the campaign devel¬ 
oped it was clear the significance of the Schlieffen 
admonition: ‘‘Make the right strong.” By having 
too strong a left, the French had merely been forced 
out of the bag that was supposed to close on them. 
But even at that, von Moltke had it in his power to 
correct the initial error of deployment for there 
were railroad vehicles galore waiting to carry troops 
from the left to the right wing. Subsequent to the 
crisis on the Sambre and Meuse, and in Lorraine, the 
German High Command seemed to lose what little 
control of the Army it had exerted before. 

At the insistence of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, 
von Moltke allowed the offensive in Lorraine to 
continue. 

In the Western Wing, he seemed to lean more and 
more upon von Bulow and preferred to leave the 
control of affairs in the hands of the respective 
Army Commanders relying for results upon cooper¬ 
ation, in which cooperation von Bulow and the 
interest of the II Army seemed to be paramount. 

Von Bulow had a very much inflated reputation 
as a maneuverer of masses, from his experience in 
the Imperial Maneuvers upon which his reputation 
was built, and that reputation seemed to have had 
von Moltke somewhat under its spell. Orders to 
the Assault Wing were almost invariably sent 
through von Bulow—telegraphic communications 
with von Bulow were kept in a better condition of 


Retreat from Mons 


95 


efficiency by all odds than the corresponding com¬ 
munications with other armies. 

This influence became more compelling until on 
the Aisne in September, von Moltke, after a con¬ 
ference with von Bulow, not only rectified the line 
of the I, II and III Armies but moved the IV and V 
Armies back from their commanding positions. 

With the retreat of the British from the Sambre 
line, von Kluck entertained hopes of forcing them 
back on to the Fortress of Maubeuge. 

Aeroplane reconnaissance at first indicated a giv¬ 
ing way toward Maubeuge but later reconnaissance 
showed the British retreating in a southwesterly 
direction. Had Independent Cavalry Group No. 2 
been in condition it might have turned the British 
left flank. 

The British continued their withdrawal but more 
in a southerly direction than southwesterly. Von 
Kluck pursued vigorously and a series of sharp en¬ 
gagements occurred between the British cavalry 
and the pursuers. 

The pursuit against the British right wing, Sir 
Douglas Haig’s 1st Corps, was not pushed vigorously 
at first as it was desirous that the German right 
wing get around to the rear. As a result Haig 
retired without much difficulty. The location of the 
Mormal forest exercised considerable influence on 
the manner of the British withdrawal. For the 
British Army to have attempted to pass to the 
left (west of the forest) would have been to have 


96 


The Marne Miracle 


left a dangerous gap between its right and the 
left on the French V Army; to pass the entire army 
to the east was precluded by the paucity of roads. 
As a compromise, the 1st Corps passed to the east 
and the 2d Corps, with the bulk of the cavalry, to 
the west. The 24th Reserve Division of the 7th 
German Reserve Corps was left to invest Maubeuge; 
the 9th Corps for the time being continued to ob¬ 
serve the defenses while the 3d Corps and the left 
division of the 4th Corps continued the pursuit of 
Haig’s 1st Corps. The right division of the 4th 
Corps and the 2d Corps followed the British 2d 
Corps (Smith-Dorrien). As stated, the von der 
Marwitz cavalry corps under von Kluck’s orders, 
covered the German right and endeavored to swing 
around the British left flank and cut them off from 
their base at Boulogne. 

French Territorials 

The 84th French territorials, who had been located 
off on the left, now occupied Cambrai and contri¬ 
buted their part toward holding off the enveloping 
German cavalry. Their presence also delayed the 
detachment of the German 4th Reserve Corps which 
stopped for the night of August 25 and 26 north of 
Valenciennes and consequently were not in the fight¬ 
ing of August 26th. Likewise, the Territorials un¬ 
der Perrin attracted a detachment of the 2d German 
Corps towards Lille and Arras so that they did not 
assist in the envelopment. 


Le Cateau . 1 

Soon after daybreak on August 26th, the advance 
troops of the left column of the German 4th Corps 
entered Le Cateau and found British soldiers of 
the 19th Brigade there and learned that the cavalry 
was a short distance away. Confused fighting oc¬ 
curred in and about the town. From the opposi¬ 
tion, the Germans became convinced that the British 
were there in force. While this was going on, the 
left column of the 4th German Corps attacked 
Caudry and found indications that the British were 
also there in force in a position ready for a fight. 

Prior to this, von Kluck must have been informed 
of the French troops holding Cambrai and of the 
location of the 1st British Corps, and now finding 
the line in between held by the 2d Corps, he could 
with reasonable certainty figure that all the British 
troops were there. Here was another opportunity 
to carry out the much coveted envelopment, and 
von Kluck had four corps and three cavalry divi¬ 
sions, total strength of about 120,000 men, as against 
55,000 British, with which to turn the trick. His 
superiority in guns could not have been much less 
than three to one. The plan was similar to that 
at Mons, that is to say, von Kluck proposed to make 
a frontal attack, mainly with his artillery, followed 
by a double envelopment. The 4th Corps was to 


1 Designated by the Germans as the Battle of Solesmes. 

97 



98 


The Marne Miracle 


attack from just west of Le Cateau to Caudry. The 
3d Corps, of which the main body was about Ma- 
roilles and Landrecies when the battle opened, was 
to march west of the Sambre on Le Cateau in order 
to attack and envelop the British right. Von der 
Marwitz’ cavalry was to pin down the British left 
wing while the 4th reserve corps came up against 
it from the direction Valenciennes; the 2d Corps 
was to move on Cambrai. The battle was fought 
with great stubbornness by the 2d British Corps 
for about seven hours. Meanwhile the 1st British 
Corps, which had repelled a night attack at Landre¬ 
cies, was retiring towards the crossing of the Oise, 
pursued by the Guard cavalry and troops of the 
German 10th Corps and 10th Reserve Corps. To¬ 
ward evening Smith-Dorrien, seeing that he must 
retire to prevent complete envelopment, issued his 
orders for breaking off the fighting but not until 
considerable of the fighting spirit had been taken 
out of the German troops. There seems to have 
been some “mix-up” in regard to the transmission 
of these withdrawal orders, for certain of the ad¬ 
vance British detachments, not getting their orders, 
were cut off and either wiped out or captured. As 
unfortunate as this was from the individual unit 
viewpoint, it greatly facilitated the withdrawal of 
the other troops since the Germans, encountering 
these detachments, thought the British were holding 
on in force. Aside from some tactical encounters, 
the German cavalry, on August 26th, were of little 


Le Cateau 


99 


use, and after the fighting had ended, went off 
towards Bapaume and bivouaced about five miles 
north of the town. 

August 26th marks the climax of the influence of 
the French Territorials on the British left. These 
Territorials occupied Cambrai and by so doing drew 
off the German 2d Corps and the Cavalry. They 
were finally forced to withdraw towards the south¬ 
west and on August 27th united with the Ebener 
Reserve Group, 55th and 56th Divisions, recently 
sent up. 

Sordet’s cavalry also had moved to the Allied left 
and was assisting in drawing the German towards 
the west While all this was going on, the VI 
French Army was being formed of the 7th Corps 
brought west from Belfort and certain available 
reserve divisions. 

Meanwhile, on the evening of August 25th, von 
Bulow ordered “an indefatigable pursuit towards 
the southwest of the beaten enemy.” 

Von Bulow in his report states that the pursuit 
was “continued without rest up to the battlefield 
of St. Quentin.” 

Von Bulow further states “the ruling thought, 
was to always leave sufficient elbow room in the 
great turning movement of the main force made 
up of the III, IV, and V Armies. At the same 
time we hoped to gradually outflank the enemy on 
the left during the pursuit.” 2 

*Von Bulow's report, p. 28. 



100 


The Marne Miracle 


The II German Army continued its pursuit follow¬ 
ing the V French Army which fell back before it 
across the River Oise. On the morning of August 
28th, the French Reserve Group, consisting of the 
61st and 62d Divisions, made a surprise attack upon 
the German Independent Cavalry Corps No. 2, 
which was on the right wing of the I German Army, 
catching the cavalry in its billets. Th)is attack 
was the beginning of the fighting that was known 
as the “Battle of Amiens.” The fighting here con¬ 
tinued on the next day, August 29th, and, in addi¬ 
tion to the Reserve Group, was participated in by 
the 7th French Corps, the Alpine Chasseurs, the 
81st, 82d, 84th and 88th Territorials, and the 3d 
and 5th Cavalry Divisions. The right wing of the 
I German Army bore the brunt while the left wing 
drove off the attacks from the direction of St. Quen¬ 
tin. The I German Army attempted to outflank 
this group around Amiens from the west, but the 
French withdrew and disappeared. It was while 
this fighting was going on that von Kluck received 
word that the French V Army was attacking the 
German II Army at St. Quentin and Guise. 



* i c 


St. Quentin-Guise. 

On August 28th, Lanrezac at his headquarters at 
Laon, and under the eyes of Joffre himself, issued 
orders for an attack next day in which the British 
right was to participate. Lord French’s forces 
were in no condition to take the offensive so the 
orders were changed confining the attack to the V 
French Army alone. It certainly was a stroke 
of luck that Sir John French decided that he could 
not make this attack for had he done so he would 
probably have been badly defeated and the decisive 
battle might have been called the Battle of St. 
Quentin-Guise instead of the Marne. The fact that 
the British Army still constituted a fighting force 
is probably what caused the Germans to be cautious 
and prevented them from making their tactical suc¬ 
cess over the French decisive. The V French Army 
at this time was isolated except for the British and 
the gradually forming VI French Army under 
Maunoury. On August 29th, the much discussed 
agreement was entered into between Joffre and 
Lord French under which the British were to retire 
behind the Aisne “Keeping always within one day’s 
march of the French Armies.” On this date, August 
29th, the British base was transferred to St. 
Nazaire, with advance base at Le Mans. 

The orders from the German High Command for 
the movements of the I Army issued on the 27th of 


101 


102 


The Marne Miracle 


August were as follows: “The I Army, with the 2d 
Cavalry Corps under its orders, will march west of 
the Oise towards the lower Seine It must be pre¬ 
pared to cooperate in the fighting with the II Army. 
It will also be responsible for the protection of the 
right flank of the armies, and will take steps to 
prevent any new enemy concentration in its zone 
of operations.” 

On the evening of August 30th, after the victory 
north of the Somme and the capture of Amiens, and 
toward the end of the II Army's engagement at St. 
Quentin, von Bulow sent the following wireless 
message to von Kluck: “In order to take full ad¬ 
vantage of the victory, it is urgently desired that 
the I Army should turn towards La Fere-Laon with 
the pivot at Chauny.” 

Von Kluck had wanted to change his advance 
from the southwest to the south, and when this 
message came from von Bulow, he was only too glad 
to comply with it. General Headquarters expressly 
approved of such action in its order of August 31st 
which reads in part: “The movements begun by 
the I Army are in accordance with the views of 
General Headquarters.” 

Here both von Kluck and General Headquarters 
were perfectly in accord with the idea of ignoring 
the existence of this Maunoury force on the right 
flank. 

It seems odd that General Headquarters did not 
ask what was being done with regard to Maunoury's 


St. Q u e n t i n - G u i s e 


103 


Army since in its order of August 27th it had es¬ 
pecially mentioned enemy concentrations in the zone 
of operations of the I Army and directed their 
prevention. 

From the wording of this order it is also clear 
that von Kluck’s main task was “protection of the 
right flank of the armies.” He was responsible 
for the security of the flank of the whole Assault 
Wing. 

Meanwhile the III, IV and V German Armies to 
the east were engaged in bloody encounters with the 
III and IV French Armies along the Meuse. 

The gap between the wings of the V and IV 
French Armies was widening. 

The IV German Army had been for three days 
engaged with the French IV Army about Sedan. 
Appeals were made to III German Army by the IV 
German Army to come in on the flank of the IV 
French Army from the north and to this appeal von 
Hausen, the commander, responded notwithstanding 
the fact that his orders from General Headquarters 
directed that he advance in the direction southwest. 
Complying with this appeal, von Hausen turned his 
left wing southeast August 29th. 

In the handling of the IV German Army there 
was much to be desired. Wurttemburg deliberately 
threw his weight toward his left flank virtually hold¬ 
ing up his 8th Corps on the right. The fact that he 
may have been expecting von Hausen to furnish the 
necessary pressure against Langle’s (IV French 


104 The Marne Miracle 

Army) flank does not excuse Wurttemburg from 
fighting his own troops to the best advantage. 

Von Hausen was hardly well on his way to assist 
Wurttemburg when at about 4:00 p. m., August 
29th, a call came from von Bulow to turn in his 
direction, to which von Hausen was unable to 
respond. 

The Battle of St. Quentin-Guise was about as 
bady handled in regard to cooperation as the Battles 
on the Sambre. Von Bulow had captured a French 
Staff officer who had with him a copy of Joffre’s 
order for the attack. Von Bulow had asked von 
Kluck to turn in towards the Le Fere-Laon line 
which would have brought the latter square into 
the left rear of the V French Army. Now, instead 
of letting the French attack and standing on the 
defensive meanwhile reinforcing his own left so that 
at the right time it could envelop from the east, von 
Bulow attacked all along the line driving back the 
French V Army which was able to extricate itself 
from the fight and get back to the Aisne. Von 
Kluck thereupon turned his left wing (3d and 9th 
Corps), with which he had intended to attack the 
French V Army, to the south again and marched 
towards the lower Oise in the direction of Com- 
piegne. Meanwhile his right wing (4th and 2d 
Corps) was swinging through Amiens and marching 
due south towards Clermont (30 kilometers west 
of Compiegne) in hopes of intercepting the Brit¬ 
ish presumed to be retiring in bad order in that 


St. Quentin-Guise 105 

direction. It was Joffre's intention to assume the 
offensive on the Aisne-Rheims-Amiens line, but the 
continued retreat of the British caused him to decide 
to fall back to the Paris-Verdun line. 

By August 31st, Foch's new army was up on the 
Aisne and opposed the right wing of von Hausen's 

III Army that had been hammering at the left of 
the IV French Army and effectively closing the gap 
that had heretofore existed. 

This gap now being closed, there was a regroup¬ 
ing of the French Army and the left corps of the 

IV Army passed to Foch of the IX Army. 

The withdrawal of the IV and III French Armies 
had been very cleverly handled. Rear Guards cov¬ 
ered the retirements from successive sector to suc¬ 
cessive sector each extricating itself in time and 
facilitating its withdrawal by the skillful use of the 
75 mm. gun. 

The fighting extended to the East as far as Ver¬ 
dun ; the V German Army getting across the Meuse 
in the vicinity of Dun on August 30th and 31st. 
Its action might have been more decisive had not the 
5th Corps been pulled out of the line for service on 
the East front. 

It now became apparent to some of the German 
Army Commands that the French were falling back 
in accordance with orders and that the retreat was 
in conformity with a definite plan. Von Bulow 
may not have thought so and, clearly he did not, if 
one can judge from the way his army functioned. 


106 The Marne Miracle 

The French had skillfully backed out of every 
pocket. It was apparent, from what was going 
on, that the German High Command was losing 
touch more and more. It was still back at Coblentz 
but now on August 31st, moved up to Luxemburg. 
It is not understood why the Post of Command was 
not moved nearer the right flank which now, beyond 
all question, was the decisive one. Yet, it remained 
at Luxemburg 240 kilometers from the critical point. 

It must be remembered that von Moltke was com¬ 
manding all the German Armies, and, in addition, 
had to co-ordinate the action of the German Allies. 
What should have been done by the Germans was 
to appoint a separate commander for the West 
Front, the same as they did on the East Front when 
they appointed von Hindenburg. General Head¬ 
quarters then should have been located at some 
central point—say, Berlin—from which location 
all movements could have been directed and 
co-ordinated. 

When the Germans became convinced that the 
Allied withdrawal was according to plan and was 
not a rout, and, when all their attempts to synchro¬ 
nise envelopments had failed, it seems odd that the 
High Command did not call a halt on the Aisne long 
enough to close up and reorganize before starting 
again. The elder von Moltke rested four days after 
the battles around Metz and before continuing after 
MacMahon in 1870, so there was precedent for such 
action. Von Motlke expressed regret afterwards 


St. Quentin-Guise 


107 


that such a halt was not ordered, but his expression 
came too late. Inside of six days the German Army 
could have been thoroughly rehabilitated and rein¬ 
forced. The Guard Reserve and 11th Corps were 
still at Aix la Chapelle and could have been returned, 
for Tannenberg was over; and the VI and VII 
Armies could have been brought around in rear of 
the western flank, as cars were ready and waiting on 
the sidings at Strassburg, or at least the VI Army 
could have been sideslipped through Metz towards 
the V Army. On August 30th, von Moltke learned 
of the rail movements from the French right to their 
left, yet this fact did not cause any action. 

Meanwhile, the French and British Armies filled 
their ranks, the British organized a new corps and 
the Germans “rushed breathlessly on.” 


Crossing the Marne . 1 

As already stated, von Kluck wheeled his left wing 
around and continued towards the lower Oise after 
St. Quentin, moving via Compiegne and Noyon. 

The I Army was led south with the hope of finally 
encircling the British, and on September 1st 
attacked them at the crossings of the Oise. 

Brilliant actions were fought at Villers Cotterets 
and Compiegne, but the British finally succeeded in 
getting across the Marne, their line being at first 
Meaux-La Ferte sous Jouarre, then the right finally 
fell back via Coulommiers toward Rozoy and faced 
generally east. 

Meanwhile, the Germans learned that the left of 
the V French Army had let go at Soissons and was 
retiring toward the southeast. With the further 
withdrawal of the British, on September 1st, the 
left wing of von Kluck struck the V French Army 
near Chateau-Thierry, and a big action was fought 
in that vicinity. The French then fell back towards 
the Seine. On September 2nd and 3rd, the IV and 
III French Armies fought back between Rheims and 
Verdun, the IV Army finally withdrawing via the 
broken and wooded Argonne country toward Vitry 
and Bar le Due and the III Army, with right holding 
Verdun and left in connection with the IV Army, 
retiring through Bar le Due. 


1 See Sketch No. 4. 


109 



110 The Marne Miracle 

The Forcing of the French Southeastward* from 

Paris 

During the night of the 2d-3d September von 
Kluck received a wireless message from the Supreme 
Command: “The intention is to force the French 
in a southeasterly direction from Paris. The I 
Army will follow in echelon behind the II Army and 
will be responsible for the flank protection of the 
armies.” 2 

This order now joins the issue as to what was 
von Kluck’s main mission. In the original order of 
deployment for August 18th among other things, 
von Kluck was warned that he would be expected to 
protect the flank of the Armies. This admonition 
was reiterated on August 27th, when von Kluck was 
directed to move down the west bank of the Oise. 
It is again reiterated in this order. 

The emphasis given this particular task convinces 
one that it was von Kluck’s main task. 

It is true that von Kluck had deployed the 2d 
active and 4th Reserve Corps for protection of his 
own flank, but the flank protection contemplated by 
GHQ was an army function not fulfilled by merely 
protecting his own army flank by a portion thereof. 

Von Kluck, in his book, gives out the idea that 
his main mission was to force the French in a 
southeasterly direction away from Paris. 


* “The March on Paris, 1914“—von Kluck, p. 94. 



Crossing the Marne 111 

He states: “It fell to the I Army to apply the prin¬ 
cipal pressure in forcing back the enemy, as it was 
the only force that was immediately on his heels 
and that could exert the necessary compulsion on 
his line of retreat.” 3 It is true that at this time von 
Kluck was a full day’s march ahead of the II Army 
and the latter was echeloned in front of the III 
Army. One might well ask how von Kluck got one 
day in advance. 

After the Battle of St. Quentin, von Bulow halted 
a day but von Kluck kept on going, notwithstanding 
his order to afford protection to the flank of the 
armies, which is generally executed by echelonment 
to the rear under the Principle of Mass. 

Were one to judge von Kluck solely by the manner 
in which he carried out the order of September 2-3, 
which found him a day ahead of the flank of von 
Bulow, with the only alternative to continuing on, 
or of stopping for two days to enable von Bulow to 
catch up and get ahead of him, one might not be so 
severe, but, to get at the real situation, one must 
take the series of orders. Had von Kluck complied 
with the order of August 27th and not rushed after 
the supposedly routed British, he would not have 
found himself in the predicament he was when he 
received the September 2-3 order. 

During September 3d von Kluck continued his 

•“The March on Paris, 1914,,—von Kluck, pp. 96 and 97. 

47 



112 The Marne Miracle 

advance across the Marne, 4 his 9th Corps driving 
the left of the French V Army now under d’Esperey 5 
in confusion through Montmirail. The II Army 
reached the Marne about September 3d, and von 
Bulow reported: “That in front of his army the 
enemy was streaming back south of the Marne in 
great disorder.” 

Meanwhile, on September 4th and 5th, von Kluck, 
still a day ahead, pushed forward, driving the enemy 
away from Paris. 

After the beginning of the movements of Septem¬ 
ber 5th, the following wireless message was received 
from German General Headquarters at 7:15 a. m. 
(sent September 4th at 7:00 p. m.) : “The I and II 
Armies are to remain opposite the East Front of 
Paris; I Army between the Oise and the Marne, 
holding the passages over the Marne west of Cha- 
teau-Thierry, II Army between the Marne and the 
Seine, holding the passages over the Seine between 
Nogent and Mery, inclusive; III Army has the line 
of march, Troyes and eastward.” To comply with 
this order, von Kluck thought it would be allowing 
“the enemy, whom we were pressing hard, to regain 
his freedom of action,” so von Kluck kept on cover- 

4 On September 4th, French troops were known to be as¬ 
sembling in force about Dammartin and to the south but 
von Kluck did not worry about them as he had two corps 
and cavalry out on that flank. On September 4th, a part 
of this French force was struck by the 4th Reserve Corps 
and driven west. 

* Franchet d’Esperey succeeded Lanrezac in command of 
the V Army after St. Quentin. 



Crossing the Marne 113 

ing the right with the Independent Cavalry and the 
2d Active and 4th Reserve Corps. 

This wireless from GHQ had been sent subse¬ 
quent to the receipt of the wireless from von Kluck 
stating “the I Army has reached the limits of its 
powers, due to continual hard fighting and the 
marching requirements.” It will be noted that von 
Kluck, by this order, was assigned a more passive 
role, undoubtedly due to his statement of the fatigue 
of his army. It is also noted that this order directs 
von Kluck to remain between the Oise and Marne, 
so the inference is that GHQ thought that he was 
still north of the Marne. 

On the evening of September 5th Lieutenant 
Colonel von Hentsch, from GHQ, arrived with a 
copy of the order, and for the first time von Kluck 
knew of the lack of success of the V, VI, and VII 
Armies and was warned of the probability of the 
French building up a strong force against his right 
flank. The following is a copy of the order von 
Hentsch brought: 

“The enemy succeeded in withdrawing from the 
enveloping attack of the I and II Armies and has 
reached the neighborhood of Paris with parts of his 
forces. Reports and other information lead to the 
conclusion that the enemy is withdrawing troops 
from the front Toul-Belfort and sending them west¬ 
wards, and that he is also withdrawing detachments 
from before the front of our III, IV and V Armies. 
The driving of the whole French Army in a south- 


114 


The Marne Miracle 


easterly direction against the Swiss frontier is 
therefore no longer possible. It must rather be 
reckoned that the enemy is assembling strong forces 
in the neighborhood of Paris, creating new forma¬ 
tions there for the protection of the Capital and to 
threaten the right flank of the German Armies. 

“The I and II Armies must therefore remain op¬ 
posite to the East Front of Paris. Their task is to 
co-operate mutually in offensive action against any 
hostile enterprise from the neighborhood of Paris. 

“The IV and V Armies are still in touch with 
strong enemy forces. They must endeavor to con¬ 
tinue to press them southeast. Thereby the road 
will be opened for the VI Army over the Moselle 
between Toul and Epinal. It is not yet possible to 
foresee whether the IV and V Armies, in conjunc¬ 
tion with the VI and VII, will be able to drive 
any considerable enemy forces against the Swiss 
frontier. 

“The task of the VI and VII Armies remains for 
the present to fix the enemy forces on their front. 
An attack is to be made as soon as possible between 
Toul and Epinal, provision being made against 
attack from these fortresses. 

“The III Army is to advance in the direction of 
Troyes-Vendeuves (between Troyes and Bar le 
Due). It will be ready to act according to the situa¬ 
tion, either in support of the I and II Armies beyond 
the Seine in a westerly direction, or to assist our 
left wing in a southerly or southeasterly direction. 


Crossing the Marne 115 

“His Majesty therefore orders: 

1. The I and II Armies will remain opposite the 
East Front of Paris, ready to act offensively against 
any hostile enterprise from the direction of Paris. 

“ ‘2. The III Army will advance on Troyes-Ven- 
deuves. 

“ ‘3. The IV and V Armies will, by pressing for¬ 
ward without cessation in a southeasterly direction, 
open the crossings over the Upper Moselle for the 
VI and VII Armies. The right flank of the IV 
Army will advance by Vitry, the right flank of the 
V Army by Revigny. The IV Army Cavalry Corps 
will explore in front of the IV and V Armies. 

“ ‘4. The task of the VI and VII Armies remains 
as before.’ ” 

Allied Distribution 

Complying with the order in regard to regroup¬ 
ing and the occupation of the Paris-Verdun line, 
before referred to, the British and V French Army 
withdrew south of the Grand Morin; Foch halted 
on the Aube; Langle de Cary on the Ornain, and 
the III Army to the east. 

The III Army (Sarrail who succeeded de Ruffey) 
consisted of the 4th, 5th, 6th Corps, without the 42d 
Division; one brigade of the 54th Infantry Division; 
65th, 67th and 75th Reserve Divisions; 2d and 7th 
Cavalry Divisions. Front: from Verdun to Revigny. 

The IV Army (Langle de Cary) : 17th, 12th 

Corps, Colonial Corps, and the 2d Corps. Front: 


116 


The Marne Miracle 


south of the Ornain from the left of Sarrail to 
Sompuis. 

The IX Army (Foch), newly organized on August 
20th: 9th Corps, consisting of the 17th Infantry 
Division, Morocco Division, and 52d Reserve Divi¬ 
sion; 11th Corps, consisting of the 21st and 22d 
Infantry Divisions, reinforced September 7th by the 
18th Infantry Division from Lorraine; 42d Infantry 
Division, and 60th Reserve Division, as well as the 
9th Cavalry Division. Front: Mailly-Sezanne. 

The V Army (Franchet d’Esperey) : 18th, 3d, 

1st, and 10th Corps; group of the 51st, 53d, and 
69th Reserve Divisions, Cavalry Divisions, and one 
brigade of the 2d Cavalry Division. 

Main Assault Group 

The British Army (Sir John French), consisting 
of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Corps and a cavalry division 
of 5 brigades with 5-horse batteries. 

The VI Army (Maunoury), by being placed under 
the Commandant of Paris, was reinforced by the 
Reserves of the Paris garrison. It included the 
Lamaze Group (55th and 56th Reserve Divisions 
and one Morocco brigade) ; Beautier Group of the 
7th Corps (14th Infantry Division and 63d Reserve 


(Note.—W hen things were critical on the Ourcq 
—five battalions were rushed out from Paris in 
motor cars—hence the legend about the taxi-cab 
army.) 



Crossing the Marne 117 

Division) ; the Ebener Group (61st and 62d Reserve 
Divisions), which arrived on the 6th; 45th Algerian 
Division; the 4th Corps from the III Army, which 
was brought around by rail, arriving on September 
6th; Sordet’s Cavalry Corps and the cavalry brigade 
Billet; ten companies of Zouaves, which arrived on 
the 9th of September. 

Reserve: Paris garrison, consisting of 83d, 85th, 
89th, and 92d Territorials, and the Renarich Naval 
Brigade. 

The time was ripe for a French counter-stroke 
if it was to come at all . 

The actions from now until about the 14th of 
September divide themselves into four parts: First, 
the Battle of Nancy; second, the Battle of the Ourcq 
and Marne; third, the Battle of Fere Champenoise, 
and fourth, the Battles around Verdun. 


























Battle of Nancy. 

One must keep in mind the days on which each 
event occurred, otherwise it will not be apparent 
what bearing each one had on the other. It will 
be noticed that there was little or no co-ordination 
among the various German forces. It will be 
recalled that the forces of De Cast.elnau had fallen 
back from the Lorraine offensive of August 21st to 
the defenses of Nancy and Toul, followed by the 
Germans who had been checked by two French 
counter-attacks on August 25th. With the with¬ 
drawal of the Allies on the west from the line of 
the Somme, the time seemed to be ripe for some 
activity on the part of the Bavarians, and it was 
thought that with the envelopment of von Kluck 
going on, a determined attack against the Nancy 
defenses might draw troops away from the Allied 
left, thereby facilitating von Kluck’s movements, or, 
if the French sent troops to hold back von Kluck, 
the Bavarians might break through the passes near 
Nancy and take the French armies west of Verdun 
in reverse. After the failure of the original attempt 
of the Germans to carry the Mirecourt Gap, a divi¬ 
sion was started from Metz across the Woevre on 
about August 30th to seize St. Mihiel, but hearing 
of the retreat of the Allies from the Somme and the 
successes farther west, this division was turned 
south towards Pont-a-Mousson to cover the right of 


119 


120 


The Marne Miracle 


the troops that were to attack Nancy. The attack 
on Nancy was made by about five corps, with 
upwards of two hundred thousand men, and the final 
grand assault was made on the 6th of September, 
the day of the beginning of the advance of Maun- 
oury. On September 7th, the attacks had definitely 
failed, so much so that the Kaiser, who was in that 
vicinity, returned to Metz. The battle having been 
settled at Nancy by September 7th, French troops 
were available to be despatched north to hold the 
Woevre heights against a menace from Metz, while 
other troops could be sent to assist at points where 
needed along the line. 1 

This situation is about as good an illustration of 
the successful use of interior lines as one will find 
in modern times. We have here another Chancel- 
lorsville to a certain extent. The Bavarians attack¬ 
ing at Nancy would correspond to Sedgwick, while 
Castelnau would correspond to Early; Sarrial and 
Cary would correspond to Anderson, and the Crown 
Prince to Hooker. The 5th Corps is blocked at 
Troyon the same as the 1st Corps, Reynolds’, was 
blocked at Banks Ford. Having checked the Bava¬ 
rians, the 21st and 15th French Corps go to the 
assistance of Sarrial and Cary, the same as Jackson 
and McLaws went to the aid of Anderson. The 

1 In all, seven Corps, two Reserve Divisions and three 
Cavalry Divisions of the I and II French Armies were trans¬ 
ferred to the West before and during the Battle of the 
Marne. 



Battle of Nancy 


121 


balance of the fighting differs in detailed movements, 
but the general result is similar. 

Now let us turn to the French left flank and see 
what was transpiring in that vicinity. Gallieni, 
Governor of Paris, issued his proclamation for the 
defense on the 3d of September. On the 2d of Sep¬ 
tember indications of von Kluck’s march to the 
southeastwards began to be observed, and by Sep¬ 
tember 4th Gallieni was so certain that the move¬ 
ment was under way and that an opportunity 
offered itself for a flank attack that he urged Joffre 
to begin the counter-attack. There is no need for 
a discussion of who first conceived of this idea. 
Gallieni, in his book entitled “Gallieni parle,” page 
52, says: “It is necessary for me to say that the 
morning of the 4th was the greatest morning for 
me, as it was necessary for me to forcefully present 
and impress my views, my certitudes, for the Gen¬ 
eralissimo this date still held firm to his first project 
of retiring behind the Seine and had transmitted 
some instructions in consequence. The telephone 
had played all morning; one is able to say that the 
Battle of the Marne was caused by the ‘coups de 
telephone.’ ” 

We often have cases in war where a subordinate 
conceives of an idea and suggests it to the com¬ 
mander and the commander executes it successfully, 
and afterwards the subordinate claims the glory. 
We know that Joffre had a movement of this kind 
in mind if the necessary opportunity was presented, 


122 


The Marne Miracle 


but since Marshal Foch has said that about every¬ 
thing in war is the execution, we can allow Gallieni 
credit for the conception, since there is enough left 
in the execution to make Joffre or anyone else 
famous. In wars on a large scale there is always 
glory enough to go around without any one indivi¬ 
dual claiming it all. 

In furtherance of his idea of striking the troops 
of von Kluck in the flank, Gallieni, on the morning 
of the 4th of September at about 9 a. m., wrote as 
follows to Maunoury (commanding VI Army) : 
“I shall give you your marching orders as soon as 
I know the direction of march of the British Army. 
Meanwhile be ready to march this afternoon, so as 
to make an attack tomorrow, the 5th of September, 
east of Paris.” This was telephoned to Joffre, who 
approved of the action directed. At this time the 
British and III and IV French Armies were still 
retreating, while the armies of d’Esperey (V) and 
Foch (IX) were being reorganized after their rapid 
retreat. Joffre decided to take Gallieni’s advice, 
and so at 4 p. m. issued the following order: 

‘‘(1) Advantage must be taken of the risky situa¬ 
tion of the German I Army to concentrate against 
it the efforts of the Allied armies on our extreme 
left. All preparations must be made during the 5th 
for an attack on the 6th of September. 

“(2) The following general arrangements are to 
be carried out by the evening of September 5th: 

“(a) All the available forces of the VI Army 


Battle of Nancy 


123 


northeast of Meaux are to be ready to cross the 
Ourcq between Lizy and May-en-Multien (north) 
in the general direction of Chateau-Thierry. The 
available portions of the 1st Calvary Corps which 
are close at hand are to be handed over to General 
Maunoury for this operation. 

“ (b) The British Army is to establish itself on 
the line, Changis-Coulommiers, facing east, ready 
to attack in the general direction of Montmirail. 

“(c) The V Army will close slightly to its left 
and take up the general line, Courtacon-Esternay- 
Sezanne, ready to attack, generally speaking, from 
south to north. The 2d Cavalry Corps will secure 
connection between the British Army and the V 
Army. 

“(d) The IX Army will cover the right of the 
V Army by holding the southern outlets of the St. 
Gond marshes and by placing part of its forces on 
the plateau north of Sezanne. 

“(3) These different armies are to attack on the 
morning of the 6th of September. 

“As to the IV and III Armies, they will be warned 
on the 6th of the great attack which is about to take 
place on their left. In consequence, the IV Army 
is to cease moving southward and must second the 
operations and take advantage of them by holding 
the enemy in check, and for this purpose will get 
into contact with the III Army which, passing out 
to the north of Revigny, will carry on the offensive 
westward.” 


124 The Marne Miracle 

This order gives quite clearly the general scheme 
of battle, and it appears to be clear, simple and 
complete, and such failures as there were resulted 
from impetousity or slowness in execution, for 
example: writers charge Maunoury with attacking 
too soon and General French with being too slow, 
and so on. 

The acts of this part of the drama of war may be 
divided into several scenes: 

First.—Maunoury attacks and drives in the 4th 
Reserve Corps. 

Second.—Von Kluck, finally alive to danger, turns 
around suddenly and counter-attacks. 

Third.—Von Bulow and von Hausen attack vio¬ 
lently and endeavor to throw back Foch and pierce 
the center. 

Fourth.—The IV and V German Armies in the 
Saulz-Ornain Valley endeavor to dislodge the 
French right. 

“The die was now cast and it only remained for 
the Franco-British Armies to carry out to the full 
the tasks assigned them by Joffre. On the morn¬ 
ing of the 5th of September, the order for the ad¬ 
vance reached the rank and file and was received 
with great enthusiasm.” 

By circulating proclamation among the troops, 
the High Command strove to bring the urgency of 
the situation to the attention of the men. Joffre 
issued the following brief unemotional order to 


125 


Battle of Nancy 

the troops, which order shorn of all sentimental 
appeals to home and country runs as follows: 

“At the moment when a battle, on which depends 
the welfare of the country, is about to begin, I 
wish to inform you that the time for looking to 
the rear is past. All efforts must be employed in 
attacking and repelling the enemy. A troop 
which is not able to advance will hold the ground 
conquered at all costs and will allow itself to be 
slain where it stands rather than retire. This is a 
moment when no faltering will be tolerated .” 2 

a “Histoire de la Guerre 1914-15"; Cornet, p. 207. 


I 









Battle of the Ourcq and Marne . 1 

On September 4th, von Kluck’s right was covered 
by the 4th Reserve Corps and the 4th Cavalry Divi¬ 
sion and the balance of his army was advancing in 
two wings the right consisting of the 2d and 4th 
Corps and the left consisting of the 3d and 9th 
Corps. Late in the afternoon of September 4th, this 
right flank guard struck the advance troops of the 
French, the Lamaze Group near Dammartin where 
it had been since September 2d, and drove it back. 
At this time the Beautier Group (7th Corps) was 
at Louvres but did not come into action; it let the 
chance to completely turn the German right, slip. 

The 4th German Cavalry Division also drove off 
attacks at Bregy. Not wishing to come into the 
zone of operations of Paris, the German line of ad¬ 
vance was swung off to the east. By the night of 
September 5th, the two German wings were south 
of the Grand Morin. These movements were car¬ 
ried out notwithstanding the orders received on the 
morning of September 5th with regard to the 
defensive flank. 2 


1 See Sketches Nos. 4 and 5 and General Map. 

3 As a result the 4th German Corps was 45 kilometers 
from the place to which it was sent into line on the Ourcq; 
the 3d Corps 45 kilometers and the 9th Corps 90 kilo¬ 
meters. The quickest these corps could arrive at the points 
required was respectively: 4th, night of the 7th; 3d, morn¬ 
ing of the 8th; and 9th, evening of the 8th. 


127 



128 


The Marne Miracle 


September 6th 

On the morning of September 6th, Maunoury at¬ 
tacked with the Beautier Group of the 7th Corps on 
the left and the Lamaze Reserve Corps group on the 
right, with one division of the 4th Corps and a 
cavalry brigade to the south of the river keeping 
up touch with Sir John French. The German 4th 
Reserve Corps was taken somewhat off its guard 
and was gradually forced back. (German accounts 
state that it held its ground.) The French made re¬ 
peated attempts to turn the German right but were 
prevented by the 4th Cavalry Division. The 3d 
German Infantry Division of the 2d Corps arrived 
on the left of the 4th Reserve Corps at about noon 
and the 4th Division, under the Corps Commander 
von Linsingen, came into action at the line Trocy- 
Etavigny (near Trocy), on the right of the 4th 
Reserve Corps. During the day the fighting was 
most desperate on both sides; the French 75’s 
showed their superiority over the German Field 
Guns and had no difficulty in silencing them but the 
German heavies in turn played havoc with the 
French 75’s and advancing infantry. 

Notwithstanding, the Corps of Lamaze advanced 
by night as far as the line Chambry-Barcy-Marcilly. 
(Towns on a line north from Meaux not shown 
on map.) 

Meanwhile, the 7th Corps was attacking in the 
direction of Acy-en-Multien. At daybreak, it 


Battle of the Ourcq 129 

seized the village of St. Souplets and pushed for¬ 
ward with considerable speed due to the fact that 
the German 4th Reserve Corps was occupied with 
the Corps of Lamaze to the south. Von Gronau, 
commanding the 4th Reserve Corps earlier in the 
day sent urgent appeals to von Kluck for assistance 
which came in the form of the 3d and 4th Divi¬ 
sions of the 2d Corps already mentioned. French 
aviators spotted these columns crossing the Marne 
and they appeared to be reinforcing the left of the 
4th Reserve Corps which was partially correct; 
so the 7th French Corps pushed its attack and by 
nightfall it had connected up with the left of 
Lamaze near Marcilly with left thrown forward a 
little to the south of Nanteuil. Von Kluck was now 
hurrying the 4th Corps north but these troops were 
delayed by the division of the 4th French Corps 
(8th Division) near Meaux. 

The Germans were now alive to the menace to 
their right flank by these attacks of Maunoury, but 
the latter was not in a position to take full ad¬ 
vantage of his superior position due to the fact 
that the attack had been launched before all his 
troops were concentrated. 

While this was transpiring north of the Marne, 
von Kluck’s left wing (3d and 9th Corps) were 
engaged on the Courtacon-Esternay front against 
the left of the V French Army while to their right 
was the cavalry corps of von der Marwitz holding 
up the British. A decided gap had been driven in 


130 The Marne Miracle 

the hostile line separating the British right from 
the left of Franchet. Into this gap the 2d and 4th 
German Corps were advancing when orders from 
von Kluck pulled them to the north. The pressure 
being relinquished the British who were advancing 
cautiously accelerating their movements slightly. 

The British Advance 

It will be recalled that the British were to ad¬ 
vance east towards Montmirail. On the evening of 
September 5th, large enemy bivouacs were seen in 
the neighborhood of Coulommiers, Rebais, La Ferte 
Gaucher, and Dagny (towns on and to the south of 
the Grand Morin). Early next morning, Septem¬ 
ber 6th, a heavy artillery fire was opened by the 
Germans and about noon the British advance guards 
encountered German cavalry supported by small in¬ 
fantry groups (jagers) and artillery. Sir John 
French states that about noon the British noticed 
that the German advance was not being pushed 
vigorously “and later . . . as we attempted to 

close with them, it was discovered that a general 
retreat was in progress, covered by rear guards.” 3 
It is certain that early in the afternoon there was 
a noticeable slackening of the efforts of the Ger¬ 
man I Army to push south and east. The 4th Corps, 
Sixt von Arnim, that had been operating to the 
south of the Grand Morin was ordered, during the 


3 “1914”—Viscount French, p. 121. 



Battle of the Ourcq 131 

late afternoon, to recross the river at Coulommiers 
and proceed towards La Ferte sous Jouarre. The 
2d Corps had already withdrawn. The British then 
lost no time in seizing the heights on the Grand 
Morin west of Coulommiers, from which the Ger¬ 
man heavy guns, during the morning, had held up 
their advance and by evening the British line was 
Dagny, south of Coulommiers, Maisoncelles (not 
shown on map). On the whole the British had 
seen little fighting this day and had captured a few 
machine guns and taken some prisoners, but they 
had advanced about eight kilometers. 

The V French Army 

It will be recalled that in the orders of Joffre of 
September 5th for the general attack, the V French 
Army was to attack direction north. 

The idea was for this army to attack with right 
forward, for the purpose of cooperating with the VI 
French Army, and entirely turn the right of the 
German II Army and completely envelop the I 
German Army. The army moved forward at day¬ 
light disposed as follows: From left to right—18th, 
3d, 1st and 10th Corps. Reserve divisions brought 
up the rear in the second line. Immediately a 
violent battle developed all along the line, due to 
the fact that the Germans had also received orders 
to advance. 

In the fighting, the French got the better of their 
enemy generally. On the left, the 18th Corps seized 


132 


The Marne Miracle 


Courtacon, being assisted by Conneau’s 2d Cavalry 
Corps which was operating on its left and keeping 
up liaison with the British. The cavalry after per¬ 
forming their part of the task admirably, camped 
for the night at Choisy, southwest of La Ferte 
Gaucher. The 3d Corps, after a particularly fierce 
artillery preparation, captured the village just 
southwest of Esternay, while the 10th Corps got 
into a position to enfilade the Germans holding 
Esternay and, after nightfall, drove them out and 
forced their right forward so that connection with 
the left of Foch’s army was effected at Charleville. 
Von Bulow had been quite hardly put and had to 
call in his 10th Reserve Corps to check the 1st and 
10th French Corps. 

In rear of the 10th Reserve Corps was the 13th 
Division of the 7th Corps. The 10th Corps was 
sent forward to reinforce the 10th Reserve Corps 
and brought the German retirement to a halt about 
ten kilometers southeast of Montmirail. At this 
point the advance of the right wing of the French V 
Army was brought to a halt. The main assault 
wing of the German Guard and 10th Corps were 
attacking the left of Foch’s army consisting of the 
42d Division and the Moroccans. 

The II German and IX French Armies 

The 19th German Division of the German 10th 
Corps forced the crossing of the Petit Morin while 
the 20th Division of the same Corps to the left 


Battle of the Ourcq 133 

crossed the St. Gond Marsh. The 9th French Corps 
to the east fared no better than the 42d Division 
and Moroccans and their advance guards north of 
the Marsh were driven back upon the main body 
to the south. 

The 1st Guard Infantry Division, still farther 
east was held up by the heavy artillery fire coming 
from the south of the marsh so that on its front 
the battle was a standoff. The 2d Guard Infantry 
Division was to move around the marsh to the east 
but was checked by strong resistance near Morains 
le Petit. The 2d Guard Infantry Division called to 
the III Army for help and as a result the 32d 
Infantry Division was diverted to the west for that 
purpose. 

The III German Army 

Meanwhile the left wing of the 12th Corps, and 
the 19th Corps, advanced south and by nightfall had 
reached Coole on the Fere Champenoise-Vitry Road. 
The 11th French Corps in its front had been driven 
back. The diverting of the 32d Infantry Division 
left a gap in the German line which the French 
failed to take advantage of. 

The IV German and IV French Armies 

The German IV Army continued its advance 
southeast and encountered the IV French Army 
which was under orders to advance with the III 
Army. 


134 The Marne Miracle 

The IV French Army was not very well placed for 
an attack since its left was in the air and only sup¬ 
ported by the 9th Cavalry Division. The battle was 
in the nature of a rencontre. The 17th French 
Corps advancing from the direction of Humbauville- 
Vitry line struck the 19th Saxons Corps. 4 

The French advance was preceded by an artillery 
duel, in which German heavy guns posted on the 
heights north of Vitry endeavored to crush the 
French 75’s on the opposite slope. 

The 12th and Colonial Corps, heavily attacked, 
held the line pretty well although the Germans tried 
to break through the front of the Colonial Corps. 
As a result, the Germans succeeded in getting across 
the Ornain. 

The V German and III French Armies 

The Crown Prince’s attack had for its objective 
Revigny and Bar-le-Duc. Orders were issued on 
the afternoon of September 5th for the attack at 
dawn and at that time the German troops moved 
forward. The 5th French Corps on the left was 
driven back since the line in this section had been 
weakened by the withdrawal of the 4th Corps which 
had been sent to assist Maunoury and the British. 
The 15th Corps was to arrive next day to take its 
place, coming from Nancy, the fighting there having 
virtually ended with the grand attack on this same 
day. Further to the right, the 6th French Corps 


4 10 kilometers S. W. of Vitry. 



Battle of the Ourcq 135 

endeavored to carry out its attack, but was unable 
to gain ground, but the 72d Division from Verdun 
did meet with some success. 

On the east side of the Meuse, one Division of 
the 5th German Corps, 33d Division and a Bavarian 
Brigade, began an attack on the barrier forts 
namely Troyon and Les Paroches near St. Mihiel. 
The 5th Corps had at its disposal heavy field Howit¬ 
zers and Austrian Mortars but was short of am¬ 
munition. 

Summary of the 6th of September 

The picture of the situation at nightfall is as 
follows: 

On the Ourcq, von Kluck with about 3 Infantry 
Divisions was being enveloped by Maunoury with 
about 7!/2 Divisions. 

The 2d and 4th German Corps were being with¬ 
drawn while the British and left of the V French 
Army, were cautiously pushing forward into the 
gap being held up by the von der Marwitz, Cavalry 
Corps and Infantry Rear Guards. (Marwitz had 
4 jager battalions with him as an integral part of 
the corps.) 

In front, von Bulow had succeeded in driving 
back the left of Foch’s Army and was well on the 
way toward driving back Foch’s right but the 
center held. Von Bulow had 7% Divisions while 
against him all along the line were 15 French divi¬ 
sions. 


136 The Marne Miracle 

Von Hausen was driving southeast towards 
Troyes in compliance with orders and had gotten 
across the main road. The main direction of Wurt- 
temburg (IV Army) was towards Vitry while the 
Crown Prince was attacking towards Revigny. 

Wurttemburg was throwing his weight towards 
his left, helping the Crown Prince, instead of to¬ 
wards the right to help von Hausen where he could 
have done the most good. The weak point in the 
French line was between Foch’s right and the left 
of Langle de Cary, yet apparently Wurttemburg 
did not appreciate it. He had committed the same 
error on the Meuse earlier in the operation. 

Under the German GHQ orders of September 
5th, the function of the IV and V Armies, and part 
of the III, was to exert pressure towards the south¬ 
east, in order to help the VI and VII Armies over 
the Upper Moselle. Naturally the Germans’ mass 
should have been thrown in a direction to make 
this possible, but instead of this the IV and V 
Armies made frontal attacks all along the line. In 
the Woevre, it was possible to have seized the Bar¬ 
rier Forts and thereby to have cut off Verdun, had 
sufficient artillery been made available. This force 
attacking Forts Troyon and Les Parodies was not 
active, and apparently expected the attacks of the IV 
and V Armies, across the Meuse, to facilitate their 
advance, instead of figuring that their attack might 
facilitate the advance of the IV and V Armies, the 
main forces. Meanwhile the VI and VII Armies 


Battle of the Ourcq 137 

were attacking vigorously against Nancy, and the 
grand assault was made on this very day, but pres¬ 
sure elsewhere was not so strong that the French 
were forced to materially weaken their Nancy force. 
Of all the days when the IV and V German Armies 
should have been most active, the 6th of September 
was the day. If there ever was a time when German 
GHQ should have taken charge and co-ordinated the 
efforts of the armies , it ivas on September 6th. 

September 7th 

For September 7th, the greater part of the II and 
the III German Armies were to unite in a desperate 
effort to crush Foch and turn him back from con¬ 
nection with the army of Langle, and von Kluck, 
with the remainder of his army, was to envelop 
Maunoury, while the British and V French Armies 
were to be held off by cavalry and small infantry 
forces. 

From what had happened on September 6th, and 
the stiffening of the German line, Maunoury real¬ 
ized that the Germans were aware of their predica¬ 
ment and were sending in reinforcements, and that 
if he wished to reap the greatest benefit from his 
surprise, he must act promptly and vigorously. 
Accordingly, the army was set in motion at dawn, 
and at first made considerable progress, but it soon 
became apparent that to secure a decision would be 
difficult. The German 2d Corps, that had recrossed 
the Marne on the evening before, continued the 


138 


The Marne Miracle 


movement of the 4th Division towards Etavigny and 
the 3d by Varreddes (south of Lizy) to the relief 
of the 4th Reserve Corps. During the day of Sep¬ 
tember 6th, the 4th Corps was also withdrawn 
across the Marne, and at 10:30 p. m. was ordered to 
move to a position to attack across the line Rozoy- 
en-Multien-Trocy. “Thus, on the morning of the 7th 
of September, the 2d Corps, the 4th Reserve Corps 
(still without its Brussels Brigade), and the 4th 
Corps stood between the Therouane and the Gregog- 
nel (tributary of the Ourcq on east bank), with 
their units rather intermingled, with the 4th Cavalry 
Division immediately to the north of them.” 5 

Meanwhile the left wing of the VI French Army 
was attacking the right of the 4th Reserve Corps, 
and by four o’clock in the afternoon had gained 
possession of a hill immediately west of Etavigny 
(between May and Bregy). Contemporaneously 
with this success, the 61st Reserve Division ap¬ 
peared on the French left at Villiers-St. Genest 
(about 3 ks. southwest of Betz), together with the 
1st French Cavalry Corps. This attack of the 
French was met by the German 2d and 4th Corps, 
which had attacked also, pivoting on its left, at 
12:15 p. m. 6 

6 “The March on Paris, 1914,” von Kluck, p. 123. 

• Toward noon on the 7th of September, for the better 
functioning of the troops fighting on the Ourcq, the I Ger¬ 
man Army was divided into three groups; the Northern 
Group commanded by General Sixt von Arnim, the Central 
Group commanded by General von Gronau, and the South¬ 
ern Group commanded by General von Trossel. 



Battle of the Ourcq 139 

The activity of the French VI Army had alarmed 
von Kluck so much that at 11:15 a. m. he sent von 
Bulow the following message: “Assistance of 3d 
and 9th Corps on Ourcq is urgently required; enemy 
considerably reinforced. Send corps in direction 
La Ferte Milon and Crouy.” 7 

Pursuant to von Kluck’s request, the 3d and 9th 
Corps were released and started for the crossings 
of the Ourcq designated in the telegram, with orders 
to be in position to support the corps on the Ourcq 
by daylight on the morning of September 8th. On 
the morning of September 7th a battalion of the 
infantry brigade of the 4th Reserve Corps and a 
battalion of the 2d Grenadier Regiment arrived at 
Villers Cotterets, and were attached to the 4th 
German Corps. 

With this withdrawal of the 3d and 9th Corps, 
the right of von Bulow was exposed, but to meet it 
he had drawn back the 10th Reserve Corps and had 
echeloned the 7th Corps (less 14th Infantry Divi¬ 
sion) in its rear. 

The 9th German Corps at first was ordered to the 
Dollau Creek, so that by bending back the right of 
the II Army to Montmirail the connection could be 
kept up. By late in the afternoon, as the menace to 
von Kluck’s right became more and more threaten¬ 
ing, the 9th Corps was ordered to the right of the I 
Army. The question may quite properly be asked 


T “The March on Paris, 1914/’ von Kluck, p. 122. 



140 


The Marne Miracle 


why von Kluck, when he found the menace to his 
right so great, did not withdraw across the Ourcq 
and assume the defensive—he would have closed the 
gap between his left and the right of von Bulow 
into which Sir John French was slowly moving. 

The British Army 

Meanwhile the British Army was advancing 
slowly, notwithstanding the urgent appeals of Joffre 
and Gallieni for haste. Sir John French asked for 
and obtained the 8th French Division to protect his 
left flank—this division came by rail from Sarrail 
on September 6th and was originally intended for 
the left of Maunoury, where the balance of the 4th 
Corps, to which it belonged, had gone. 

The German cavalry and jagers fought a very 
effective delaying action, so much so that by night 
they were holding the northern bank of the Grand 
Morin. 

The V French Army 

As the 3d and 9th Corps withdrew across the 
Marne, the pressure was felt to relax, especially in 
front of the left of the V Army, so that the advance 
of the 18th and 3d Corps became really a pursuit. 
They were able to advance to the line La Ferte- 
Gaucher-Trefols (east, not shown on map), a gain 
of about six miles. At about noon, Foch, who was 
being violently attacked, asked for assistance from 
the V Army. The 10th Corps, which was on the 


Battle of the Ourcq 141 

right of the V Army, was ordered to bear off towards 
its right to afford the assistance required, while the 
1st Corps conformed. By night the main body of the 
10th Corps was about Charleville in touch with the 
left of the IX Army. The day had been quite suc¬ 
cessful for the V French Army. 

The IX French Army 

Early in the morning, the Germans attacked all 
along the line and, east of the St. Gond marshes, 
heavy artillery came into action, replied to in kind 
by the French. The 11th Corps on the right held 
its ground; the 9th Corps in the center, protected 
by the marshes, maintained itself without difficulty, 
but on the left the 42d and Moorish Divisions were 
hard put to hold off the attacks of the Germans' 10th 
Corps. Due to the timely assistance of the 10th 
Corps from the V French Army, they (the left of 
Foch’s Army) were able to hold their ground. 

The IV French Army 

This was a critical day for the IV Army. The 
left held its ground due to the timely arrival of local 
reserves. The center held against violent attacks, 
but the right was driven back and by night the 2d 
Corps (right of the IV Army) was outflanked by 
the continued efforts of two German Corps and the 
attackers were in possession of Sermaize, danger¬ 
ously threatening the connection between the III 
and IV French Armies. This near break through 


142 The Marne Miracle 

was at the junction point of the two French armies 
and in the vicinity of the place from which the 4th 
Corps had been withdrawn to go to aid of Mauno- 
ury. 

The III French Army 

This day witnessed merely more or less desultory 
fighting between this army and the army of the Ger¬ 
many Crown Prince. Had the latter been as active 
as the IV Army, the III French Army might have 
been cut off. 

Summary of the 7th of September 

The German situation at nightfall looked good for 
decisive results on the morrow. 

Von Kluck was in position to threaten Maunoury 
with envelopment. 

The German Cavalry had held back the British 
and V French Armies who had the Petit Morin and 
the partially bridgeless Marne to cross before they 
could become dangerous; the right of the IX French 
Army was in danger; the right of the IV French 
Army had been pierced; troops were advancing 
from Metz toward Fort Troyon in Sarrail’s rear, 
and Maubeuge had fallen during the course of the 
day, thereby releasing the investing troops, but 
what is more, enabling the Germans to reopen the 
railroads passing through that point and their sup¬ 
ply system to resume its functioning normally. 

This situation probably explains the two Ger- 


Battle of the Ourcq 143 

man proclamations that were found dated the eve¬ 
ning of September 7th, stating among other things, 
“Everything depends on the results of tomorrow.” 

Lieutenant General Tulff signed one at Vitry-le- 
Francois worded as follows: “7 September, 10 
hours, 30. The object of our long and arduous 
marches has been achieved. The principal French 
troops have been forced to accept battle after hav¬ 
ing been continuously forced back. The great de¬ 
cision is undoubtedly at hand. Tomorrow then all 
the German forces as well as all our army corps, 
will be engaged on the front from Paris to Verdun. 
To save the welfare and honor of Germany, I ex¬ 
pect every officer and man, notwithstanding the 
hard and heroic fight of the last few days, to do his 
duty unswervingly and to his last breath. Every¬ 
thing depends on the results of tomorrow.” 8 The 
above order was issued by the Corps Commander 
of the 8th Corps and a copy of a similar order was 
found among the effects of the commander of the 
7th Corps. The interesting point is that this order, 
issued on September 7th, referring to tomorrow 
must mean September 8th as the critical day. By 
the night of September 7th, von Kluck was out of 
the pocket and enveloping Maunoury and the situ¬ 
ation was not unfavorable to the Germans, so to 
them the decisive day was September 8th. 

8 Histoire de la Guerre, 1914-1915, Cornet, p. 208, and 
Nelson's History of the War, Vol. 2, p. 158. 



144 


The Marne Miracle 


The Battle on the German Right 

SEPTEMBER 8TH 

The deployment of the VI French Army at this 
time was about as follows: The approximate line 
was Betz-Etavigny-Pusieux-Marcilly-Chambry (line 
due south from Betz; except Betz and Etavigny, 
towns not shown on the map), and thence to the 
south. The left flank held by the 61st Reserve Divi¬ 
sion and the 1st Cavalry Corps was refused. The 
7th Corps held the center from about Etavigny to 
Marcilly, while the 45th Division continued the line 
south, and the 55th and 56th Reserve Divisions and 
the Moorish Brigade were on the extreme right. 

The Germans were holding their positions un¬ 
shaken. The 3d and 9th Corps were advancing to 
reinforce the right, the artillery with covering 
cavalry in advance; the 3rd Corps with the 6th In¬ 
fantry Division towards the right on Antilly (near 
Betz) via Mareuil, the 5th Division farther south, 
while the 9th Corps was moving via La Ferte around 
to the north to complete the envelopment. Troops 
were approaching from the north and on September 
8th had only 18 kilometers to go to be in position 
to strike the rear of Maunoury through Baron. 

Lepel’s 43d Reserve Brigade of the 4th Reserve 
Corps (The Brussels Brigade) arrived at Berberie 
on the evening of September 8th being followed by 
the 10th Landwehr Brigade; two lines of communi- 


Battle of the Ourcq 145 

cation battalions arrived at Villers Cotterets and 
part of the investing troops from Maubeuge. 

It is clear that the numerical superiority of 
Maunoury was gone or about to be gone. Never¬ 
theless he resumed the attack. His plan was to 
attack with the 45th Division from the line Barcy- 
Marcilly (just north of Meaux) towards Etrepilly 
and Varreddes (in the direction of Lizy) with the 
view of holding as many Germans in the neighbor¬ 
hood of Meaux, thereby facilitating the attack of 
the French left wing, namely the 61st Division and 
Cavalry Corps who were endeavoring to envelop the 
German right. The task of the 7th French Corps 
was to hold the line between the two flank move¬ 
ments at all costs. 

The Germans attacked mostly against the 7th 
French Corps and the fighting between Etavigny 
and Marcilly was almost as severe as any on record. 
In addition, the Germans heavily attacked the 
French left at Etavigny and le Bas Bouillancy (near 
Etavigny) and occupied Thury-en-Valois (near Betz) 
and Betz. At Acy-en-Multien the struggle went on 
all day with extreme violence, and by evening the 
Germans were still holding the village itself, while 
the French were in occupation of a little triangular 
wood which commanded the entrance to the village 
and was full of corpses of both sides. The pressure 
on the left was so great that the 7th Division of the 
4th French Corps had to be shoved into the line 


146 The Marne Miracle 

between the 61st Division and the 7th Corps. The 

i • 

1st Cavalry did not do much on this day apparently. 

By the evening of September 8th, the VI French 
Army was brought to a standstill and, with the 
troops available at the conclusion of the fighting, the 
Germans decided “on the morrow upon the envelop¬ 
ing attack of General von Quast with the 9th Corps, 
the 6th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Divisions, from 
the wooded country north of Curvergnon (located 
northwest of Betz a short distance). The infantry 
brigade of von Lepel was to press forward from 
Berberie towards Baron, west of Nanteuil, and the 
group of General Sixt von Arnim—the 16th Infan- 
. try Brigade, and the 7th and 4th Infantry Divi¬ 
sions—would, if he thought fit, cooperate by taking 
the offensive. The strength of this wing of attack 
was therefore five and a half infantry divisions and 
the 4th Cavalry Division, in addition to Lepers 
infantry brigade.” 9 

EVENING OF THE 8TH 

By the close of the day, Maunoury was “no longer 
fighting for victory but only to prevent his own de¬ 
feat.” Even the official French Press Report made 
the following admission: “On the evening of Sep¬ 
tember 8th, it became clear that our movements to¬ 
wards the east had failed. Instead of turning the 
German right wing, Maunoury was obliged to take 
care not to be enveloped himself.” 


9 “The March on Paris, 1914,” von Kluck, pp. 133-134. 



Battle of the Ourcq 147 

“On the evening of September 8th, the 5th Cav¬ 
alry Division (French) made a surprise attack from 
Villers Cotterets upon the flying field of the I Army 
near Le Ferte Milon, just as the Command of the I 
Army was returning from the battle front. Officers 
and chauffeurs seized their carbines. The advance 
guard of the 17th Infantry Division, coming up, 
soon put an end to the nocturnal phantom. The 
liaison of the I Army with the rear remained undis¬ 
turbed, however.” 

With the I Army, it would seem that another day 
would bring victory and it is an actual fact that 
Maunoury on the night of September 8th contem¬ 
plated retiring to the Monthyon-St. Souplets-Le 
Plessis-Belleville Line (N. W. & S. E. through Dam- 
martin) . It is understood that the order was issued 
during the next day but its execution was cancelled 
when the Aviators reported von Kluck marching off. 
The French were also out of artillery ammunition. 

The British Army 

The direction of advance of the British Army was 
towards Nogent-F Artaud as a preliminary to a 
further movement towards Chateau-Thierry. 10 The 
advance led across the Petit Morin between La 
Ferte-sous-Jouarre and Sablonnieres (a short dis¬ 
tance up stream from La Tretoire). The German 

10 The British axis of advance laid down in Joffre’s orig¬ 
inal order was east but subsequent events caused it to be 
changed to the north. 



148 The Marne Miracle 

cavalry, supported by infantry and some heavy ar¬ 
tillery, made quite a determined stand on the river. 
The German Guard Rifles, attached to the Guard 
Cavalry, entrenched themselves at Orly (on the 
Petit Morin, S. W. La Ferte) and remained until 
nearly the whole force was captured. The 2d Divi¬ 
sion of the 1st Corps on the right struck consider¬ 
able opposition, but the 3d Corps on the left, as¬ 
sisted by some French guns and British howitzers, 
attacked on the line Signy-Signets (West of La 
Ferte)-La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 

This attack was successful and all that prevented 
the 3d Corps from crossing the river was the 
destruction of the bridges. By evening the Brit¬ 
ish had made good the Petit Morin and were on the 
line west and south of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre along 
the general line of the main road to Montmirail as 
far as Viels Maison (north of the Petit Morin, N. W. 
of Montmirail). 

The V French Army and II German Army 

The right wing of the II German Army refused, 
as it was, had a very quiet day. It consisted of the 
13th Division under von Einem and the 10th Re¬ 
serve Corps. The French V Army had been ordered 
to secure the line of the Petit Morin east and west 
of Montmirail. No difficulty was experienced un¬ 
til the river was reached when the Germans showed 
every evidence of stubbornly disputing the cross¬ 
ing. However, after dark the Germans withdrew 


Battle of the Ourcq 149 

and the French moved in. The 3d French Corps 
at this point had a bitter fight of from seven to 
eight hours while the 18th French Corps farther 
west had an easier time and got across the river 
near Le Celle (west of Montmirail) and by night 
was north of the river on the line through Marchais 
(west of Montmirail). 

The 18th Corps forced the passage at La Celle 
and by night was on the line of Marchais (west of 
Montmirail north of the river). The 3d Corps 
encountered more difficulty at Montmirail for the 
Germans had many guns in action. On the right 
the 1st Corps reached Vauchamps, east of Mont¬ 
mirail. The 10th Corps on the extreme right in 
supporting the IX Army crossed the river north 
of Charleville and were facing east and threaten¬ 
ing von Billow’s right. The V Army now held Mont¬ 
mirail and considerable distance east and west. 
Von Bulow’s P. C. was at Montmort. 

The IX French Army 

The German Guard and other select troops were 
massed opposite the center of the line between Sez¬ 
anne and Fere Champenoise in the region of the St. 
Gond marshes, with the object of turning back 
Foch’s left. You will recall that von Bulow was 
to pass through Montmirail and his general direc¬ 
tion was towards Marigny (S. E.), so this would 
throw him against the left of the IX Army—as a 
matter of fact the right of Foch’s Army was the 


150 The Marne Miracle 

one that came nearest being turned. The 42d and 
Moorish Divisions clung desperately to the out¬ 
skirts of the Mondemont heights and plateau over¬ 
looking the marshes. The 10th Corps and right 
wing of the Guard Corps attacked again and again 
but the French hung on, replying to each thrust 
by a counter-stroke. “It is related how, when at a 
critical moment a subordinate commander reported 
that his troops were so worn out as to be incapable 
of further efforts, General Foch replied merely with 
a curt order to attack at once.” This spirit of re¬ 
fusing to acknowledge defeat resulted in the 42d 
Division and the 10th French Corps, not only re¬ 
pulsing the German attacks, but actually gaining 
ground. The 9th Corps, covered by the marshes, 
still held their southern edge, but further to the 
right the 11th Corps was in difficulty. 

Attacked by the left wing of the 2d Guard Divi¬ 
sion and the 32JD (Jager Division) and 2d (RD) 
Reserve Division of von Hausen's III Army, the 
corps was driven back to the line Corroy-Gourgan- 
con, about 12 kilometers. Foch had to move his 
P. C. back from Pleurs to Plancy on the Aube. 
The 11th Corps halted behind the stream, La 
Maurienne, where, reinforced by a reserve division, 
it checked and drove back the attackers. On the 
right of the 9th Cavalry Division, operating on the 
French maneuver field of Mailly, had maintained 
touch with the IV Army and supported an attack 
by the latter on Sompuis. The night of September 


Battle of the Ourcq 151 

8th looked pretty dark for the IX Army and seemed 
like the prelude to a disaster. 

The Two IV Armies 

The 2d French Corps was attacked heavily near 
Sermaize by two German corps who tried to open 
up the breach already made the day before and, 
turning to the right, to roll up the 2d Corps while 
another German Corps held it in front. The timely 
arrival of a brigade of the 15th Corps from Alsace 
enabled the 2d Corps to maintain itself. A little 
later Hausen's 19th Saxon Corps hit the French 
17th Corps, which gave way a little after fierce 
fighting. It was encouraged to hold on by news of 
the arrival of the 21st Corps from the Vosges. By 
the evening of this date the 18th and 43d Divisions 
of this corps were concentrated a few miles south 
of Sompuis and Dampierre (near Sompuis, not 

shown on map), respectively. 

% 

The III French Army and V German Army 

The 15th Corps was filling in the gap between 
the III and IV Armies while the 5th Corps gained 
some ground towards Liamont (N. E. of Revigny), 
but elsewhere Sarrail was strictly on the defensive. 
However, a new danger was looming up—the Ger¬ 
man forces reported in the Woevre were opening 
up with artillery on Fort Troyon. If these troops 
were successful, Verdun would be cut off and the 
III Army turned. Luckily troops were now arriv- 


152 The Marne Miracle 

ing from the Nancy battlefield and the 73rd Divi¬ 
sion, with the 2nd Cavalry Division and Reservists 
of the 15th Corps, covered Sarrail’s rear. 

Summary of the 8th of September 

The night of the eighth, brought both armies face 
to face with the possibility of victory or defeat. 
Von Kluck was out of difficulty and threatening 
Maunoury with envelopment; Sir John French’s 
left had crossed the Marne but the special infantry 
detachment of von Lochow was holding him on the 
river; there was a gap (filled with cavalry and in¬ 
fantry detachments) of about 35 kilometers be¬ 
tween the left of von Kluck and right of von Bulow; 
von Bulow’s right was drawn back but his left was 
successful and the right of Foch had been forced 
back so that the latter’s front was facing east; the 
17th French Corps on the left of Cary had been 
forced back slightly but the 21st Corps from Alsace 
was coming up; the right of Cary and left of Sarrail 
had been driven asunder but the 15th Corps was 
coming up from Alsace; and the German 5th Corps’ 
attack on Troyon and the Meuse Heights forts was 
being threatened in flank by troops coming up from 
Toul, being released from the II Army. 

Take it all in all, it is believed that the chances 
for victory on the morrow were about equal. 


The Decisive Day 

September 9th 1 —I German Army 

The Assault Wing under von Quast advanced 
with its right wing from the woods of Crepy with 
an enveloping attack towards Nanteuil. At the same 
time, the 43rd Reserve Infantry Brigade pushed 
south on Nanteuil via Baron and the 10th Landwehr 
towards Crepy. The advance continued until about 
two p. m. against the weak resistance of the enemy. 
The front west of the Ourcq held, but unfavorable 
reports from von Bulow about the falling back of 
his Independent Cavalry Corps No. 2 and the with¬ 
drawal of his right caused von Kluck to order a de¬ 
fensive flank by his left Group from Crouy to 
Coulombs, west of Chateau-Thierry. This force 
(5th Infantry Division) together with the von 
Krawel detachment from the 9th Corps enabled von 
der Marwitz with Independent Cavalry Corps No. 2, 
to effectively stop the British. The withdrawal of 
the I Army's left, west of the Ourcq, was unfor¬ 
tunate as it was misunderstood by the troops as 
being an involuntary retreat. It seems that at that 
time von Krawel and von der Marwitz were holding 
back the British effectively. 

Meanwhile, the von Quast Assault Group had ar¬ 
rived at Villers St. Genest (just southwest of Betz) 


1 See Sketch No. 5. 


153 



154 


The Marne Miracle 


while the Lepel Brigade was attacking towards 
Nanteuil. 

This was the condition in the I Army at noon on 
September 9th, about the time von Hentsch 
appeared at its Headquarters at Mareuil. 

Before von Kluck was a jumbled together mass of 
approximately six Infantry and four Cavalry Divi¬ 
sions. It has been pretty well established that the 
order for the withdrawal of the Maunoury Army 
had been issued by Joffre and was only annulled 
when it was discovered that the Germans were with¬ 
drawing. That the French were in retreat, there 
can be no doubt for numerous eye witnesses to what 
was transpiring within their lines confirm it. The 
following is a typical statement: “I opened fire with 
a success which had never been attained before on 
great masses of the French, who were streaming 
backwards. All was in confusion there. Many men 
were left lying on the ground. The masses streamed 
hastily back to Fresny le Lust, I observed the scene 
looking down from a high heap of straw and was 
actually intoxicated with the victory. Then I heard 
of an order to the Infantry that the pursuit was 
not to be continued any further.” 

A French Colonel who participated in this part 
of the battle confirms the above report and a Swiss 
Observer, in addition to confirming the statement 
that the French contemplated retiring and had 
actually issued the order, stated further that the 


The Decisive Day 155 

French supply of artillery ammunition had become 
exhausted. 

We may conclude, consequently, that at the time 
Lieutenant Colonel von Hentsch, GHQ representa¬ 
tive arrived, that there was nothing in the situation 
of the I Army calling for a retirement. 

Von Bulow’s II Army 

The movements in the II Army on the 9th of 
September are the direct reflection of the mental 
attitude of its commander. The withdrawal of the 
3d and 9th Corps by von Kluck and the resulting 
gap created were having a bad effect upon von 
Bulow and he was becoming very much depressed. 
It must be borne in mind that von Bulow’s knowl¬ 
edge of how troops should be handled was learned 
from the handling of them at Imperial Maneuvers. 
Von Bulow was the “Master of Imperial Maneu- 
vers.” He was not familiar with battlefield condi¬ 
tions so that when a gap was unquestionably made 
between his right and von Kluck’s left he came 
under the influence of maneuver rulings which 
would have called for a withdrawal. 

There was nothing in the situation of the II 
Army calling for action of this kind and had von 
Bulow been in communication with the commanders 
of the armies on his flank he might have learned 
this (he had no wire communication with von Kluck 
at all, everything was radio). It does not appear 
that von Bulow visited neighboring headquarters to 


156 


The Marne Miracle 


talk matters over nor did other commanders visit 
him. This was not confined to von Bulow alone 
for the IV Army was out of communication with 
the III Army at a time when the two Headquarters 
were two miles apart and there was no interchange 
of personal liaison. 

Von Bulow on the evening of the 7th, radioed 
GHQ that his army had only a battle force of 
three corps left. During the day of September 8th, 
he remained at his advance report center at 
Fromentiers (south of Montmort). “The far from 
pretty pictures behind the front after a battle last¬ 
ing three days oppressed the spirits of the gray¬ 
haired instructor of the Army in the strictest old 
Prussian discipline. 2 The brief wireless messages 
annoyed him. Everything was going well on his 
left and the French were being driven back in con¬ 
fusion so that von Lauenstein, Chief of Staff for 
von Bulow, sent word to von Einem commanding 
the right wing to be prepared to attack and that 
von Bulow in person would be in Sezanne in the 
evening. When von Einem protested against the 
attack, von Bulow again became depressed and can¬ 
celled the order so far as the right was concerned. 
This is the mental attitude of von Bulow as he re¬ 
turned to his Headquarters at Montmort and met 
von Hentsch, emissary of G.H.Q. 

Favorable accounts were coming in of the work 


1 Baumgarten-Crusius. 



The Decisive Day 157 

of the 14th Division and 10th Reserve Corps on the 
right of the center who were advancing, and of the 
Guard which was attacking from the east. The 
French retired in rout and the villages of Monde- 
ment and Allemont fell into German hands. The 
attack of the left wing, in conjunction with the von 
Kirchback Group of the III Army (right group of 
III Army) was progressing famously and was driv¬ 
ing the French before it. 

However, just about this time in came a report 
from von Einem to the effect that he was giving 
up Montmirail and the line of the Dollau, and was 
withdrawing to the line of the Conde-Montmirail 
railroad (railroad running north from Montmirail). 
And then, when aviators reported the advance of 
five hostile columns toward the Marne between Le 
Ferte and Chateau-Thierry, the question of retire¬ 
ment was finally decided. 

When von Hentsch arrived at von Bulow’s Head¬ 
quarters on the evening of September 8th, he sent 
the following wireless to GHQ: “Situation on the 
right of II Army serious but not hopeless.” 

Von Bulow’s mind was made up, and, after a 
sleepless night, in conference with von Lauenstein 
on the morning of September 9th, he decided to 
order the retirement. He sent word to the I Army 
of his action by wireless at 11:45 a. m.; to the III 
Army at 2:45 p. m., after he had already ordered 
the right group of the III Army to withdraw at 1 
o'clock. What von Bulow’s authority was for issu- 


/ 


158 


The Marne Miracle 


ing orders to a part of von Hausen’s army without 
consulting the latter is not clear. It makes no dif¬ 
ference what instructions von Hentsch had received 
from GHQ in so far as the II Army was concerned, 
von Bulow ordered the retirement himself, as his 
mind had been made up before von Hentsch arrived. 
Why von Bulow ordered his right to retire before he 
did his left, is not clear, since such action had the 
tendency to further widen the gap between the I 
and II German Armies. 

The Left of the II and Right of the III German 

Armies 

Army Headquarters No. 3 ordered a continuation 
of the attack in the morning. When Lieutenant 
Colonel von Hentsch passed through he reported to 
GHQ: “Position and point of view of the III 
Army entirely favorable.” The Right Group, under 
von Kirchback, attacked to the southwest, assisting 
the 2d Guard Division of the II Army. The direc¬ 
tion of the attack was towards the Heights south¬ 
west of Gourgancon, and the attack progressed well, 
the French being driven out and retiring in rout, 
leaving many prisoners behind. An urgent appeal 
came at about 11 a. m. from the II Army for help, 
so the right wing, III Army, turned farther to the 
west. Meanwhile the center of the III Army (23d 
Reserve Division) took Mailly in the morning, and 
by noon had taken the Heights south of Mailly, 
while the French were retreating towards Salon. 


The Decisive Day 


159 


The left wing had a harder time, the 23d Jager Divi¬ 
sion attacking towards Sompuis and the 19th Corps 
toward Courdemanges, southwest of Vitry. 

The French artillery greatly annoyed the attack¬ 
ers all day, but at nightfall the Germans had been 
able to establish themselves on their objectives. 

By nightfall the situation on the right of Foch 
was so bad that it is understood that Joffre had 
already issued the order for Foch to retire when 
just in time word came to the French GHQ that 
von Kluck was retiring. During all this time, while 
everything was going badly with the IX French 
Army, Foch was optimistic to a superlative degree. 
At the time when the III German Army's center 
was passing into Salon and right was moving into 
Connantre, Foch is supposed to have sent a telegram 
to Joffre couched in the following words: 

“My center is giving way. My right wing is 
yielding. Situation brilliant. I attack in the 
morning.” 

This was the superlative of optimism which could 
only be justified if success followed. John Pope, of 
the Federal Army, was equally as optimistic, but 
failure followed his messages to Halleck, and he 
was ridiculed on account of them forever afterwards. 

The situation in Foch’s IX Army at this time was 
about as follows: The 10th Corps from the V Army 
relieved the 42d Division, which was exhausted— 
the latter moved in reserve at Linthes (on road half 
way between Sezanne and Fere Champenoise). 


160 The Marne Miracle 

The Morocco Division and 9th Corps swung the 
line to the south, passing just west of Connantre; 
the line was then continued east, south of the Mau- 
rienne, by the 11th Corps as far as Salon; from 
thence on, by the 18th Division, formerly Foch's 
Army reserve which arrived from Lorraine on the 
7th, towards the east where it connected with the 
9th Cavalry Division. 

At about 4 p. m. Foch decided to throw in the 
42d Division again. It was ordered to break through 
at Fere Champenoise, but made little progress that 
night. This attack by the 42d Division is made to 
appear in many French accounts as the reason for 
the German withdrawal. As a matter of fact, the 
German order for withdrawal was issued three 
hours before the 42d Division started, and the 
retreat was well under way before the advance of 
the 42d began to be felt. 

The Two IV Armies 

During the day the 19th (Saxon) Corps continued 
in action south of Sompuis, but without the same 
success as the troops to the west. Joffre had ordered 
Cary to counter attack by his left wing, so the latter 
moved a division each from the Colonial and 2d 
Corps across to the west of the Marne for this 
purpose. 

The attack was made vigorously by the French, 
but was effectively checked by the Saxons. 

In the centre and on the left of the IV German. 


The Decisive Day 161 

Army the day was spent in preparing for an attack 
by the 8th Corps next morning, September 10th. 

The III French Army 

Sarrail’s attitude was one of watchful waiting, 
except on his left flank, where the recently arrived 
15th Corps attacked toward evening and succeeded 
in advancing. The Germans made a few attacks, 
but they were not characterized by any particular 
vigor and were easily beaten off. 

Summary 

On the Ourcq the crisis had passed, and von Kluck 
was in retreat; and von Bulow’s II Army was also 
withdrawing. True von Hausen had driven back 
Foch’s right and the armies in the Woevre were 
bombarding Fort Troyon, but the scales had now 
tipped to the side of the Allies. 














































The von Hentsch Incident 

This campaign, like Balaklava, had its Nolan, but 
in this case the officer’s name is von Hentsch. Lieu¬ 
tenant Colonel von Hentsch was the intelligence 
officer of the German Supreme Headquarters, and 
was sent out on the 8th of September with certain 
instructions from von Moltke. These instructions 
were verbal, and considerable doubt has arisen as to 
exactly what they were. The question at issue is 
this: Was Colonel von Hentsch to order a with¬ 
drawal in the name of Supreme Headquarters if the 
situation as it appeared to him seemed to warrant it, 
or was he merely to co-ordinate the retirement, had 
that retirement already begun? German writers are 
divided on the subject of what these instructions 
were. As both principals are dead, probably the 
question will never be answered satisfactorily to all. 

Now, what was von Moltke’s mental attitude that 
caused him to send out von Hentsch and why was 
von Hentsch and not someone else of higher rank 
sent? 

Von Hentsch was in charge of the Intelligence 
Division and had been along the front before, in 
particular on September 5th, when he brought the 
order to von Kluck that called attention to the threat 
from Paris. 

Von Moltke was completely out of touch with the 
situation on the right and knew that since the 31st 


163 


164 


The Marne Miracle 


of August the French were reinforcing their west 
wing. 

Von Kluck and von Bulow had both been calling 
for help, and doubtless von Hentsch had reported 
his observation when he got back from his trip of 
September 5th. 

What was more natural than that the officer so 
recently from the battle front should again go to 
report the situation. He knew the route and dis¬ 
tribution. The fact that a suboridnate staff officer 
was sent indicates that the function to be performed 
was a staff function and not one of command, for 
otherwise a higher ranking officer would have 
been sent. Sometime after the event, Colonel von 
Hentsch, then in Roumania, requested a court of 
inquiry to investigate the case. This court was 
known as the von Hindenburg-von Ludendorf Inves¬ 
tigation, and it found the following: “Colonel von 
Hentsch, at that time Lieutenant Colonel and Chief 
of Division on the Staff of the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Field Army, received orally from the 
Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army on 
September 8th, 1914, at General Headquarters a 
commission to go to the V to I Armies and to shed 
light on the situation. 1 II In case retreating move¬ 
ments had already been begun on the right wing of 
the army, he (von Hentsch) was instructed to direct 

1 At this time von Moltke was out of touch with the I and 

II Armies except by wireless which took about 12 hours to 
get through. 



The von Hentsch Incident 165 

those in such a way that the gap between the I and 
II Armies would be closed again, with the I Army in 
the direction of Soissons, if possible.” The question 
that is most discussed at present is whether or not 
von Hentsch exceeded his authority in ordering the 
withdrawal of the I Army. 

The von Hindenburg-von Ludendorff report con¬ 
tinued : “Lieutenant Colonel von Hentsch was 
thereby to give binding instructions in the name of 
General Headquarters in the above contingency. 
On September 8, 1914, he went to Army Headquar¬ 
ters Nos. 5, 4 and 3, and passed the night of Sep¬ 
tember 8-9, 1914, at Army Headquarters No. 2. 
The command of the II Army decided independently 
on the morning of September 9, 1914, to retreat 
behind the Marne, Lieutenant Colonel von Hentsch 
agreed to this view and then went on further to 
the I Army. There, after discussing the situation 
with the Chief of the General Staff, he gave the 
order to retreat on the afternoon of September 9, 
1914, in the name of General Headquarters and in - 
virtue of the authority invested in him. He was 
justified in doing this, since the contingency had 
come which had been foreseen in the instructions 
given him (the beginning of retreat movements).” 
“Whether the decision of the command of the II 
Army and the order to retreat given by Lieutenant 
Colonel von Hentsch to the command of the I Army 
was really necessary, in view of the situation, must 
be decided in later years by research connected with 


166 


The Marne Miracle 


the history of the war, etc. . . . By direction 

(signed) Ludendorff.” 

With regard to the I Army, von Hentsch gave the 
order to von Kuhl, the chief of staff, outlining the 
new line on von Kuhl’s map. Von Kuhl states in his 
account that he, Kuhl, then went to see von Kluck 
for conference, and that von Kluck, with heavy 
heart, complied with the order. Von Hentsch did not 
depart until after von Kuhl had returned from this 
conference. There seems to be nothing in the story 
that von Hentsch gave the order to von Kuhl, chief 
of staff, ignoring the commander, for apparently 
von Kluck had time to see von Hentsch in person if 
he so desired. Von Dommes later gave the order 
for the withdrawal of the V Army to von Knobels- 
dorff, chief of staff for the Imperial Crown Prince, 
without seeing the latter, which shows that von 
Hentsch’s action was not unusual. 

The whole incident appears about as follows: 

Von Moltke was out of touch with the army, the 
right wing in particular, and he knew of the French 
troop movements in the west, and that his own army 
was exhausted. Von Hentsch had just returned 
from his trip to the Assault Wing Armies, so, at 
the usual morning General Staff Conference at 
GHQ, at Luxemburg, it was decided to have von 
Hentsch go back again and look into the situation 
and report, but that if a rearward movement had 
been started on the right, he was to co-ordinate it 
so that the gap between the I and II Armies would 


The von Hentsch Incident 167 

be closed. Acting thereon, von Hentsch went to 
the V, IV and III Armies and found the situation 
favorable, and so reported, but upon arriving on 
the evening of the 8th at the headquarters of the 
II Army, at Montmort, he found von Bulow and 
von Lauenstein, his chief of staff, very much “down 
in the mouth” and depressed by the situation. 

Von Bulow had determined that the situation 
called for a withdrawal, and von Hentsch, being 
rather pessimistic about a favorable outcome any¬ 
way, did not disagree. It must be borne in mind 
that von Bulow was a field marshal with a reputation 
for great ability and von Hentsch was a lieutenant 
colonel. The decision having been made by von 
Bulow, all there was left for von Hentsch to do was 
to co-ordinate the withdrawal of the I Army so as 
to close the gap. The decision having been made, 
von Hentsch proceeded to Mareuil via Rheims, 
Fismes, Fere en Tardenois. His trip took all morn¬ 
ing, and he encountered great confusion. Trains and 
transports were withdrawing, and wounded were 
streaming to the rear. At Brumetz, south of Le 
Fere, von Hentsch was forced to turn about, on 
account of the report of the proximity of British 
cavalry. With this condition before him, and know¬ 
ing that the II Army was withdrawing, it is small 
wonder that von Hentsch thought that all there was 
left for him to do in so far as the I Army was con¬ 
cerned was issue the order for withdrawal, so as 
to close the gap. He claims he met von Kuhl, chief 


168 


The Marne Miracle 


of staff for von Kluck, in the village street and the 
latter exclaimed: ‘‘Yes, if the II Army retreats, we 
can not remain here either/’ As you will recall, 
the II Army had radioed its retreat decision over 
to von Kluck at about 11:45 a. m. and von Hentsch 
didn’t arrive until between noon and 1:00 p. m. 
Von Kuhl claims that everything was going all right, 
and that there was no occasion for retreating. It 
may be that everything was all right west of the 
Ourcq, where von Quast was enveloping the left of 
the French VI Army, but east of the Ourcq, the 
territory through which von Hentsch traveled was 
a scene of confusion. With the issue of these two 
orders, the retrograde movement began and the 
Marne Miracle had been performed. 

Summary 

The situation at the time the order to retreat was 
given by von Bulow was about as follows: 

German line from right to left: 

Von Quast was enveloping the left of Maunoury. 

Von der Marwitz, Krawel and the 5th Division 
were holding back the British on the Crouy-Colom- 
bes line—British across the Marne. 

A 35-kilometer gap existed between the left of 
von Kluck and right of von Bulow, but was filled 
as indicated above. 

Von Bulow’s right was resting along the Mont- 
mirial-Conde Railroad, facing west, and was not 
hard pressed. 


The von Hentsch Incident 169 

Von Bulow’s center and left were driving back 
the IX French Army; the left had advanced about 
25 kilometers. 

The center of the III Army was successful while 
its right was driving back the IX French Army’s 
right. 

Left of the III Army was successful, but was 
held up by the left of IV French Army south of 
Sompuis. 

The V Army was holding its own, and attacks 
in the Woevre were gathering success, but were 
being threatened from the south by French troops 
from Nancy. 

French, left to right: 

Maunoury’s left was turned, and the retreat 
order had been issued. 

The British and the left of V French Army were 
across the Marne, and were threatening the left of 
von Kluck’s Army with envelopment. 

The right of the V Army was facing east, and 
was supporting the left of Foch’s Army, which had 
been driven back all along the line with general front 
northeast; and Joffre had penned the order for its 
withdrawal. 

The left of Cary’s IV Army was holding up the 
attacks towards the south through Sompuis, and 
reinforcements were coming in at that point from 
Alsace. 

Sarrail’s III Army was waiting for an attack 


170 


The Marne Miracle 


against its center, but was counting on the arrival 
of the 15th corps from the II Army. 

The troops released from Nancy were advancing 
north along the Woevre and were threatening the 
left flank of the 5th German Corps, attacking the 
forts on the Woevre Heights. 

Corollary 

The consensus of opinion among the German com¬ 
manders seems to be that the retreat was premature 
and that the various actions, had they been allowed 
to continue to a conclusion, would have turned out 
well in the end, and the Battle of the Marne would 
have been a German triumph. 


The Retreat 


The I German Army withdrew without much 
difficulty, the right wing of the fighting force north 
through Crepy, the center to the northwest of the 
Ourcq, while the left retired across the river, then 
fell back northward behind its east and west course. 
Von der Marwitz and the Krawel Brigade covered 
the withdrawal, but were not pushed. By the night 
of September 10th the I Army was on the line 
Crepy-La Ferte Milon,—the Upper Ourcq. It then 
fell back and crossed the Aisne west of Soissons. 
The British and left of the V French Army, on Sep¬ 
tember 10th, pushed forward to Fere en Tardenois 
and advance groups threatened the road to Soissons, 
but were held in check by the 5th German Division. 
The pursuit, for the purpose of overtaking the Ger¬ 
mans, was not vigorously executed in so far as the 
British were concerned. At 3:55 p. m., on Septem¬ 
ber 10th, the command of the I Army was subordi¬ 
nated a second time to that of the II Army. The 
II Army, with its trains in the lead, retired at first 
behind the Marne and then behind the Vesle. The 
13th Division of the 7th Corps protected the cross¬ 
ing of the Marne, and was the only force attacked 
with any degree of vigor. 

The III Army received the order for retreat with 
amazement. It had driven back the French over 
20 kilometers and nothing had transpired in its 


171 


172 The Marne Miracle 

front to warrant such a movement. The order to 
the left wing was received at 7:00 p. m., but later 
was revoked in so far as the 19th Corps was con¬ 
cerned, and the latter was directed to be ready to 
support the daylight attack next morning, Septem¬ 
ber 10th, by the 8th Corps, IV Army. On the right 
of the III Army, von Kirchback delayed obeying the 
order from von Bulow until late in the afternoon, 
and not until it was confirmed. He began withdraw¬ 
ing at 4:30 p. m. The withdrawal of the 32d Divi¬ 
sion on the right of the von Kirchback group was 
made imperative by the withdrawal of the 2d 
Guards under von Plettenberg. 

At 10 p. m., September 9th, the III Army received 
wireless orders from GHQ that it was to remain 
south of Chalons and support the attack of the V 
Army, in which the IV Army was to participate. 

On September 10th the German attack was made, 
with considerable success, but French reinforce¬ 
ments coming up, the attack was checked, the Ger¬ 
mans dropping back on the defensive and stopping 
the French. 

On the night of September 10th word was received 
of the withdrawal of the II Army back of the Vesle, 
so orders were sent to the III Army directing it to 
cross the Marne and take position back of the Vesle 
to the left of the II Army. 

The IV Army withdrew on the morning of Sep¬ 
tember 11th. Neither the III nor IV Armies were 
very vigorously pursued by the French. The V 


The Retreat 


173 


Army carried out partial attacks on its front while 
its 5th Corps, in the Woevre, continued its advance. 
Finally, on September 12th, pursuant to orders 
brought by Colonel von Dommes, the V Army with¬ 
drew, not being pursued at all. As early as Sep¬ 
tember 8th, Joffre had issued orders for the aban¬ 
donment of Verdun, which Sarrail ignored, being 
finally rewarded by the withdrawal of the V German 
Army to the north of the St. Menehould-Argonne 
line. Had the Crown Prince continued his attacks 
with vigor on September 10th or 11th, there is no 
question but what Verdun would have been cut off 
and a junction been formed by the V German Army 
and its 5th Corps attacking Fort Troyon and the 
other forts in the vicinity. 




Conclusion and Final Comments 

It must have been apparent as the reader followed 
the movements in the text wherein the greatest 
weakness of the German Army lay. It was with 
the High Command. Von Moltke attempted to 
handle not only the operations on all fronts in gen¬ 
eral, but those on the West Front in detail. To 
have done the latter, it would have been necessary 
that he establish himself at some point where he 
could keep in close touch and feel the pulse of the 
Western Army, and direct its action. 

The following is one of the most glaring illustra¬ 
tions of defective command. Von Moltke, in his 
orders, repeatedly refers to the main movement as 
“through Belgium and Luxemburg into France/' 
and then, at the most critical time, withdraws two 
corps from that flank and starts them to the East 
Front and withdraws other corps from the same 
flank later. His entire attitude shows that he either 
did not know or did not appreciate the efficacy of 
that Napoleonic doctrine of singleness of lines of 
operation, which is nothing more than stating in 
other words “one should do but one thing at a time." 
If his main movement was through Belgium and 
Luxemburg, why didn't he back it to the limit? 

Von Ludendorff says in an article in “The Army 
Quarterly" for October, 1921: “If he had not sent 
the Guard Reserve Corps and the 11th Corps to 

175 


176 


The Marne Miracle 


East Prussia, all would have gone well. If he wished 
to send something, he should have taken the corps 
from the left wing.” 

Thus again, “Leadership.” 

However, there are two angles from which to 
view this weakening of the right wing. Von Moltke 
may have considered it of lesser importance than 
the left wing and yet again he may have estimated, 
after the receipt of von Bulow’s very optimistic 
message reporting the enemy’s flight after the cap¬ 
ture of the Sambre Line, that the right wing had 
finished its task and consequently could spare the 
troops better than the left wing. As one reads and 
studies this campaign from the German viewpoint, 
one must be impressed with the fact that the trouble 
was vacillation in high command as a result of lack 
of information, that in turn being the result of poor 
liaison. 

The Supreme Command did not keep in touch with 
the various armies, due to the defects of radio and 
telegraph; but the failure of these agencies cannot 
be held solely responsible, for had the Post of Com¬ 
mand gone where von Bernhardi says it should go— 
“Near the point where the decision is to be secured” 
—defective liaison would not have mattered so much. 
Von Moltke, although nominally Chief of the Great 
General Staff, was, in fact, the Commander of the 
Army, for nearly all German writers agree that the 
Kaiser did not interfere very much but, metaphori¬ 
cally speaking, signing on the dotted line. It is too 


Conclusion 


177 


much to say that von Moltke was to blame for the 
defeat, for no one man was. The defeat was the 
result of the German system which made it almost 
impossible for a man with a mind of his own to rise 
very high in the estimation of the Kaiser. We might 
well consider what would have happened had von 
Ludendorff been in command on the West Front, 
with von Hindenburg on the East Front and the 
Supreme Command at some central point co-ordi¬ 
nating the efforts on these two Fronts. Added to 
this, had some strong character, such as von Mac- 
kensen, been in command of Armies I, II, and III as 
a group, with von Eichorn in command of the IV 
and V Armies, and another strong character in 
command of the VI and VII Armies; doubtless the 
story of the Marne campaign would have been 
different. 

The Germans were followers of the doctrine of 
the elder von Moltke of concentration on the battle¬ 
field. This form of concentration had been carried 
out successfully by the elder von Moltke at Konig- 
gratz and subsequent to that time it had been the 
studied thought of the German Army. Von der 
Goltz, in his “Conduct of War,” points out the great 
weakness of this form of a concentration. He says 
in substance that it should not be attempted unless 
one has good troops, competent leaders who will act 
promptly and in harmony with the ideas of the 
Supreme Commander. The great danger is that the 
subordinate commanders will get out of touch with 


178 The Marne Miracle 

the Supreme Command and act in a manner that 
will defeat the main object. The elder von Moltke 
brought about a ‘“Cannae” with this form of a con¬ 
centration at Koniggratz, but it will be recalled 
that even then he had to hasten from Berlin to the 
army of Prince Frederick Charles, emerging from 
Saxony, that was about to withdraw, not being able 
to establish touch with the army of the Crown 
Prince. With a concentration such as will result in 
a “Cannae,” the Supreme Command must keep in 
touch with the various columns and direct their 
efforts toward the common objective. This purpose 
cannot be accomplished by allowing these various 
commanders to arrange it themselves, as was done 
on the Sambre. 

The Germans evolved a plan for this war which 
was vitally defective, in that it attempted to 
regulate the movements after the initial con¬ 
tact with the enemy. As it appears, the German 
General Staff had war-gamed this plan so often and 
had studied it so much that it thought that all that 
was necessary was to start the ball rolling and the 
machine would function automatically. In this the 
General Staff was doomed to disappointment, and 
the German Army like all highly developed machines 
when once out of order was very difficult to repair. 

The German Army was greatly handicapped by 
lack of railroads in the invaded territory. The rail 
movements of the concentration of the German 
Army were completed on the 16th of August and 


Conclusion 


179 


worked without the slightest hitch. Subsequent to 
that time, however, due to the very effective demoli¬ 
tion by both the Belgian and the French, railroad 
transportation became very difficult, and south of 
the Sambre River nearly all transportation had to 
be motor or animal drawn until the fall of Maubeuge 
on the 7th of September, and the repair of the 
railroad bridge at Namur. The German system of 
handling trains known as the system of deflection, 
failed badly. This system provides for a group of 
highly trained railroad experts to be stationed at 
various points to head off trains by telegraph and 
shunt them to points where needed. The great 
defect is that should a train get past the point to 
which the telegram is sent it is apt to cause great 
confusion before it can be headed off. The French 
system, on the other hand, worked to perfection. 
Their system provides for the establishing of regu¬ 
lating stations well to the rear to which both troops 
and supplies can be sent, to be transshipped to the 
point where most needed. The regulating station is 
nothing more than a railroad yard with a competent 
group of men to operate it. As the Army retired, 
regulating stations were selected farther and 
farther to the rear and were not interfered with 
by the enemy. It is not too much to say that the 
railroads contributed as much to the winning of 
the Battle of the Marne as any other one thing. 

A representative of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
who happened to be in France at the time of mob- 


180 


The Marne Miracle 


ilization, said that there was a complete absence of 
confusion and had it not been for the sight of sol¬ 
diers in uniform one would not have known that a 
mobilization and concentration was going on. 

The following are some of the specific reasons 
for failure that developed during the course of the 
campaign; and while this list is quite extensive, it 
is believed that the causes given therein would not 
have been sufficient to have wrecked the campaign 
had the Army been properly commanded. We might 
say they merely magnified the consequences of 
defeat. 

Failure to organize the Assault Wing into a Group 
and to place a competent commander over it. 

Placing of von Kluck’s Army under command of 
von Bulow, Commander-in-Chief of the II Army at 
the eleventh hour, thereby making the I Army in 
reality a right flank guard of the II Army. 

Withdrawal of the Guard Reserve Corps and 11th 
Corps from the Assault Wing after Namur and 
attempting to send them to the Russian front. (Rail 
transport was not available at Aix-la-Chapelle for 
four days.) If von Moltke was determined to send 
two corps from the right wing why didn’t he sub¬ 
stitute the 9th Reserve Corps that was coming in 
from Schleswig-Holstein in place of either the 
Guard Reserve Corps or the 11th Corps? 

Withdrawal of the V Corps to Diedenhofen for 
service on the East front thereby weakening the V 
Army at a critical time. (The V Corps consumed 


Conclusion 


181 


five days going to, remaining at, and returning from 
Diedenhofen.) 

Permitting the III Army to be turned from its 
strategical march direct southwest, on August 24th, 
to the west in order to support the tactical attack 
of the left wing of the II Army. 

Failure to permanently attack Independent Cav¬ 
alry Corps No. 2 to the I Army and keeping it so 
attached. 

Subordinating the I Army to the Command of 
the II Army, and ordering the II and III Armies 
to establish liaison for the first battles on the 
Sambre, instead of directing their actions from 
G.H.Q. 

Improper use of cavalry—(a) Needless attack by 
Independent Cavalry Corps No. 2 on the Belgian 
Army on the Gette. (b) Needless attack of Inde¬ 
pendent Cavalry Corps No. 1 on Dinant. (c) After 
having assigned Independent Cavalry Corps No. 1 
to the task of covering the front of the II and III 
Armies and, after the aviators had reported the gap 
between the left of the IV and the right of the V 
French Armies, ordering this cavalry around to the 
north of Namur, thereby keeping it out of action 
at a critical time, (d) Sending Independent Cav¬ 
alry Corps No. 2 on a bootless reconnaissance to 
locate the British and failing to release it to the I 
Army in time for it to get back and participate in 
the Battles of Mons and Le Cateau in a fresh condi¬ 
tion. 


182 


The Marne Miracle 


Failure to call a day of rest on the Aisne River. 

G.H.Q. remaining too far away from the front 
of main issue and not keeping up effective liaison. 

Failure to switch the VII Army from the left to 
the right flank promptly enough to assist in the 
decisive battle of the Assault Wing. 

Failure to assign 9th Army Corps to von Kluck 
at the outset. 

Failure to make provisions for replacing the 
losses, which should have been anticipated as a re¬ 
sult of forced marches and repeated engagements. 
It is said that the German units arrived on the 
Marne with only about 50 per cent of their original 
strength. 

The use of first line troops to assist in the invest¬ 
ment of fortresses instead of using second line 
troops for that purpose. 

Failure to provide for the grouping of armies 
before D day and H hour, so that the efforts within 
respective wings could be coordinated. 

Failure of the ammunition supply. 

Failure to utilize the services of the navy to pre¬ 
vent the arrival of the British Expeditionary 
Forces. 

Defective radio and wire systems. 

After the disappearance of the French troops at 
Amiens, not showing more concern about their 
whereabouts nor echeloning against their possible 
reappearance to the west. 

Failure of von Kluck to properly evaluate the 


Conclusion 


183 


importance of the following extract in the General 
Headquarters Order, “the protection of the flank 
of the Armies.” 

The custom in the Germany Army of a Chief of 
Staff being jointly responsible with the Commander, 
thereby creating a double headed authority. Had 
it not been for this fact, it is to be gravely doubted 
whether General of Infantry von Kuhl, Chief of 
Staff of the I Army, would have accepted the orders 
of von Hentsch without first consulting with von 
Kluck. Or would the Chief of Staff of the V Army 
have accepted Colonel von Dommes’s order to re¬ 
treat without consulting his Commander in Chief, 
the Crown Prince. 

Failure to mobilize the Landstrum earlier than 
the latter part of August. 

Superiority of the French 75-mm. field gun over 
the German field gun. 

Principles of War 

The Principle of Cooperation was misapplied by 
von Moltke—he attempted to get cooperation by 
leaving the various commanders alone. In their 
attempt to cooperate on several occasions, they 
forgot their missions. Cooperation can never 
replace unity of command. 

Von Moltke violated the Principle of the Objec¬ 
tive most flagrantly. He decided that the Allied 
Army on the West Front was the main objective, 
and then at a critical moment detached three corps 


184 


The Marne Miracle 


and a cavalry division for service on the East front. 

In applying the Principle of the Objective insofar 
as it obtained to the Western Army, von Moltke 
did not pick out one particular point as the decisive 
one throwing his mass in that direction. He 
changed from time to time as the situation de¬ 
veloped, first throwing his centre of gravity to the 
left and then to the right and keeping the process 
up. 

He violated the Principle of Economy of Force 
by taking the three corps away from the Assault 
Wing. Also he left superior forces on his left to 
be contained by inferior French troops instead of 
shipping them around to the right where their 
superiority could be felt. 

The Independent Cavalry Corps No. 1 covering 
the front of the III Army was withdrawn from its 
position on the Meuse and dispatched around to 
the north of Namur to enter the line in front of 
the II Army in violation of the above principle. 
While this corps may not have been in the best 
place, the withdrawing of it kept it out of the 
critical part of the fighting on the Sambre and 
Meuse. 

Von Moltke violated the Principle of Mass in 
not keeping a Mass Maneuver in rear of his ma¬ 
neuver wing, the right or at least replacements. It 
had been contemplated in the von Schlieffen Plan to 
have the six Ersatz Divisions (17 Brigades) in rear 
of the right. Von Moltke had them in rear of the 


Conclusion 


185 


left and when they were sent to the right, it was 
too late. Von Moltke’s reason for not having a 
stronger right was his fear in regard to supply. 

Cavalry 

With reference to the German Cavalry, it is be¬ 
lieved that it was not used to the best advantage. 
Its screening functions up until August 18th were 
admirably performed. Its strategic functions were 
not so well executed. The tactical battle on the 
Gette and at Dinant caused losses without com¬ 
pensating advantages. 

The German Cavalry does not seem to have ad¬ 
vanced much since 1870 in battle tactics if one is 
to judge from its actions in the preliminary com¬ 
bats. Possibly in its mind it had before it the 
picture of von Bredow’s Brigade charging at Vion- 
ville, on August 16th, 1870, and thought that the 
wild charge against infantry was still its major 
battlefield function. 

Wild charges make a fine theme for the poet, the 
painter and the sculptors but as a method of tac¬ 
tical movement against unbroken infantry on the 
modern battlefield they are about as effective as 
would be the mass of flags and unearthly howls of 
the Ancient Oriental. Year after year at the Ger¬ 
man Imperial Maneuvers, whole divisions and corps 
of cavalry made most imposing mass attacks in a 
spectacular manner before the eyes of their admir¬ 
ing Emperor and apparently von der Marwitz and 


186 


The Marne Miracle 


von Richthofen got the idea that that was the 
correct way for cavalry to function. 

At all events one gets that impression if one 
studies the cavalry attacks at Haelen, Dinant, La 
Garde, and other places where the first cavalry 
fighting occurred. 

It would have been better to have massed the 
cavalry in a large body, after deducting the neces¬ 
sary tactical groups, and then to have held that 
mass in rear of the right wing to be thrown for¬ 
ward as soon as the general advance had started. 
A force of this kind could have cut the Belgians 
off from Antwerp, if that was desired, and could 
have sought out the British and located the flank 
of the Allied Army. 

Organizationally it was wrong to make Cavalry 
Corps No. 2, independent of von Kluck and then, 
at the last moment, to place it under the command 
of von Kluck. This cavalry corps should have kept 
in touch with the flank of von Kluck’s Army, and 
should have voluntarily closed in on the flank 
of his army as soon as contact with the main Brit¬ 
ish forces was established. The attack of Inde¬ 
pendent Cavalry Corps No. 1, against Dinant was 
without purpose, for the aviators had already made 
maps showing the continuous line south as far as 
Givet. These aviators had also located the gap be¬ 
tween the right of the French V Army and left of 
the French IV Army into which gap this cavalry 
corps might have been sent had it not been ordered 


Conclusion 


187 


to the north of the Sambre to swing around and 
get in front of the II Army. It has been suggested 
that the whole cavalry force might have been used 
on the East Front from the outset to make a strong 
demonstration towards Warsaw with a view of 
holding up the Russians and then have been quickly 
switched to the West Front in time for the advance 
which did not begin until August 18th. It is diffi¬ 
cult to understand how the Independent Cavalry 
Corps was surprised by infantry north of Amiens 
if it was paying any attention to its security. 

The action of von der Marwitz’s 2d Cavalry 
Corps in holding back the British Army south of 
the Marne was as fine a piece of covering action 
and rear-guard work as history records. His action 
shows the wonderful screening and delaying prop¬ 
erties of the machine gun and modern rifle; he had 
two cavalry divisions and five Jager Battalions. 
This cavalry held Sir John French south of the 
Marne for three days and after crossing the river, 
being reenforced by the 5th Division and the Krawel 
Brigade, could probably have stopped the British 
further advance. 

The French cavalry reconnaissance work was 
most defective. Sordet’s did not discover anything 
on his reconnaissance towards Liege nor to the 
east from Dinant although German Armies were 
concentrating not far away. 

Sordet did assist the British after Le Cateau 
but before that time his corps was too badly blown 


188 


The Marne Miracle 


and fatigued according to the statement of Sordet, 
to be of any assistance. 1 

On the battlefield the French cavalry did not play 
a very important part although it had ample op¬ 
portunity. It is true that the 5th Division did get 
around in rear of von Kluck from the north but 
was easily driven off. 

It seems that the British cavalry division 
fully justied itself if any mounted men ever did. It 
did not hesitate to sacrifice itself on all occasions, 
and to it may be paid the most lasting tribute for 
its efficiency, self-sacrifice and daring. 

Aviation 

Aviation, particularly on the German side, seemed 
to have played its part particularly well in recon¬ 
naissance, but it is not clear that the information 
so received was always acted upon. 

German aviators located the gap in the French 
line toward Givet before mentioned and dropped 
maps, but apparently no particular attention was 
paid to it. One piece of information obtained by 
the German aviators was in regard to the advance 
of the five columns between the right of von Bulow 
and left of von Kluck—this information cinched 
von Bulow’s determination to fall back. 

1 A French Cavalry officer who was with Sordet’s Corps 
said to the author: “I was with Sordet during these days— 
the horses were dead from exhaustion. The odor when 
marching at the rear of the column was worse than any 
battlefield. The horses were rotting to pieces.” 



Conclusion 


189 


The French aviators reported the withdrawal of 
von Kluck and von Bulow, and it is strange that a 
vigorous pursuit was not pressed, unless it was that 
the French army itself was used up. 

The Germans used their Zeppelins, but without 
much success, as a result of the fact that they did 
not seem to know their appropriate tactical use. 
“They had three of these ships—the Z-VI was badly 
damaged over Liege and had to put back to Boon, 
where it was dismantled; Z-VIII was used in pur¬ 
suit of the French through the Vosges, but was 
badly damaged by hostile fire, so much so that it 
came down and was temporarily in the hands of the 
enemy; Z-IX, after bombing some of the Channel 
ports, had to put back and over Brussels came near 
being brought down as a result of engine trouble. 
It finally reached its home port, Dusseldorf, where 
it fell a victim to a British aviator.” 

Artillery 

In one thing in particular the French outclassed 
the Germans, and that was in field artillery. The 
French 75 mm. was far better than the German gun. 
The maximum range of the French gun was 6,800 
meters as opposed to 5,600 of the Germans. And 
the accuracy of the French gun at the maximum 
range of the German gun was five times greater. 
The effect in depth of the French shrapnel was 
greater. The explosive charge of the French shell 
produced greater effect. The German heavies bal- 


190 The Marne Miracle 

anced this disparity whenever used. But the skillful 
use of the French 75s had more to do with defeating 
the Germans than anything else. The French 75s 
would open up unexpectedly from a woods or other 
cover, causing the Germans to deploy, when they 
would withdraw to repeat the performance again 
and again. The army of von Hausen was held up 
wholly or in part on about seventy different occa¬ 
sions by demonstrations of this kind. It may be 
summed up as follows: “The superior German 
infantry could not accomplish its task on account 
of the lack of artillery support and the inferior 
French infantry was saved from collapse by the 
artillery.” 3 

Infantry 

Too much cannot be said about the German 
infantry. It performed prodigies in marching. It 
suffered terrific losses, particularly among the 
officers. 

The total losses during the campaign was three- 
fifths of the initial strength. 

Enough has been said already about the command 
of the respective armies. 

Even though the French Plan 17 provided for an 
offensive, it does seem as if Joffre, in the back of his 
head, knew full well that he would have to and 
should assume the defensive. Michel, his predeces¬ 
sor, had favored a defensive and had gotten his 


3 Baumgarten-Crusius. 



Conclusion 


191 


conge, so Joffre, in order to retain his position, had 
to meet the demand of the younger element for the 
offensive a l’outrance. After the failures in Lor¬ 
raine, he quickly recovered himself and then carried 
into execution the move that Michel had sacrificed 
his official head by suggesting. As a proof that the 
Allies were about as badly exhausted by their vic¬ 
tory as the Germans were by their defeat, one need 
but refer to their failure to vigorously pursue. The 

V and IX Armies pushed themselves forward, the 
left of the V Army the more vigorously. The other 
armies seemed too dazed to follow. Joffre seemed 
to handle the situation tactically quite well, but it 
is not understood why he didn’t make Maunoury’s 

VI Army stronger, even at the expense of the V 
Army, and why he did not delay the advance until 
the VI Army was thoroughly assembled. 

The question so often asked is, why did Germany 
fail? After forty-four years of preparation, it 
would seem if there were anything in preparedness 
Germany should have won hands down. We find 
our answer in the words, “Germany thought she was 
prepared, but really was not.” The following are a 
few items indicating her unpreparedness: No pro¬ 
vision had been made for ammunition supply, 
though demands for it had been made by the General 
Staff; the French 75 mm. gun was better than the 
German gun and this was known by the Govern¬ 
ment, yet no attempts had been made to perfect a 
better German field gun; from 1909 to 1913 three 


192 


The Marne Miracle 


new corps had been asked for, but nothing was done, 
the General Staff being told, time after time, that if 
they “insist on such demands, we are on the verge 
of national bankruptcy or a revolution;” contrary 
to the generally accepted idea, only about 50 per 
cent of Germany’s population was trained. 

We have in all this an illustration of the violation 
of the Principle of Mass from the superiority view¬ 
point. If we rely upon superiority, then that superi¬ 
ority must be real, not imaginary. 

We must expect war, and when it comes we should 
find ourselves in such a condition as to bring about 
a successful conclusion in as short a time as possible; 
and this can only be accomplished by viewing our 
military condition every day exactly as it is; looking 
facts squarely in the face; and not attempting to 
make ourselves believe we are strong where we are 
weak. Germany did not do this. No one was 
allowed to investigate; no one was allowed to 
remark, write, or point out defects contrary to the 
wishes of the All Highest and which might shock 
his vanity. 

Viewed in the retrospect, what must be the feel¬ 
ings of the various German commanders when they 
realize that the campaign might have been won. 4 
Much of the bitterness is taken out of defeat when 

4 “Only little by little did French and English reports call 
our attention to the fact that at that time the German Army 
was standing on the threshold of a great success, but did not 
find the key to open the door of victory.”—Von Francois. 



Conclusion 


193 


it is realized that all was done that could have been 
done, but when the bitterness of that defeat is ag¬ 
gravated by the thoughts and realization of lost 
opportunities, the conscience with difficulty finds 
relief. 

“The moving finger writes, and having writ 
moves on; 

Nor all your piety nor wit 
Can lure it back to cancel half a line; 

Nor all your tears wash out a word of it.” 

The outcome of this campaign seems to have been 
influenced by inexorable fate. It was a miracle on 
one side and a tragedy on the other. And what must 
Wilhelm II think as he ruminates in his exile on past 
events and grows to a consciousness of the fact that 
had he been less egotistical and arrogant, and had 
he invited, yes, welcomed suggestions and advice, 
he might today still be one of the leading, if not the 
leading, figure in the political world; but all his 
glory is gone, such is the ephemeral nature of fame. 

Sic transit gloria mundi. 


A Few Good Books 

That should be included in every military library 

American Campaigns— Steele Set, $10.00 

Prepared originally for students at Army Service Schools 
for their course in Military History. The one book, 2 
volumes (text and maps) that contains the military activi¬ 
ties of the nation up to and including the Spanish-Amer- 
ican War. Handsomely bound. 

Mass Physical Training— Raycroft $5.00 

Approved by the War Plans Division General Staff. “Con¬ 
tents forms the basis for the training and instruction of 
the military service of the United States in Physical 
Training.” Extract from foreword by Major-General 
Haan, chief of War Plans Division. Profusely illustrated. 
Chapters on the tactics of baseball, football, and basket¬ 
ball that are the best that have ever been produced. 

Thirty-Minute Talks— Stewart-Waldron $2.50 

A collection of twenty every-day talks on military sub¬ 
jects in langauge that the man new to the service can 
understand. These talks will serve to keep you in touch 
with the “Military Game”—they will save you a lot of 
time “brushing up” when called upon for a talk on a 
military subject. 

Employment of Machine Guns— Short $3.50 

The first comprehensive study of American machine gun 
tactics as developed in the World War. The only machine 
gunners’ text-book based on the present tables of or¬ 
ganization. Shows the machine gunner how he must sup¬ 
port the rifleman. Illustrated with fine maps. 

Army Regulations (Up-to-Date) $3.00 

Contains the pamphlets of the New Army Regulations and 
all the paragraphs of the old Army Regulations, cor¬ 
rected up to date, that are of interest to the individual 
officer or the administration of the unit with which he 
is on duty. 

A complete index makes all of this material readily avail¬ 
able when you need it. Cloth bound, 600 pages. Sold 
with our ironclad guarantee of satisfaction. 

Defense of Duffer’s Drift— Swinton .50 

An interesting story of the Boer War that brings out and 
illustrates the principles of minor tactics. 

194 



i 

Battle of Booby’s Bluffs— List .75 

A companion book to “The Defense of Duffer’s Drift.” 
Deals with the operations of a Battalion of Infantry in 
combat. Interesting and instructive. Endorsed by many 
of the leading officers of the Army. 

Terrain Exercises— Waldron $2.50 

The book that sets forth in detail the up-to-date method 
of training in Infantry minor tactics. Model problems 
prepared that may be fitted to any terrain that may be 
available. The discussions, explanations and solutions 
bring out the principles of minor tactics. Will save many 
hours of preparation in the conduct of terrain exercises. 

Reserve Officers’ Examiner $2.00 

Complete text of the five subjects included in the basic 
examination of officers for promotion—Administration, 
Military Law, Military Courtesy and Customs of the 
Service, Field Service Regulations, Military Hygiene. 
Based on S. R. 43. Text arranged in convenient ques¬ 
tion and answer form. 

Scout’s Handbook .60 

The most complete book in print covering the subject. 
Profusely illustrated. Tells you what to do and how to 
do it, in language you can understand. 

Minor Tactics $1.25 

A reprint of the map problems in Minor Tactics that 
have appeared in the Reserve Officers’ Department of the 
Infantry Journal from time to time. These problems 
were prepared at The Infantry School, Camp Benning, Ga., 
and represent the most up-to-date thought on the subjects. 
Paper bound. 

Scouting and Patrolling— Waldron .75 

A little book that tells in language the soldier can under¬ 
stand, how a scout goes about his work as an individual 
and how the operations of a patrol are conducted. En¬ 

dorsed by leading officers of the Army. Revised and 
brought up to date to include the experiences of the 
World War. 

U. S. Infantry Association 

Washington, D. C. 


195 


The Marne Miracle 


By 


Col. W. K. Naylor, G. S. 


Price $1.50 


An American analysis of the Battle of the Marne 
(1914) and the campaign leading up to that de¬ 
cisive conflict. 

Why do the French refer to this campaign as a 
Miracle? Why do the Germans refer to it as a 
tragedy ? 

Was Germany prepared for the World War? 

What were the plans of France for the war with 
Germany—offensive or defensive? 

Did the stand of the Belgians at Liege save France ? 


Who was responsible for the withdrawal of the 
German Armies? 

Why did Germany lose the Battle of the Marne ? 


All of these mooted questions and many more are 
answered. 


U. S. Infantry Association] 

Washington, D. C. 



196 


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